Lisa Koriouchkina*
 
 
WAITING FOR THE ENUMERATORS:
a case study of the expectations of and attitudes towards the Census 2002 
among Meskhetian Turks and Cossacks in Krasnodar region
 
"Write your name down in the history of Russia... You, your children and grandchildren need the census..." - these slogans filled the Russian mass media during the second week of October 2002 when the census was taking place. Even though the academic literature agrees that the census is an instrument for a nation-state to categorize and manage its population along the lines of collective identities (Kertzer and Arel 2002) the discourse employed by the Russian state to advertise the upcoming census 2002 targeted individuals: "your name", "your children", "your future". It seemed that participation in the census was a personal matter for every law-abiding citizen. The census was presented as if it was a question to be resolved between a state and an individual subject - no intermediaries were to be involved. However, the overall participation in the census cannot be explained by the behavior of individuals alone. Specifics of the position of a group, as defined by ethnicity, language and/or legal status, vis-Ю-vis other groups, past history as well as present politics, affect the groups overall participation rate as a whole. In the following paper, based on observations conducted during my stay in the Krasnodar region during the week of October 7th though October 16th, I will try to explicate some of the issues pertaining to the question of attitudes towards the census among the members of two ethnic groups, the Meskhetian Turks and the Cossacks. On the basis of this discussion, I will identify some of the factors that affected their rate of participation in the census as well as the contents of the answers given to the census takers. This discussion would allow me to elucidate the meaning that the census holds to the people and to examine the nature of the relationship between the state and its subjects.
 
At first, the focus on the Meskhetian Turks and Cossacks might seem surprising. Nothing can be more different than the situation in which these two groups find themselves in Krasnodar. The Meskhetian Turks, who arrived to the region a little over a decade ago after an ethnic uprising in Fergana valley in Uzbekistan, are often described by the local mass media as a major problem. Criminal activities as well as civil disobedience are presented as the major offenses posed by the Meskhetian Turks to the permanent population of the region. On this basis, as well as certain clauses in the local laws, they have been categorically denied Russian citizenship. Cossacks, on the other hand, present themselves, and are accordingly portrayed by the mass media, as the protectors of the local regime, the guardians of morale and tradition. However, a comparison of the attitudes toward the census among the members of both groups provide a vantage point that allows one to better understand the processes that define a person's choice to participate in the census or to shy away from it.
 
 
Meskhetian Turks: The History of Being "The Other"
 
Prior to the tragic events in Fergana valley, Uzbekistan, when 97 Meskhetian Turks were killed in the course of an interethnic conflict, hardly anyone in the USSR or in the West had known about the existence of these people. Within the context of the Soviet state, Meskhetian Turks were virtually invisible. Few references to them and their contested history could be found in studies of ethnic deportations (Conquest 1970; Nekrich 1978; Akiner 1986; Sheehy 1980). There is no mention of them in the Soviet statistics after the late 1930s (Aidingun, 2002: 189). The situation is somewhat different today as the Meskhetian Turks appear to have became a symbol of the "ultimate deportees", a "people with nowhere to go" (Khazanov 1992) whose tragedy (Payin ???) attracts attention and demands re-interpretation. In order to better understand the specifics of their current situation and their participation in the 2002 census, it is important to examine the history of these people formed through the interplay of the classificatory efforts of the Soviet state, politics of assimilation on the Federal and local level, as well as the struggles on behalf of the people to maintain their sense of unity as a group.
 
One of the theories about the genesis of the Meskhetian Turks as a group presents them as Turkicized Georgians who converted to Islam in the period between the sixteenth century and 1829 when the region of Meskheti-Dzavakheti was under the sway of the Ottoman Empire (Khazanov 1992: 195). Along with Orthodox and Catholic Georgians, Meskhetian Turks inhabited 212 villages located along the border with the Turkish Empire. Although as Muslims they maintained a certain degree of ethnic and cultural isolation from their neighbors, their ethnic and linguistic identity was rather vague. Often bilingual, Meskhetian Turks as well as their neighbors - the Kurds, the Turks and the Georgians, - had little consciousness of having a separate identity. At that time, religious differentiation and local identities based on kin, village and class were much more important (Simonenko 2002).
 
The situation in the border territories between Georgia and Turkey changed dramatically after the 1920s. When the region was finally given to Georgia in 1921, the Meskhetian Turks who during the Turkish-Russian war and the 1st World War fought on the Turkish side were treated as potential 'enemies' of the regime and as security risk near the Turkish border. The government of Soviet Georgia followed a policy of forced assimilation toward the Muslim groups in the republic. The Meskhetian Turks were ordered to change their Turkish names to Georgian names. Later on, they were forced to switch to the Russified forms of their names. During this period, some of the Turks chose to register themselves as Azerbaijanis; others registered themselves as Georgians. However, the majority of the Meskhetian Turks retained their official identification as Turks.
 
Changes in the official registration of ethnicity could be observed in the changing categorizations employed in the census. In the 1926 Census, Meskhetian Turks were recorded as Turks. By 1939 the category of "Turk" was eliminated from the list of the recognized nationalities. In the 1939 census, the Turks were referred to as Azerbaijanis (Aidingyn 2002: 189). Striking as it might seem, the practice of merging the smaller ethnic groups with the larger can be seen as one of the major projects of social engineering on behalf of the nation-state that is striving to make the "chaotic" agglomeration of its subjects legible (Scott 1998: 4-5). Undertaking of such a magnitude often involves manipulation of the schemes of classification - introduction of new categories and elimination of others. Tishkov, in his close analysis of the history of the Soviet Nationalities policies, shows that one of the first undertakings of the Soviet engineering was to conduct "an inventory of ethno-nations and, where necessary, invent nations" (Tishkov 1996: 25). Thus, in the first Soviet census of 1926, citizens were asked about their "nationality". Over 200 different "national" identities were given as an answer to this question. Ethnographers, sociologists and linguists immediately began working on the problems of identifying an internal order to the ethnic identification as expressed by the respondents. As a result of this, many ethnic groups acquired new names. Some, considered too small to represent a separate ethnic group, were merged with other, larger ethnie. Turks and Tatars in some areas of the USSR were counted as "Azerbaijanis"; Bukharzi were merged with "Uzbeks", etc. (ibid. 26).
 
In November 1944, the Meskhetian Turks along with some other smaller ethnic groups - Kurds, Khemshils, and Turkmen, - were deported to Central Asia. As a consequence of "fortif<ication of> strategically vulnerable borders", over 100,000 Meskhetians were exiled into the steppes of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan where they were resettled in small groups. As the so-called special settlers (spezpereselentsi), they were deprived of the basic civil rights: forbidden to change their residence; subjected to monthly registration; unable to marry outside of their immediate settlement (Sheehy 1980). Although in the late 50s and 60s the regulations towards the deported people were relaxed and/or lifted, the Meskhetian Turks were not allowed to leave the territory of the Central Asia and return to their homelands.
 
Relocation of the Meskhetian Turks to Central Asia reveals yet another important aspect of the emergent Soviet state. Reshuffling of the ethnic composition of the Soviet Union in the Central Asia and Caucasus regions through deportation led to the physical rupture of ties based on religious or clan identities. Imposition of the internal administrative boundaries between the republics, introduction of Cyrillic instead of Arabic and Latin scripts aimed at a similar goal - increased control over the internal composition of the ethnic mosaics of the Soviet Union based on the "divide and conquer" principle. One might argue whether the ultimate aim behind all of these manipulations was the emergence of the Homo Sovieticus or just an increased security within the boundaries of the state. It is probably important to be cautious in this regard and not to over-demonize the Soviet state by identifying one over-arching idea behind these processes. Different actors with different aims in mind were involved in the creation of the Soviet state. However, one can agree with Brubaker, that the Soviet system, though privileging internationalism as a state ideology, served as an incubator for the new nationalities (Brubaker 1994).
 
As a result of the forced resettlement and assimilation policies, Meskhetian Turks lost many aspects of their traditional material culture. New cultural traits in the modes of subsistence (type of agriculture, animal husbandry), dress, diet housing, interior decoration were borrowed from the people of Central Asia with whom Meskhetian Turks were in touch. Yet, despite the politics of the forced assimilation, official denial of their ethnic identity, inability to participate in the political decision-making - or, may be, due to all of this, - Meskhetian Turks did not loose their sense of cohesion as an ethnic group. According to Khazanov, it was in exile that the Meskhetian Turks first began to conceive of themselves as a separate people (1995: 202). At first lower economic and social status and later on a specific goal of political mobilization for the return to their homeland provided a basis for the strengthening of the ethnic identity.
 
The history of the Meskhetian Turks shows a complex interplay between the subjective identification of the people and classificatory schemes created by the state. It points one to the topic largely unexplored in the literature on the nation-state - the question of to what extent the socializing functions of the state ideology are successful in creating a new person. As Ong points out, "seldom is attention focused on the everyday processes whereby people ... are made into subjects of a particular nation-state" (Ong 1996: 737). The categorization of identity, created and manipulated by the state and recorded within the census framework, is not fixed for individuals. People are able - even if this ability is constrained and limited by the state – to re-formulate, re-interpret and either to reject or to accept and internalize it.
 
In June of 1989, Meskhetian Turks experienced yet another tragedy. 97 Meskhetians were killed, over 1,000 wounded, and 752 houses burnt to the ground as a result of the horrible massacre in the Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan (Payin 1992: 37). Most of the Meskhetian Turks fled Uzbekistan immediately afterwards. Those few, who stayed, were forced out a year later. Unwelcome in Georgia, many of the Turks settled in various regions of Central Russia; some found their way to Azerbaijan and Turkey. Over 10,000 Turks migrated to Krasnodar region, a territory in the south of Russia. Prolonged negotiations between the Soviet leadership and the Georgian authorities did not lead to any resolutions in regard of the relocation of the Meskhetian Turks back to Georgia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, their situation did not improve. Negotiations with Georgia came to a halt.
 
Despite open animosity on behalf of the local administration that outlawed the Turkish settlements and denied them any civil rights (including Russian citizenship), the Turks have been residing in Krasnodar since then. For the local population of Krasnodar, the Meskhetian Turks became a symbol of the changes in the demographic transformation of the region defined primarily by labor migration and refugee movement from the Transcaucasus region and Central Asia. The last citizens of the Soviet Union, they are portrayed in mass media as the ultimately evil, endowed with such characteristics that would make even a devil blush (REF).
 
 
Kuban Cossacks: The History of Living a Myth
 
A brave Cossack in a tall "papaha" with a saber in his hand rushing into the midst of a battle to triumph over the enemies... Stenka Razin and Emelyan Pugachev liberating the peasants and leading them against the tsar regime... Cossacks, supporters of the monarchy and orthodoxy, threatening the revolution.... These conflicting images are familiar to anyone brought up in the Soviet Union. Unlike Meskhetian Turks who became virtually invisible during the Soviet period, manifestation of Cossacks as a group was strongly felt in mass media, literature and popular myths. However, despite their articulated presence as the cultural symbols, their reality as an ethnic group was denied in a way similar to that of the Meskhetian Turks.
 
The history of Cossacks goes far back to the 14th-15th centuries when the first settlers established their residence at the frontiers of the early Russia. The "Slavic" Cossacks were not even an ethnic group but a self-formed community of the homeless and disenfranchised (Kornblatt 1992: 6). Comprised primarily of Ukrainians, Great Russians, and Poles, these settlements were characterized with unique cultural and social traits that formed the basis for the Cossack communities. Military prowess; exclusive obedience to the authority of the Cossack leaders, atamans; macho behavior in every day life were seen as characteristic traits of these people.
 
Insubordinate to the Russian or any other central government, Cossacks presented a considerable challenge to the authority of the emergent Russian empire. Peter the Great was one of the first to follow the strategy of gradual russification and imperialization of Cossacks. One of the strategies employed by the state to control them was the forced resettlement into the new frontier regions (the aim of these resettlements were similar to the goals behind the deportations undertaken by the Soviet state). By the 19th century, Cossacks were almost fully "domesticated". Many of them settled permanently in the lands and into the life style and value system of the agrarian populations that surrounded them. Some of them did preserve the military life style and served in the Russian army as special Cossack regiments.
 
During the revolution period, the Cossacks were caught in a conflict between the Bolshevik and the reactionary White generals. Hoping to revive independent settlements of the early days and to establish a Cossack republic in the Kuban region, the Cossack autonomists formed a local political body in the summer of 1917. Largely dismissed by the White Russians, they turned to the newly independent Ukraine for assistance. Yet, the Ukrainian state proved to be too weak and could not provide any tangible support to the Cossack efforts.
 
During the Soviet period, Cossacks as a culturally specific group almost disappeared. Though still recognized as a category in the 1926 census, by 1939 census they were no longer considered an ethnic group. The state referred to Cossacks as either a social group (sosloviye) of the Russian empire or a sub-ethnic group. As such, they were merged in classification together with either Ukrainians or Russians. The hunger of the late 20s and 30s; collectivization; demographic changes in the areas populated by Cossacks (primarily through migration of the non-Cossack population) led to the eradication of the Cossacks as a social group.
 
Further domestication of the Cossacks by the state took on a different route. Instead of focusing on the physical aspects of Cossackdom, the state concentrated its efforts on the identity politics. Thus, Babel's stories about Cossacks, Sholohov's Nobel prize winning "The Quiet Flows Don", Pushkin's novel "The Captain Daughter" as well as folklore choirs specializing in the Cossack songs popularized the image of a Cossack as a freedom fighter, a precursor to the revolution. At the time, when it was no longer possible to identify one's self as a Cossack, the glamorous figure of a Cossack on a horse graced the box of the popular brand of cigarettes "Kazbek". Thus, the Soviet state transformed the ethnonym "Cossack" into the ultimate signifier without the signified.
 
The late 80s and early 90s witnessed the emergence of the Cossack movement. Led by a small group of the local intelligentsia, the movement provided an alternative to the crumpling ideology of the Soviet state. One can say that Cossack identity became a substitute and later on filled in a void of the Soviet identity when such identification was no longer tenable. Derlugian and Cipko present the revival of the Cossack movement as a response to the weakening control of the centralized state. As such, the Cossack revival provided an opportunity to take pride in the provincialism, in the locally based identity, as a challenge to the "cosmopolitanism" of Moscow (Derlugian and Cipko, 1997: 1490). Together with the retired military personnel, several university professors, journalists, and businessmen established a quasi-military organization aimed at reincarnating the Cossack Rada of the pre-revolutionary period. World War I military uniforms, strict military discipline, and exercise of brutality were meant to ignite the spirit of the contemporary Cossacks and propagate the image of the Cossacks. However, vigilantism and ultra-patriotism did not gain popular support of the public. Despite the efforts on behalf of the Cossack Rada to increase its popularity, at no point since its inception could it bring together more than 5,000 people to any of its events (ibid. 1491).
 
It is important to point out here that the ideology of the Cossack revival was far from uniform and conflict-free. Most of the debates surrounding the movement centered around two questions. The first one concerned the problem of defining Cossacks as either an ethnic or a social group. The second question that raised a number of discussions in the newly formed Cossack movement was the debates about the role of Cossacks in the post-Soviet politics (Derlugian and Cipko 1997: 1490).
 
In the early 90s, Cossacks proclaimed themselves as a distinct people but not a nationality. This slight distinction is connected with the theory of ethnicity accepted in the Soviet Ethnography the principles of which defined the ethnic politics in the Soviet Union. Thus, in the Soviet Ethnic studies, ethnic group was defined as an "ethno-historical organism, ESO', ... with its highest manifestation expressed through being a nation" (Tishkov 1997: 3). Differences in the historical evolution of various ethnic groups were characterized by the degree of their ethnic / national consciousness and were consequentially reflected in the administrative division. The 'socialist nations', i.e., those ethnic groups that had their "own" union or autonomous republics, were considered the highest type of ethnos (ibid.).
 
The Cossack's choice to proclaim themselves as a people rather than a nationality, a sub-ethnos rather than a distinct ethnic group might have been affected by two reasons. On the one hand, by announcing themselves as a nationality, Cossacks would have challenged the ethnic composition of the region and affected the balance between Russian and non-Russian populations. Political consequences of such an action were difficult to anticipate. On the other hand, disappearance of the Cossack life style during the years of the Soviet regime, symbolic merger of the Cossack history with the history of the Russian people affected identification of people on the individual level. Historians and ethnographers agree that the current identification among the majority of people of the Cossack descent is ambivalent (REF). Even though it preserves identification with Cossackdom, identification with the Russian ethnos is still rather strong. Picturesque uniforms, military parades and other paraphernalia could not serve as a basis for the exclusive identification with the Cossack ethnos. However, by proclaiming themselves a separate ethnic group, the movement could gain more political power and rights endowed upon by the status of a separate nation. All of these controversies and ambivalences became even more apparent during the weeks prior to and during the 2002 Census.
 
 
The 2002 Census: Overcoming the myth and the "other-ness"
 
As "the most visible, and arguably the most politically important means by which states statistically depict collective identities" (Arel and Kertzer, 2002: 3), the national census is a particularly interesting object of investigation into the state project of creating a nation as a population. By assigning people to a single category (ethnicity, race, class, mother tongue, etc.), it assists in inventing a collective identity that is presented as a shared vision of social reality and in so doing creates a "cultural citizen". At the same time, the national census can be seen as a plebiscite (Arel 2002) that allows citizens of the state to voice their mis/trust, to challenge or to accept the state imposed categorizations. As the first post-Soviet census, political and social mplications of the 2002 census are particularly important. After years of economic stagnation, radical social transformation, dramatic changes in the demographic processes (plummeting birth-rates, increasing mortality, unprecedented scale migration), the Russian state was to stand the test of the public opinion. The rate of the people's participation in the census could be seen as an indicator of the rate of the state stability- if people decided to participate in the census, agreed to go along with the statewide project of creating a snapshot of a nation, it would mean that the state has preserved some of the strength of its predecessor. In the opposite case, one would have to conclude about profound societal problems in the relationship between the state and its people.
 
Participation of the Meskhetian Turks and Cossacks in the census is particularly interesting as it illuminates a number of aspects characteristic of the wider population of Russia. Meskhetian Turks, whose relationship with the state was the one of open discrimination and prosecution, could have chosen a number of different options in regard of their participation in the census. Demographic literature shows that recent migrants and people of the lower socio-economic and educational background are less likely to take part in the surveys and censuses (Fein 1989; Iversen et al., 1999; Jones 1979). As recent migrants, Meskhetian Turks could have chosen to hide or flee (not to participate in the census) or compromise and register themselves as Russians or as any other ethnic minority. Also, they could have chosen to use their voice and manipulate the format of the census to protest against their discrimination. For Cossacks, the census could have presented an opportunity to proclaim their identity and bring to life the myth of Cossack-dom with which they had been living for years. On the other hand, in the face of the perceived threat from the massive non-Russian migration to the region, they could have been guided by the greater political interests of preserving the Russian majority of the Krasnodar region undivided. Also, political and social apathy of the population might have prevented the Cossacks from gaining popular support thus bringing the rate of the overall participation in the census down. I explored many of these questions during my fieldwork in the Krasnodar region during the week of October 7-16, 2002[1]. In the sections to follow, I will present my informants' accounts of their perceptions of and attitudes towards the census that would enable one to validate or invalidate these hypotheses.
 
 
"Everything Should Be as It is in Real Life..."
 
It was easy to find the house of Sarvar Tedorov, a leader of the Meskhetian Turks in Varennikovka village, located in the Krymsky region of Krasnodar. He warned us beforehand that in preparation for the wedding of his son, he was renovating his house. So, when we noticed the construction site, we immediately realized that this was the house we were looking for. Even though he was extremely busy, Sarvar seemed to be happy to see us: a passionate leader, he uses every opportunity to raise the awareness about the problems his people are faced with. He let us into the living room - the only one yet untouched by the construction. In the beginning of our conversation, Sarvar asked me to remain faithful to the spirit of our discussion and to represent his words truthfully: "it is important that my words are rendered as they are," - he emphatically underlined.
 
I asked Sarvar whether census takers had already visited his house. He confirmed that indeed, they had visited the previous day. Even such a simple question opened the floodgates to sad reflections on the current position of the Meskhetian Turks in the region: "I am scared that once again we'll be accused of something. They would say: 'even though you are not citizens, you told the census takers that you are citizens'. But we did choose to list ourselves as the citizens of the Russian Federation. As you know, during the past 13 years all the laws of the Russian Federation and International Law were violated. On this basis <on the basis of the Russian Constitution> we were supposed to be granted the Russian citizenship. But all of these laws are ignored - bluntly and openly". From his very first words it was obvious that he perceived the census as an opportunity for his people to fight the injustice - to attain the status of Russian citizenship at least within the census. The ambiguous legal situation of Meskhetian Turks in the Kransnodar region made people apprehensive of the many questions asked by the state officials. Sarvar further elaborated on this topic: "You know, under pretext of the study of the public opinion, there were many attempts - on behalf of the local deputies - to conduct different surveys. They wanted to get to know what we want. Even though we openly state what we want. They also wanted to conduct a referendum: to decide whether we as a people should exist or not. It is stupid: should such a people exist or not! It all makes people uneasy about their answers - they are concerned that what they say might be used in a harmful way". Increased interest from a number of different institutions - local administration, local Human rights activists, US researchers as well as local newspapers, - often raised people's concern about the importance of their answers. Also, the on-going census and my questions about it introduced the topic of previous surveys being carried out among Meskhetian Turks. It was obvious that the past research projects affected their perception and expectations of the census.
 
When I asked Sarvar directly whether he conducted any work in the community to alleviate these concerns and to ensure high rates of participation among the Turks in the census, he answered: "When the President's representative - Surkov, - was here, we raised a question: please, allow us to be included in the census, so that you yourself know how many of us are here. So that you would not be saying: there are fifty thousands of you here. So that you would not make an image of enemies from us. Otherwise, they <the administration> are saying: 'oh, there were 10,000 <of the Meskhetian Turks> here originally, and now there are 50,000 of them here now. And then in 5 years there will be 5mln of them living in the region.' Where do they get these figures? - 50,000... 40,000... 30,000 - only fools get those numbers!" It is amazing how in case of the Meskhetian Turks, the discourse on statistical measurement becomes a "language of social contestation" (Urla 1993: 818). Indeed, techniques of enumeration contribute to the formation of the different types of social identities and determine the politics of representation. The mythical figure of 50,000 as well as the discourse on the 15% threshold of the non-Russian population[2] are present in the public imagination and influence construction of the image of Meskhetian Turks as a group. Aware of the material consequences, Meskhetian Turks pay close attention to the statistical practices of the state and mobilize to influence and affect them. As Urla points out, in the context of the census enumeration, understanding of such basics as cost-of-living, health care and education allocation enter discourses of ethnic minorities. More importantly, however, minority concerns with statistics go beyond those basic needs. Numbers as a regime of truth production in the nation-state enter the discourses of the minorities not only through the competing claims to resources but also as competing claims to truth (Urla 1993: 819). For the Meskhetian Turks, participation in the census was one (and possibly the only) way of establishing the truth about their situation.
 
I continued the interview with the question regarding overall participation in the community. "Yes, it is important that everybody participates in the census," - Tedorov said. - "During the summer when Surkov agreed and said that they will let the census people know that we should be enumerated as well, we told all the people that they should participate. We also told them that they should respond to the questions the way they think. We encouraged them to say everything as is." Insistence on the importance of telling the truth was even more pronounced in the interviews I conducted later at a small bazaar in Varennikovka (the results of those interviews will be discussed below). Sarvar further clarified what he means by "truth" by providing an example: "For instance, my daughter got married. Even though their marriage was not registered, but they are living together two blocks from here. She was enumerated with that family. She said that she lives there in the apartment, that she has 2 children and is the citizen of Russia. I did not list her in my household. When the enumerators came I said that there are 5 people living in this house: two of my daughters, my son, my wife and myself. Everything should be as it is in real life. And that's what we told people." This discussion about the meaning of a "true answer" reveals that the census was perceived by the leader of the Meskhetian Turks as a way to amend the injustice of the local authorities. "The real life" in this case is contrasted with the legal reality in which marriages among the Turks are unregistered and couples are considered to be cohabiting while their children are regarded as illegitimate. In this case, "a science without a scientist" (Urla 1993: 820) with its unsurpassed ability to represent the reality in the form of statistics is seen as the ultimate answer to the Meskhetian Turks' problems. They believe that the numeric representation of them for what they are would restore the principle of truth violated by the local government.
 
Later, Sarvar returned to the topic of the people's overall participation in the census: "We do not have the right to remind them <about the census> too often or to insist. And of course, there is no time or opportunity to do that either - people are separated now, the community is spread out. But we did say that we should participate in the public life". Ethnographic research in other regions supports the observation that people often perceived the census to be akin to the election process. In many regions across Russia, local elections took place either before or right after the census. In Krasnodar, census posters were displayed side by side with posters announcing the upcoming elections. This observation might explain why the Meskhetian Turks thought it would be illegal for them to conduct propaganda to ensure higher rates of participation. But of course, predicaments of their legal status as well as multiple obstacles to the functioning of their grassroots organization "Vatan" account for the overall perception that the Turks are not allowed to conduct any lobbying in this regard. However, it is interesting to note that "Vatan" found indirect ways to spread information about the census and to raise awareness about the importance of the high rates of census participation in their community: "Once Surkov gave us his permission to be listed in the census, we told our people that they should participate. It seems to me that the predominant majority would go. I talked to people myself and I also told them to raise this question at the weddings and other public events that it is important to participate in the census."
 
 
"We are Russian Citizens..."
 
At the end of our conversation, I asked Sarvar to take me to a place where people usually congregate and where I could ask them about their attitudes to and expectations of the census. He took me to a tiny roadside bazaar. Despite bone chilling wind and drizzling rain, several men and women were selling vegetables and nuts. Once Sarvar introduced our research team and explained why we had come, the roadside discussion began. Most of the time, the person I addressed would answer the questions while everybody else would be listening carefully to the answers. However, at times when the questions seemed to be particularly poignant, people interfered in the conversation and contributed their understanding of the problem.
 
I approached Fatima[3], a woman in her mid 40s selling walnuts: "Has a census taker come to your house?" - I asked. Fatima quickly responded: "Yes. She asked me: where do you work. And I said: I searched for a job. I said the truth – I searched for a job hard, but where will you find a job? If there are no jobs, where will you find it?" It was obvious that the question of employment was extremely important to her. She continued our conversation by telling me about her history. A seamstress in Uzbekistan, she had to work as a milkmaid after they moved to Krasnodar. Fatima was not upset about the change in jobs. However, she was extremely distressed with the fact that after 9 years of working at a collective farm she was fired and had to sustain herself and her retired husband by selling vegetables in the market. Problems with registration and lack of citizenship affected employment opportunities for the Meskhetian Turks. In several other interviews, when asked about the census people quickly seized the opportunity to talk about the fact that they were not allowed to work, were often fired because of their nationality or legal status and were prohibited from gaining qualification even for low-level jobs.
 
I then asked Fatima whether the census taker asked her about her citizenship. Fatima quickly responded: "I said that I am a Russian citizen. I've spent 13 years here." A man standing nearby and listening to our conversation added: "Of course, we've lived in the Soviet Union and now we have spent 13 years here. We are Russian citizens." Fatima further continued: "When they give us a place to go, then we'll leave. But for now, we are Russian citizens. Even though we do not have permanent registration, we live here. We have nowhere else to go to." Several other men who were listening to the conversation were shaking their heads in approval. To engage them in the discussion, I directly approached one of them: "What did you say about your citizenship?" The man's answer turned out to be different from the answers given by my previous discussants: "I said that I do not have citizenship." - he simply stated. At this point Sarvar Tedorov who was present during the interview interfered: "He said the truth - we do not have citizenship. Though we are indeed citizens. But he said the truth. A different question is: whose fault is it that we do not have the citizenship? So, in a sense, even though he said that truth, he was actually wrong." Two other men agreed with Sarvar and confirmed that they also answered to the census takers that they are citizens of Russia. In order to prove his point even further, Sarvar addressed another man: "Akhmed, what did you answer to the census takers?" Akhmed seemed to be a little bit uncertain: "I don't know, my wife was at home at that time. She answered all the questions." To counteract Akhmed's uncertainty, another man jumped into the conversation: "We said that there are 4 of us living there. About the language - I said Turkish. I also said that I do not have citizenship." Sarvar used this opportunity to explain his position once again: " There is a big difference whether you do not have citizenship or whether you are not given citizenship. There is a very big difference." Agreeing with Sarvar, the man corrected himself: "Yes, they are not giving it to us. But she <the census taker- L.K.> asked: you do not have citizenship and I said that I do not have it." A woman standing beside Fatima elaborated Sarvar's rhetoric about citizenship further: "What else could I answer about the citizenship? We've lived here, we are living here now and we will be living here - where else can we go? We are the same law abiding citizens as everybody else. We pay all the taxes. We are doing everything that is required. Where else would we go?".
 
The question of citizenship as it is directly related to the questions of legal status, employment opportunity, medical assistance, education and even retirement pensions was one of the most important for the people. In several other cases, when asked about the census, people first of all mentioned the issue of citizenship. They also showed me their red old-style Soviet passports with multiple temporary registration stamps that had to be renewed every three months. As citizens of a country that disappeared over a decade ago, they were trying to make a case that they should be recognized by the state. However, despite their leader's efforts to define their position in this regard, people often seemed to be uncertain what was the right or correct answer to the question on citizenship. As in the example above, some of them responded that they do not have citizenship. In several other cases, people answered that they are citizens of the Uzbek republic (Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic). It is unclear how census takers recorded their citizenship in this case (most probably, it was put down as citizenship of Uzbekistan). One can conclude here that uncertainty of the legal status led to definite heterogeneity of answers given by the Meskhetian Turks to census takers.
 
It is interesting to note here the complexity of the discourse on truth. The discussion about citizenship shows that truth can be double-sided. Tedorov clearly distinguished between the truth of the local administration that presents Meskhetian Turks as aliens without any rights and the truth of Meskhetian Turks who consider themselves the rightful citizens of Russia. The truth of the local administration was reinforced with the power of the state expressed in the form of a registration stamp in the old Soviet passport. The truth of Meskhetian Turks could only gain power through people's participation in the census when the "truth" of their citizenship becomes a social fact expressed in the "hard" numbers.
 
Another question that I addressed during the interviews in Varennikovka was the question as to why people decided to participate in the census. Even though this question is not as obvious as it might seem, several people appeared to be offended by it. "We've spent almost 14 years here. What, we are not people or something? Why should we not?" - a woman I asked this question even turned away hiding her feelings. Another woman continued trying to correct my misunderstanding: "Why are you saying that we don't want to participate in the census - no, we want to participate in it. It is important for Russia to enumerate us as well. We want to participate in the census." A somewhat defensive attitude in both these answers reflects the uncertainty of the people's position vis-Ю-vis the permanent population of the region. Even the slightest suspicion that their behavior - census participation in this case, - might be different from that of other people raises strong emotional protests. In this regard, one can conclude, the Meskhetian Turks perceived the census as one of the ways to confirm their inherent similarity with the rest of the country, with the rest of the "people".
 
Following up on the questions about the reasons for participating in the census, I asked whether people were concerned as to how the results of the census would be used in the future. Many of my informants did not share fears expressed by their leader Sarvar Tedorov. However, most of them shared his hopes that the census would bring a change for the better: "No, we are not scared. Why should we be? I am not concerned about that." - Fatima told me. Several other women joined our conversation at that point: "I know that some people were even staying at home waiting for the census takers to come over to their house. They wanted to make sure that they are included in the census." - "Everybody should participate and everything will be fine." - "It should be good. We'll write our names down in the history of Russia. Nothing bad can come out of it." - "We'll be considered local after that - that's good. We have nowhere else to go." The rhetoric about the statewide importance of the census is clearly present in these responses. However, it is interesting to note that this discourse is combined with the expectation that such a significant event in the life of the state will have direct positive consequences for the people - be it simply local recognition ("we'll be considered local") or the official legitimization of their status.
 
 
"Consciousness as a Group - Cossacks Have It!"
 
It was fairly easy to locate the head office of the Krasnodar Cossack Army. An imposing building with a metal plaque indicating the name of the organization was hard to miss. However, it was not all that easy to arrange an interview with Vladimir Prokofeevich Gromov, the Ataman of the Krasnodar Cossack Army. After a brief meeting with his assistant, Prof. Buckley and I were given some hope - though no definite promise, - that we might be able to meet with Gromov the following day. To ensure due process in the meeting, we were asked to submit a list of five questions that we wanted to ask. The next day, after an hour of waiting in the enclosed yard of the building, we were let inside for an interview. Gromov, a man of commanding presence, was sitting at a conference table. We were shown to a seat several meters away from him and the formal interview began.
 
The first question on the approved preliminary list concerned the Cossacks' position in regard to their acknowledgement as an ethnic group. Vladimir Prokofeevich got to this question right away: "The decision was made at the military rada: Cossacks should proclaim themselves as an ethnic group." To support his statement, Gromov referred to the 1991 law about the repressed people that indirectly acknowledges the status of the Cossacks as a people. To strengthen his argument even further, Gromov exclaimed: "What is even more important, the people's consciousness as a group defines their status. And Cossacks have it!" The next question on the list was intended to probe this topic further. Several months prior to the census, in a newspaper interview Gromov stated that it was far too early for Cossacks to announce themselves as a separate ethnic group <REF>. Yet, now that the census was taking place, Cossack Rada seemed to be advocating quite the opposite. Vladimir Prokofeevich did not appear to be baffled by the evident contradiction in his position. He simply stated: "Well, since there is going to be a census, we decided to let them <the people> announce themselves as Cossacks." Despite my efforts to get further explanation, Gromov suggested to go on to the next question. The next question was intended to get the idea about the overall expectations of the census and indirect estimation of the validity of data obtained through the census. To this question Gromov answered: "No, I am sure that this census will be faulty. It will not show the exact number of the Cossacks. It will also show the lower number of the Russians <lower than in 1989> - Why? - Migrants. In 20 years time, the Russians will turn into a minority here. It is the processes of turning the Kuban "brown" with only Armenians, Meskhetian Turks, etc moving in and taking over the lands." It is interesting to note here that in his answer Gromov correlated the quality of the census' results with the expectations that the numbers for the Cossacks will be lower than the number of the other ethnic groups some of which are recent migrants to the region. A certain ambiguity in the Cossack-vs.-Russian ethnic identification can be noted here when Gromov predicts a dramatic decrease in the numbers of the Russian population in the next 20 years. In order to clarify this point further, I asked Gromov whether he thinks participation among some ethnic groups would be higher than others. Gromov did not hesitate: "Sure. According to the logic of things, the Meskhetian Turks <would be the most active>. They will try to legitimize their presence in the region. They would want to show that there is a significant number of them in the region." To make me better understand the complexity of the ethnic situation in Krasnodar, Gromov drew a parallel between Krasnodar and Germany and UK: "Look at what's going on in the Democratic Republic of Germany - they don't know what to do with Turks, Osman Turks. And in the flea-infested, Imperialist England - suffering from Arabs!" He characterized the situation in Western Europe and in Krasnodar with the word "doveli" - that he further elaborated by saying: "<They, i.e., the migrants> came to the host house and "doveli"... We <the Cossacks> did not fall out of the bunker. We are the indigenous people of the region. These lands are ours." Negative attitudes towards the migrants in Gromov's diatribe were closely connected with the question of power. To him, participation in the census was one of the ways ethnic groups could gain greater power in the region. Gromov clearly understands the power of the numeric expression of identity and the consequences of it. In his rhetoric, the statistical figure for a particular ethnic group is correlated with the political power this group would be able to attain as a result of the census. Also, he does not doubt the quality of the information obtained through the census. Legitimizing authority of the census as a state undertaking is not questioned.
 
When asked whether Cossacks conducted any information campaigns about the census encouraging people to participate, he answered: "We called two meetings of the army council and we talked about it. But the campaign began far too late." Despite the fact that Gromov perceived participation in the census as one of the ways other ethnic groups could gain power in the region and as a way for Cossacks to announce themselves as an ethnic group, little work seemed to have been done to increase the overall participation of Cossacks in the census. Due to the limited time Gromov could devote to our interview, I was not able to pursue these questions further. However, some of the aspects about the participation rates among Cossacks and overall expectations of the census results were further clarified in my interview with Ivan Vasilievich Besugly, Ataman of the Taman region (okrug).
 
 
"These Lands are Cossack Lands!"
 
To better understand attitudes among the Cossacks towards their own identification and to the presence of other ethnic groups in the region, I arranged an interview with the Ataman of Taman, a region that hosts one of the more compact settlements of Meskhetian Turks. Fortunatelly, Ivan Vasilievich Besugliy was in Krasnodar for a meeting of the Cossack Rada. Even though he was busy, he devoted some time to our conversation. During a break in the Rada meeting, we sat in the courtyard and talked about the census. "How do you think the census will change the situation?" - I asked him. "I found the documents of my grandfather. In his papers it was not written that he is Russian. The documents defined his standing ("sosloviye") as Cossack" - Besugiy said. - "What will the census change and how is it imporant? We are always talking about the Cossacks as a group within Russia or within the Krasnodar region. But we do not know the exact numbers, we do not proclaim ourselves. Back then <during the Soviet Period> people were afraid to do so because people thought that it would turn out that the numbers would be insignificant. Perhaps, it would turn out that we are only keeping the face (zsheki naduvayem) and indeed our numbers are insignificant. But I think, no matter how many of us are here, it is important for us to enlist ourselves. We should proclaim that there are Cossacks in the Kuban region." For Besugliy, as well as for Gromov, the census was an important act of manifesting that the Cossacks as a social and ethnic group exists. It was also a way to confirm the cultural legacy of their ancestors. The question of the past Cossack glory and self-identification of their parents often came up as an important topic in my conversations with Cossacks. It is interesting to note here certain ambivalence in regard of the total numbers of Cossacks in the region. At one point during our conversation, Besugliy mentioned that he expects the census to show that there is at least 1mln of Cossacks in Krasnodar. At the same time, in the quote above, he is allowing some amount of doubt as to whether the numbers would be all that significant. He is even emphasizing that it is not the absolute numbers that matter but the very fact that Cossacks would be recognized as an ethnic group. However, he recognizes the importance of obtaining the number for the Cossack population. In this case, statistical data would legitimize the existence of Cossacks as an ethnic group. 
 
Besugliy further continued: "Let me tell you one thing. 10 years ago when we just organized the Cossack society, many people used to tell us that their parents tried to stop them from joining the society. They would almost be in tears when letting them go. They would say: "We've been through this. We said that we are Cossack and then we all had to pay for it". Even now, when talking to people I heard the following questions: "What if I say that I am Cossack, and then people with guns would come to our village". I think it will be a negative factor that might affect the results of the census. Though, this factor would probably affect little the younger people. But it will definitely affect the older generation who still remember about the events of the 30s." Here Besugliy referred to the genocide of the Cossack population in the 30s when many people were targeted on the basis of their identification. Concern over the influence of the history of repressions and its impact on people's self-identification is well grounded in the Cossacks' case. It also points at the ambiguity in the relationship between the state and its subjects. Fear as the mediating factor affects people's interpretation of their identity and their expectations of what the state might do once it symbolically appropriates them by registering their identity. Perhaps, these concerns are also triggered by the impending choice of either announcing their identity and becoming visible as a statistical minority or of remaining virtually invisible in the midst of the Russian majority.
 
I asked him whether the Cossack Council conducted any preparatory work in order to counteract these attitudes and to increase the overall participation in the census. "Yes, we did have some prep work. We received some direction in this regard from ataman." - Besugliy said. - "Though I do think that there was insufficient work in this regard. I will talk about it at the Cossack council meeting in the Taman region today. I will let them know how disappointed I am with what I have seen in many regions. I think we should have conducted a much better work explaining to people about the census, telling them how important it is to participate in the census. And also, telling them how important it is to indicate their nationality as Cossack." Later in our conversation, Besugliy mentioned that he visited a number of villages and when talking to people brought up the topic of the census. However, it seemed that the question of the upcoming elections were the primary reason for his trips to the countryside. He further mentioned that there were several instances when the census takers refused to write down the ethnicity of the respondents as Cossack; instead, the census takers insisted that their ethnicity should be put down as Russian. Even though there were only few cases of such misrepresentation reported, the possibility that the census takers' understanding of what comprises "correct" ethnicity were debated even before the census. Thus, I asked Besugliy whether the Cossack council encouraged any of their members to participate in the census as enumerators, thereby, taking care of the proper census coverage themselves. He said: "No, the question has never been addressed in such a way. It never really occurred to us..." It is important to note here that despite the general understanding of the importance of the census, little effort on behalf of the Cossacks was done to ensure proper census coverage. Even though in the literature the census-as-a-state-project was often compared to a form of plebiscite and in mass media it was equated with an act of civil courage that manifests the alliance between the state and its citizens, in the Krasnodar region at least, there was little effort on behalf of the population to ensure high rates of participation. One might hypothesize, that despite political agitation around the questions of ethnicity, language and citizenship that characterized the census campaign in many regions, people largely relied on the state to ensure that everybody is accounted for.
 
 Ivan Vasilievich further elaborated on the topic of importance of the census: "You asked earlier, why I think the census is important. Let's consider the land question. I am against the idea of land being sold - and I think many Russian patriots would support me on this. Though now some people begin telling stories that it is necessary to sell the land. But if now it would turn out that there is quite a significant number of the Cossacks in Kuban, we would be able to announce our position in regard of the land. This land was bestowed upon by Katherine the Great. This land is Cossack land. If they want, they can sell the land of their ancestors, but we are not going to trade our heritage. We do not want to and I think we won't. We'll work on this question together with the authorities, with the governor of the region - and his position in this regard is the correct one. And there are many other questions that would need to be considered." This passionate rhetoric about control over land reveals the true importance the census holds for at least some Cossacks. Thus, it is not only their recognition as an ethnic group but also affirmation of their continued political influence in the region that is perceived as an important outcome of the census. In a sense, Besugliy's speech clarifies Gromov's statement presented earlier: "We are the indigenous people of the region". But in this context, the indigenous status is correlated with the question of power.
 
The topic of the quest for power among different ethnic groups came up when I asked Besugliy whether he thinks the census would be able to reflect all the changes that have occurred in the course of the past 10 years in the ethnic composition of the region. Besugliy answered: "Yes, I think it will. And of course, participation among some ethnic groups would be higher than among others." - "Which groups do you think would be the most active?" - "I think the Armenians. They would try to show that there are a lot of them... Why? Today, with all of these demographic changes, everybody is striving to gain more power. Meskhetian Turks - you know what nationality they belong, right? ... And if ten years ago they were only asking us for a place to wait over (otsidetsya), to take a break after the Fergana valley events, now they are telling us openly: "This is our land. Kuban is our land. It is Muslim land and you would have to leave it." Today they have enough insolence to openly tell us such things. In the coastal regions, it is primarily the Armenian cliques that hold the power. So, they would be interested in enumerating as many Armenians as they could. And who knows, they might be talking about acquiring an autonomous area in the region! I think it is extremely dangerous for us." Besulgliy's discourse on the participation rates among different ethnic groups clearly equates the size of a given group with the power it is striving to achieve. It also implies correlation between ethnicity, the size of an ethnic group and its entitlement to land and political rights. Apprehension of the migrants' presence in the region is described as a challenge to the Russian - and implicitly Cossack, - majority of the population and its control over the region. However, it is important to note here once again, that even though Besugliy emphasizes the connection between the political rights of the recent migrants and high rates of participation in the region among them, he does not draw similar conclusions in regard of the Cossacks. Cossacks who could have achieved similar goals are presented in this case as victims who do not share such an agenda.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The contested histories of both Meskhetian Turks and Cossacks determined the specifics of their participation in the 2002 census and their expectations of the possible outcomes. For both groups participation in the census carried political as well as socio-cultural implications that determined their overall attitudes towards the census.
 
Both groups wanted to legitimize their status through participation in the census. Thus, Cossacks wanted to be acknowledged as an ethnic group while Meskhetian Turks strived to be acknowledged as Russian citizens. For both groups, this question was a matter of cultural and for Meskhetian Turks it was also the matter of physical survival in the region as a whole.
 
The heterogeneity of the answers given by the members of these two groups can be explained through careful examination of the historical processes and specifics of the present politics in the region. Thus, some Meskhetian Turks answered that they are the Russian citizens while others indicated no citizenship or Soviet citizenship. Some Cossacks - despite their self-identification, - possibly chose to enumerate themselves as Russians. Among the older generation such a position could be explained by fears of the past. The younger generation might have chosen to write themselves down as Russians because their Cossack identity is, arguably, not as strong. For Meskhetian Turks, answers about their citizenship reflected the ambiguity of their current standing that affects their survival as a group. For Cossacks it reflects certain ambiguities in their ethnic identification.
 
Fully aware of the politics of numbers, Meskhetian Turks used the census as an opportunity to transform themselves - even if at the symbolic level - from being the citizens of the country that no longer exists, i.e., the Soviet Union, into the citizens of the Russian Federation. The numbers were also manipulated by members of these ethnic minorities to gain or to escape visibility. Thus, Cossacks wished to show that there are significant numbers of them present in the region; Meskhetian Turks seemed to be trying to prove that their numbers are relatively insignificant. While Cossacks tried to become visible on the political scene in the region, Meskhetian Turks tried to escape the gaze of the public and become virtually invisible by showing that their numbers are insignificant. The goal behind both discourses is the same: to legitimize their current standing as a social group. One can agree with Urla, that in the current political economy of knowledge, numbers function as authoritative "facts" (Urla 1993: 836). My ethnographic observations show that people respond to the practices of subjectification of the nation-state by manipulating those numbers by making claims upon the state, by describing themselves - even in the limited language the nation-state understands, - and by making themselves visible and invisible as the situation commands.
 
The current status of each group vis-Ю-vis other groups in the region determines the measures taken by each group to ensure their participation. As such, the Meskhetian Turks, one of the most visible ethnic minorities in Kransnodar, took many more covert measures to ensure participation while the Cossacks chose to take overt measures. The choice of measures was determined by the specifics of the current social situation of the group in question. Meskhetian Turks believed that they did not have the right to lobby for the census. Instead, they chose to act indirectly to ensure participation among its members by relying on the community to spread information about the census. Cossacks relied on the state to conduct the census. Since their participation in the census was less tied to the question of survival - as it was for the Meskhetian Turks, - and was closely connected with the question of power and control over the land, it was not as vital for them (though, it remained very important). Differences in attitudes towards the census might also be explained through references to the Soviet mentality that implied that the state would take care of everything - even the enumeration of its subjects. This perspective seems to be very strong among the Cossacks. One might hypothesize that such a perception could have existed among the Turks as well. However, the need to survive in the current situation forces them to act more pro-actively.
 
The discourse on truth came up in a number of interviews. Cossacks never raised the question about "saying the truth and nothing but the truth". This rhetoric, however, was extremely strong among the Turks. It clearly shows that their position is a defensive rather than an offensive one. From this perspective, the "truth" of ethnic identification is revealed not in the daily lives of people, not in their folklore or grass-roots organizations, but in and through this institution of measurement that serves as one of the principal modes of interaction between the state and its subjects.
 
 
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[1] Interviews with Meskhetian Turks were conducted in Varennikovka, a village 140 km away from Krasnodar city, the capital of the Krasnodar region. The trip was organized together with Frederique Longuet Marx, a French researcher from the Univesity of CaennCHECK, Nonna Shahnazarian and Alexei Kochergin from the Center for Pontic and Caucasian studies who comprised an international team engaged in the study of the census. The interview with Gromov, Ataman of the Kuban Cossack Army, was conducted by myself and Prof. Cynthia Buckley from the University of Texas at Austin. The interview with Ivan Vasilievich Besugliy, Ataman of the Taman region, I conducted alone after establishing initial contact with Prof. Buckley.
 
[2] Appealing to the scientific research, a recent article on the Meskhetian Turks points out that their compact settlements violate the 15% principle that postulates that the presence of large numbers of migrants exceeding 15% contribute to the social instability and lead towards increased criminal activities (REF).
 
[3] The names of my informants have been altered in order to protect their identity.
 
* Brown University, US, Elisaveta_Koriouchkina@brown.edu