Struggle for statistics
Identities
and politics: the Volga-Ural region during the 2002 Russian Census
By Xavier Le
Torrivellec
Draft :
please do not cite without permission of author
Paper submitted to :
Association for the Study of Nationalities
8th Annual Convention
“I work all night to
ensure the safety of the census taker in charge of the railway station. I don’t
receive any premium but I am happy. Two days ago I had a son. And he arrived in
time to be counted”. These words were not reported by the census taker, A. P.
Chekhov, at the end of the 19th century. They belong to the history
of the first Russian post-Soviet census[1].
The representative of the
Located between the
urban
In the
70s, an ethno-national theory was formed to justify the local rooting of the
bureaucratic elites promoted by L. Brejnev[15]. In 1978, under
the pressure of the clientelist factions of the south, the Tatar language lost
its status as the third official
language in the new Constitution of the
Bashkir ASSR. At the same time, the teaching of Bashkir language was imposed in
all the rural localities of the North-West[16]. Whereas the
dominant practice had consisted in dissociating language and nationality, this
new theory took the Bashkirs of the Ural areas as cultural and linguistic
prototypes of Bashkir “ethnic group” as a whole. As a consequence of this
policy of “Bashkirization”, a significant part of the populations formely
registered in the “Bashkirs” category returned to the ethnonym “Tatars”.
Affirming the “right of the Bashkir people to self-determination”[17] the
declaration of state sovereignty appears as the last step of a long process of state-construction. Bashkortostan
offers the unique case of a national republic in the
This balance has been threatened since 1999. To establish his
new “vertical power”, V. Putin attacked the privileges of the national
republics[22]. Far from
bringing togheter local elites, the way they clutch at the Soviet doctrines of
ethno-federalism is damaging their neighbouring relations. Taken as a pretext
to these tensions between
From administration to memory, the (federal) census as
a (local) object
The State
and nations
Though the census is an instrument of State administrative
management, it is also a pure production of its time. In the Russian case of
2002, the ethnic approach of the territory once again overtakes representation
in terms of citizenship. Three years ago, suppression of the nationality
mention on the Russian passports was refused in
It was only then in the personal dimension of ethnic
membership that the spirit of the liberal times could have an influence.
Everywhere - in the laws, census instructions, press articles and speeches of
the administrative managers etc. - was emphasized the freedom guaranteed to
each individual to answer freely the question about nationality. If the method
of self-declaration had been adopted at the time of the previous censuses, it
used to be explicitly subjugated to a higher truth[26]. For the first
time in October 2002, the State voluntarily stayed in the background, as the
public guarantor of a subjective choice. According to the census takers, the
sentence which they generally had to repeat was this one: “we register what you
say, we no longer need the passport”. The principle of personal liberty has
been used by the Russian legislator as a guide in the elaboration of the
census, to such an extent that the concern for protecting privacy sometimes
seemed to go against collective interest [27].
Among the reasons for this liberalization is obviously the
federal State’s concern in reducing the appeal of intermediate memberships. It
was neither the Russians (russkij), neither the Bashkirs nor the Krjašeny that the
State invited “to be part of the Russian history”[28]. It was the
Russian citizen (rossijskij) that he was
looking for through them: to be counted, not in order to subject themselves,
but to consciously take part in the social change, “the self-organization of
the society”[29]. This liberal
orientation was decisive at every step of the census: in asking the society -
the individuals as well as the groups - to count itself, the State recognized
the separate existence of an autonomous social body. And while remaining the
garantors of the scientificity of the calculation, the ethnologists of the
Local administrations were charged to carry out the census
operation. But in simply « obeying the ministry’s orders » [31], the
Chairman of the republican Committee of Statistics (Goskomstat) found
himself at the same time in narrow dependence towards the Bashkir authorities.
Much like in 1926, the latter had its own word to say [32]. With rare
exceptions[33], no
serious dispute rose in
Actually, each level - federal/local - hoped to benefit from
this statistical achievement, not only in collecting part of the legitimacy
which it would be carrying, but especially in transforming it into an
instrument of their own policy. Our first observation in the field was the
seriousness with which the census was prepared of the census preparation in
Such Union sacrée on the census was inevitably
to lead to overzealousnesses. Necessary as they were to ensure the material
success of the operation, the powerful administrative levers have also allowed
controlling and inhibiting the village populations[43]. But only the
aggressiveness of the national activists could start such a political crisis in
the Volga-Ural area. A declaration of Kh. Išmuratov ignited the spirits of
the Tatars opponents[44]. There
were no more doubts for them that the Bashkir government wanted to ensure the
demographic victory of the eponymous national group.
The census
as object of memory
Before considering the chronology of the events, we should
analyse the nationalist vision of the census. To avoid the emergence of any
alternative points of view, the nationalists have tried to monopolize the
processing of the event. Since they are in favour of a substantialist approach
to the ethnicity and against any idea of dual membership, they only spoke about
stocks and flow of ethnic units. The stake of this struggle for statistics was
political[45]. In a both
traditional and excessively pragmatic way, the political weight was put in
direct connection with the demographic weight[46]. As always, both
intelligentsias - radical and official - shared the tasks. Therefore, the
reciprocal accusations of “genocide”[47] could be based
upon “scientific” arguments.
In addition to this countable reading of the event, the
enemies shared the same respect regarding their past. Indeed, the censuses of
1979 and 1989 were used as landmarks by respectively the Bashkir and Tatar
avant-gardes to convince the undecided populations of the North-West of their
true identity[48]. It had to
be “Bashkir” to find the 73000 Bashkirs “disappeared” between 1979 and 1989[49]; or
definitively “Tatar”, as a logical continuation of the “democratic” census of
1989[50]. The
historiographic efforts aiming to find the “true” history of those which for
“all eternity” were either Bashkirs or Tatars. Mixing practice and theory, the
ideologists involved themselves in this effort to persuade. From January 2002,
many articles published in the Bashkir press looked back on the nomadic origins
of the populations of the Western districts. Starting in the spring of the same
year, the national leaders decided to go and meet the people. They went to the
villages in order to “convert”[51]. They were
driven by their desire to take part in the making of the history. In some way,
they were also convinced of the progress of
autonomy. But rather than individuals, they accompanied the ethnic groups
towards their political autonomy, so they could present themselves as
legitimate spokesmen of these groups.
Through these examples, it appears that the ethno-national
doctrine is also a victim of the shocks of modernity. Since membership is no
longer convincing, the ethnicist speeches have to be adapted to remain
persuasive. Assimilating part of the individualistic values, it became a plea
for the authenticity[52]. The
neo-nationalist apprentices have to take into account the privatization of
memory – a consequence of the disenchantment with history[53]. They become
lawyers of the private memory and demand that each one remember his ethnic
membership. But in doing so, they contradict themselves without realizing.
Actually, if the individual “forgot” his true membership, it means that it does not resemble him any more, and that he doesn't need it
anymore. And as far as the guardians of
Ethnicity are concerned, now they can only travel all over zones of blurred
identities and preach for the return to the era of the memberships. From a
simple struggle for statistics and substances, the nationalist confrontation
has changed to a clash of sermons.
The identities policy : the (Russian) census as a
(Tatar-Bashkir) moment
The
election of the census
Not
only a formatted, criticized and achieved object – the result of a political
decision -, the census was also a particular moment in Russian history. Dealing
with it diachronically should allow us to relativize some observations and to
better understand its internal logics. National Congresses played for instance
a crucial role in the rise of the crisis. August 2002 is thus used as a
dividing line between two periods: the election campaign of the “ethnic
parties” and a phase of exacerbation of the tension between officials.
In
December 2001, the Tatar deputy F.Safiullin spoke during the Douma discussion
of the census bill. He denounced a plot meant to divide the Tatar nation: the
starting point of a press campaign in order to obtain the modification of the
list of nationalities. But the claim for the Tatar unity by the historians of
Qazan always goes with the denunciation of the artificiality of the Bashkir
language and nation[54]. In
February 2002, the ousting by M. Rahimov of a mayor of Tatar nationality raised
a general outcry in the local opposition[55]. A few days
later, A. Giniatullin explained why, among the two most threatening dangers to
the Tatars of Bashkiria, the most serious was not “the divorce of Krjašeny but
the “Bashkirization” of the Tatar people”[56]. His declaration
was approved on
On
Another
innovation was the radicalization of Tatar nationalism in
Census in
event
Far
from these violent disputes, the census proceeded in a routine and peaceful
way. In spite of some administrative limits[68], the district proved to be a
territorial framework perfectly adapted to the needs of the census. As far as the rural populations are concerned, the
warm reception given to the census takers[69] shows the positive
image of the census[70].
The way the federal media covered the event was
severely criticized[71]. The
significant engagement in favour of the operation’s success represented a total
social fact. Experienced as a time of festivities, the census was often
regarded as a privileged moment, an invaluable testimony of the social cohesion[72].
As a moment of
disclosure, the census revealed an underground dimension of the political
links. During the mission, very few villagers were interested in the topicality
of interethnic relations. On the contrary, the
consciences were clear about the stately caracter of the statistical operation.
The sovereign state, which was questioning them, was not Bashkir but rather the
federal state. Particularly perceptible among elderly people – who all their
life had to support an excessive State –, this feeling of citizenship was
extended to several social classes. The State became closer and more attentive
while abandoning the mask of its administrators for the more attractive one of
its census takers[73]. And after
responding to them, most people were proud of the accomplished duty. While
taking part in an officially recognized activity, the individual found himself
as a citizen[74].
Such
enthusiasm was not enough to avoid errors and confusion. To the relative
inexperience of the census takers – most of which recruited among the staff of
local libraries – must be added the complexity of the questionnaire[75]. The instructions for question 9.2
invited them to indicate their mother tongue. Very often, however, either the
question was not asked, or the census taker proposed his own interpretation[76]. The population also made an immoderate use of all
these inaccuracies[77]. Finally,
the data relating to the question of spoken languages hardly seem exploitable.
The
individual in autonomy: (collective) census as (personnal) gesture
The census
of identities
Submitted
to the rigid framework of the census questionnaire, the individual, however,
could act independently. Free in answering, he could fabricate his own
identity. The many cases of families resulting from mixed marriages are
illustrative of this phenomenon[78]. At the
same time, communities took the census as an opportunity to express their
demands for recognition[79]. Old
ethnic representations have gradually been losing their significations at the
expense of new combinations. Without knowing the final results, we already can
say that in
In a
completely significant way, these experiments found a voice to defend them.
Indeed, the ethno-political crisis of the autumn seems to have reinforced some
tendencies toward moderation. The idea that politics is able to overcome ethnic
divisions has been widespread. Even naively formulated, a “postmodern”
perspective of the fusion of the Turkic groups starts to resonate according to
a new social diversity. Endowed with an undeniable capacity of persuasion, this
utopian idea suggests a different future[81].
Such phenomena of fluidity linked with identities can be
appreciated both through the ordinary run of things and through the long
duration of history[82]. In
relation to territorial histories, the krjašen communautarism
appeared in
the search for Krjašeny
More than
dwelling on anti-Tatars calculations that certainly accompanied the reintroduction of Krjašeny
into the list of nationalities[83], it is essential
to think
about the nature and the consequences of such a decision.
On one hand it was
imposed on the Russian government under the pressure of local communities[84] to obtain
cultural rights. Symbolically speaking, it was also a way for the
federal State to correct an injustice, i.e. to reconsider the decision made in
1926 by Stalin to deprive Krjašeny of their status of narod.
Live coverage of this memorial duty [devoir de mémoire] involved
in the mediatic success of these “orthodox Tatars”[85]. But such
“come-back” of History may be explained above all by the commitment of
individual actors in the imaginary space of the Krjašen “culture” : “For
some time, the young people from all parts of the district started to be
interested in their origins, they wanted their nation”[86]. They are no more sensitive to a membership coming from
the outside; their identity has to be the result of their own choice. Convinced
of the legitimacy of her preference, a girl from Bakaly required census
takers to cancel the answer given by her parents. She wanted to be registered
as Krjašen rather than
as Tatar.
On the
other hand, religious motivations are ineffective to explain this
reappropriation: members of a society in rapid secularization, Krjašeny
are not better believers than their Russian or Tatar cousins. On the
contrary, it is the obliteration of the religious dimension of life which may
explain this identity search, this need for meaning. Here is a typical
post-modern phenomenon closely connected with the end of religion[87]. This
process contribute to increase the inadequacy between people and their
immediate social environment. This girl does not know precisely what
distinguishes her from a Tatar. Is it the language, the religion, the history…
or even - according to some people[88] - the character
? In fact, she doesn’t care. That is the reason why Tatars are looking
condescendingly at her. Moving from membership, she leaved the reign of
substances and may not believe in the unicity of the truth anymore.
The
case of Krjašeny is exemplary because it was the coincidence
between a local claim and a federal proposal. By attacking the ethnic grid and
the “primordialistic” approach, the liberal task of the census organizers
caused the radicalization of local national movements. In continuity with
Soviet times, nationalist leaders locally monopolize the political opposition.
Consequently, the ethnic competitions between Bashkirs and Tatars increase the
tensions between the two republics of Volga-Ural region. The establishment of
social pluralism means the gradual elimination of ethno-national doctrines -
after that of the Communism ideology. The shock may be traumatic. But more than
the danger of a nationalist exaggeration and possible conflicts, the principal
danger lies in the absence of political pluralism. If ethnic groups could be
used during thirty years like substitutes for the civil society, the
authoritarianism of M. Rahimov, driving his adversaries to radicality,
repressed the potentialities of local citizens. It could be daring to see
open-mindedness in his recent decision of introducing parliamentarism in
Bashkortostan. In any case it remains that the census played a decisive role of
crystallization. Through this census considered as an object and a peculiar
moment, individual potentialities have had the opportunity to express
themselves. Autumn 2002 will have marked for
Paris
Bibliography
Alain Blum and Martine
Mespoulet , Bureaucratic
anarchy, Statistics and power under Stalin,
Allen J. Franck,
Islamic Historiography and « Bulghar » identity among the Tatars and
Bashkirs of
Dmitry
Gorenburg, « Identity Change in Bashkortostan: Tatars into Bashkirs and Back »,
in. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.
22, 1999.
Dmitry
Gorenburg, Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization
in the
Kate Graney, Projecting Sovereignty: Statehood and Nationness
in Post-Soviet
Islam of Russia, Community
Conscience and political autonomy at Tatars of the Volga and the Ural, since
XVIIIe century, éd. S. A. Dudoignon, D. Is' haqov & R.
Möhämmätshin, Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 1997.
B. H. Juldašbaev , Baškiri I Baškortostan, etnostatistica, [Bashkirs and
Bashkortostan, ethnostatistic],
Xavier Le
Torrivellec, “Entre steppes and stèles, Territoires et
identités au Bachkortostan”,
Terry
Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in
Soviet Union, 1923-1939,
Dawn Elaine Nowacki,
Ethnicity, Nationalism and Political Orientations among Elites in Tatarstan
and Bashkortostan, Ph.D diss.,
M. I. Rodnov, « Čislennost' tjurskogo
krestj'anstva Ufimskoj gubernii v načale XX v. » [Démographie de la
paysannerie türke du gouvernorat d'Oufa au début du XXe
siècle], Etnografičeskoe obozrenie, 6, 1996.
Victor A. Shnirelman,
Who gets the Past ? Competition for ancestors among Non-Russian
Intellectuals in Russia,
Yuri Slezkine, « The USSR
as a Communal Apartment, or how a socialist State promoted ethnic particularism
», Slavic Review, summer 1994, vol. 53-2.
Charles Robert Steinwedel,
Invisible Threads of Empire : State,
Religion, and Ethnicity in Tsarist
Xavier Le Torrivellec
EHESS-Paris
Bashkortostan in Russia
from :
1989 : Percentage of nationalities in Bashkortostan
