V

Russian Census 2002: the Ethnic Dimension

By V. Tishkov & V. Stepanov

1. Overall Evaluation of the Census

For several years preceding the first Russian census of 2002 and indeed right before it, many experts and journalists forecasted its failure. Politicians and public activists announced that the very procedure of a universal survey is an invasion of privacy violating civil rights. Meanwhile, the staff members of the Russian statistical agency (State Statistics Committee or Goskomstat) were worried that the majority of the population will refuse to answer the questions in the census questionnaire. Experts believed that people would be opposed to answering not only questions about personal income, but wouldn’t want to be asked about their ethnic identity either[1]. This phenomenon of quite massive aversion to the census, mainly by elite social groups, was something new for the country. This occurrence cannot be explained away merely by the advent of democracy in Russia and by the so far insufficient culture of civic responsibility. Most likely other factors also influenced the situation.

a) More than 13 years have passed since the last Soviet census; the political and mass media environment had been filled with a radically new generation of characters (participants) who for the most part had a very vague notion of what a population census is;

b) The existence in the country of something like an “alternate reality” in the form of a shadow economy, massive migration unregistered by the authorities, concealed sources of income and private property;

c) An initially incorrect advertising strategy that put special emphasis on the fact that the procedure is completely democratic and voluntary while acknowledging that there would be problems with guaranteeing confidentiality.

This unusual perception of the census by the society has not yet been analyzed; we plan to address this topic at a later time. The goal of this article is to evaluate the preliminary results of the census from the ethnic demographics point of view.

Despite criticizing the organizers of the census, we, along with other participants of the Brown Project, believe that, overall, the 2002 census was carried out on a proper level, that its results are quite legitimate and that they deserve a critical analysis.[2] One of the fundamental issues is the estimate of the extent to which all population was involved and the nature of a possible underestimation of the population. Expert estimates of these numbers vary, and it seems that only State Statistics Committee staff and immediate census analysts can give a more or less correct answer. In our opinion, approximately 5-7 percent of the population did not participate in the census. There are three basic categories of the population that were not fully covered in the course of the census:

а) large city residents,

б) migrants from the former Soviet Union republics, China and Vietnam,

в) residents of tightly guarded or otherwise inaccessible country mansions.

At this stage, we can only say that the highest probability of upward distortions (i.e. filling out the questionnaires using the data from passport departments of the local police stations) could occur in three instances:

1. In large cities which strove to keep or to gain the status of cities with a million and more residents;

2. In the territories with ethnic rivalry where one ethnic group would try to receive favorable “correct numbers” larger than that of their ethnic rivals;

3. In ethno-territorial autonomies with a goal of confirmation or “improvement” of the demographic status of “titular” ethnic groups.

There is no answer to the principal question – we do not know whether the population count was under- or overcounted. Heated discussion on this topic began started before the census and continues to this day. Some say that not all of the population was counted up, while the others claim that the number of the country’s residents turned out to be higher than expected. In fact, both instances are partly correct. In some regions the population wasn’t counted fully. For example, in the Far East the Chinese were counted up, but far from all of them. It’s not that the Chinese refused to take part in the census. Rather, local authorities didn’t want to take them into account. If the census showed too many Chinese natives, the Federal Center would toughen the border crossing regime and that would have a negative effect on the region’s economy. In other regions, like in Chechnya and Ingushetia, too many population were counted up. In Moscow, the census-takers did not count up of the majority of the newly arrived city residents, but worked too hard to count the locals. Therefore it is difficult to understand what the final result was and how far from reality is it.

In addition to migrants, some ethnic population categories are represented in the census with evident distortion. There are various reasons for this, some technical, some political. It is very difficult to name one key factor. Even in the instances that seem completely obvious, deliberate manipulations are not the only cause of distortions. Some cases of underreporting the numbers are quite obvious. For example the census registered only 3,300 Meskhetian Turks. Earlier, in Soviet-time censuses this category wasn’t distinguished at all. But it is well known that in the Krasnodar krai alone, the number of Meskhetian Turks is several times higher than official figures show. The attitude of Krasnodar regional authorities towards Meskhetian Turks is also well known: they do not want to consider them full members of the society. For over ten years, regional authorities have denied these people all social welfare rights. The census nearly “didn’t notice” this nationality despite the fact that since the late 1980s, when Meskhetians moved to the Krasnodar krai, administrative registration of this ethnic group has been done on regular basis[3]. On the other hand, one shouldn’t forget the imperfections of the questionnaire method and of the end-result calculations. Many declared themselves to be just Turks and their Meskhetian membership was left unaccounted. Some people deliberately called themselves that, planning to leave Russia for Turkey soon, while others didn’t want to call themselves Meskhetians because of personal convictions[4].

In many instances, ethnic demographics of the census were based on the staunch notions of the Soviet times about what a nationality is. In Russia, just like before in the Soviet Union, the opinion that “nationality” is the affiliation with “your people” in terms of ethnic unity is still quite widespread. Nationality is seen as an indispensable attribute of any person, at that it is unique and given to everyone at birth. But even the Soviet-era statistics showed that real life is much more complex. According to the census of 1989, a quarter of the population lived in the families with complex ethnic make-up, a very significant cause for the spread of double ethnic identity. For example it is known that almost 76 percent of ethnic Ukrainians living in Russia are members of mixed families, the majority of them Russo-Ukrainian.[5] The same is typical for Russia’s Germans. Often a person perceives him or herself as not merely German, but as ethnically Russian-German, or as a Russian and a German simultaneously or depending on the situation: in some instances he or she is ethnic Russian, while in others German. Because of this, despite strict rules, millions of Soviet citizens changed over from one group to another between the censuses. The most obvious examples of such conversions are the “transformation” of Ukrainians into Russians in the period between the censuses of 1926 and 1937[6], of Jews into Russians in the first Soviet censuses and conversely of Russians into Jews in the censuses of 1979 and 1989, as well as Tatar-Bashkir changeovers in all of the Soviet-era censuses.[7] The phenomenon of ethnic drift demonstrated itself in the 2002 census, but it was locked in by the strict principle of unique identity.

Despite this widespread conviction, some people in Russia have never given a thought to their nationality, particularly because since 1997 there is no “nationality” line in the Russian citizen passport (passports of USSR’ citizens held such a line). These people simply were not ready to give the census-taker a definite answer, and the statistics registers them as evading the question. The majority of such “evaders” were registered in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Overall, among those who were counted in the census process, only 1 percent of the respondents were unable to state their ethnic identity[8].

According to our observations, approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of respondents altogether had a hard time dealing with the “nationality membership” question. Meanwhile the instructions forbade the census-takers to explain anything. Just like in past Soviet-time censuses, the 2002 census didn’t take into consideration the possibility of double ethnic identity, forcing approximately 10 percent of the population into making a tough choice in favor of the nationality of one of their parents. Just like always, the preference was shown towards the most prestigious and high status form of identity – the Russian. This is why after 2002 census, the statistics show a decrease in the number of Ukrainians and Belarusian, even though they did not “die out” or leave the country. The same can be said for such large ethnic categories as Mari, Udmurt, Chuvash, Mordvinians. It is as if the census anticipated the fact of ethnic assimilation of the representatives of these and some other groups, even though in reality the process is much slower and not so simple.[9]

2. Concerning the Increase in the Number of “Peoples” Based on Census Results

In 1989 there were 128 “nationalities” in the Soviet Union. Now there are more than 150 in Russia alone[10]. It is all a matter of methodology: how the ethnic groups are grouped and displayed in the final list. In the Soviet Union, in 1989, there was a preliminary list of 800 possible ethnic self-identifications that could be used by the people in the course of the census. After the census all of the answers of the 250-million strong population were grouped in 128 categories. That is how the number of “USSR peoples” came about. The preliminary list of possible self-identifications for the newest 2002 census was no smaller than the one used in 1989. Based on the census results, statisticians made a list of 158 1^st-tier ethnic names and two or three dozens (the question still remains arguable and open) of 2^nd-tier categories that could be statistically united with the first.

The political aspect of the nationalities list can be clearly seen in the recent census. One of the most politicized questions is the one about Tatars. The nationalist part of the Tatar expert and political community, followed by the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan, accused the State Statistics Committee and the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of a conspiracy that has as its goal a schism in the Tatar nation. When President Putin visited the republic in August 2002 he was subjected to considerable pressure over the same issue.

The 2002 census recognized a distinct ethnic category 10,000 Nagaibak, who are no longer counted as part of the Tatar nationality. There also appeared Kryashen and Siberian Tatars, who were never before counted as separate from Tatar ethnic entities. The census also counted Besermyan who were previously considered Udmurt. Among Daghestani Avar, more than a dozen of small-numbered ethnic groups are now distinguished. Among the Dargin the census “discovered” Kaitaq and Kubachi nationalities. The statistics “saw” them only now, even though ethnologists knew these groups very well and long ago[11]. Overall the census distinguished 68 new ethnic categories, among them 22 statistically “independent” names. The number of other accounted groups is calculated in aggregate with demographically more considerable categories (Table 1).

Table 1. The list of new ethnic categories in the All-Russian Census - 2002

The statistically graduated method of accounting used in the census 2002 had never been used before and requires a very thorough analysis. On the one hand, the aliasing of the category list allows for a possibility of a more diverse account of ethnic identity variants. That is definitely a big achievement of the recent census. On the other hand, the future fate of such a list is unclear. Will its two-tier structure be conserved in all of the result publications or will the so-called second-tier disappear from the future statistical reports? That depends on the societal attitude towards these second-tier nationalities, primarily the attitude displayed by government officials.

Even in the academic environment, the two-tier list is still perceived from positions of dogmatic approach. This approach separates all ethnic groups into “independent” (“real”) peoples and dependent “sub-ethnos” that form a part of them. This approach gives life to the conviction that only statistical “independence” of some ethnic category, which is marked in the census materials, may testify of a “real nation.”

Moscow-based experts from the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEA RAS) and the representatives of authorities and scientific circles in the regions have argued numerous times. The former insisted that the small-numbered ethnic categories that were not recognized in the Soviet times must be counted separately. For example, they said, Ando-Tsez groups should be fully statistically independent from Avar, and Kryashen from Tatars. Their opponents qualified these arguments as forcible attempts to fragment the existing nations.

The task of creating a reconcilable list is really difficult, especially since in the course of the census the statisticians for the first time tried not only to reflect the diversity of Russia’s population but also to show the realities of cultural integrative and assimilative processes. The most difficult case was in Daghestan. Avoiding the possibility of ethnic tension in the questions of access to power, the government of Daghestan demanded that groups of Daghestan residents be counted as separate categories but then added to the overall Avar population. The working commission which prepares the census materials for publication at its meeting in March 2004 decided to meet Daghestan’s demands. This means that the number of “first peoples” will be shortened by 14 names, while the number of “subgroups” will increase. For the same reasons there are no statistically “independent” categories “Kryashen” and “Siberian Tatars” in the 2002 census data. Both of these categories would indicate as statistical subgroups of Tatars.

In the instances when there was no noticeable political pressure from the republics, new ethnic categories “appeared” smoothly. We are talking, for example, about Besermyan whose total population is 3,200. The Udmurt Republic authorities had nothing to say against their “statistical independence.” The same can be said regarding Kumandin, Telengit, Teleut and others, who are accounted separately from Altai people. The census also distinguished Shapsug separately from Adygei, Rusin separately from Ukrainians and Soyot separately from Tuvinians.

3. Concerning depopulation and demographical growth

The subject of depopulation, present in practically all discussions regarding the problems of Russia’s population, has also surfaced in regard to ethnic aspects. Overall, the census demonstrated the groundlessness of many fears and conversations about the “ethnocide” that supposedly took place in 1990s, as well as of the radical changes in the demographic ratios among Russia’s core nationalities. The data on 23 most large-numbered groups (96 percent of the country’s population) looks as follows (Table 2).

The census showed the groundlessness of fears of a catastrophic decrease in the number of ethnic Russians[12]. On the eve of the census, mass media had published numerous forecasts according to which the population of Russians decreased by 15-19 million, or almost 15percent as compared with the last Soviet census. The decrease really did take place, but its value was considerably less. The overall number of Russians decreased by 3 percent, and their share in the country’s population fell by 2 percent. The main reason for the decrease is the demographic ageing of the population, the majority of which are city dwellers. This in turn causes low fertility and high mortality rates. Emigration played a secondary role in the decrease in the number of ethnic Russians. Overall, migration plays a positive role by compensating the decrease in the Russian population. An additional source of demographic replenishment is the assimilation in favor of the Russian language and ethnic identity among certain groups. On the whole the population of ethnic Russians can be considered stable with a tendency to decrease due to the demographic ageing.

Table 2. Ethnic Composition of Population in Russia, 2002

	2002		1989		percent increase, 2002 to 1989
	thousand people	percent of total	thousand people	percent of total	percent increase, 2002 to 1989
Total Population in Russia	145166,7	100,00	147021,9	100,00	98,74
Russians	115889,1	79,83	119865,9	81,53	96,68
Tatar	5554,6	3,83	5522,1	3,76	100,59
Ukrainians	2943,0	2,03	4362,9	2,97	67,45
Bashkir	1673,4	1,15	1345,3	0,92	124,39
Chuvash	1637,1	1,13	1773,6	1,21	92,30
Chechen	1360,3	0,94	899,0	0,61	151,31
Armenians	1130,5	0,78	532,4	0,36	212,34
Mordovian	843,4	0,58	1072,9	0,73	78,60
Belarusian	814,5*	0,56	544,0**	0,37	149,71
Avar	808,0	0,56	1206,2	0,82	66,98
Kazakh	654,0	0,45	635,9	0,43	102,85
Udmurt	636,9	0,44	714,8	0,49	89,10
Azeri	621,8	0,43	335,9	0,23	185,13
Mari	604,3	0,42	643,7	0,44	93,88
Germans	597,2	0,41	842,3	0,57	70,90
Kabard	520,0	0,36	386,1	0,26	134,68
Ossetians	514,9	0,35	402,3	0,27	127,99
Dargin	510,2*	0,35	353,3*	0,24	144,38
Buryat	445,2	0,31	417,4	0,28	106,65
Yakut	443,9	0,31	380,2	0,26	116,73
Kumyk	422,4	0,29	277,2	0,19	152,40
Ingush	413,0	0,28	215,1	0,15	192,04
Lezgin	411,5	0,28	257,3	0,17	159,96
Other/declined to state	4257,1	2,93	4036,1	2,78	105,48

* The Avar category included Ando-Tsez and Archin; the Darghin category included Kaitaq and Kubachi.

The census also registered a negligible decrease in the population of Mari, Udmurt, Chuvash, Mordovian, Khakas, Komi and several other groups. Other categories, on the contrary, grew in numbers (Avar, Azeri, Armenian, Bashkir, Buryat, Darghinian, Kabardinian, Kumyk, Lezgin, Ossetian, Chechens, Ingush and Yakut). However this didn’t create any radical changes in the ethnic makeup of the country’s population, except for a considerable decrease in the number of Ukrainians, Jews and Germans.

As far as the largest ethnic categories, more than a million strong, the census discovered the following tendencies. There are categories whose numerical strength has grown considerably. This is, first of all, the Armenians, whose numbers have doubled (212 percent as compared to their population in Russia in 1989). The census of 1989 counted 532,000 Armenians, while the most recent count is 1.1 million. The reasons for such growth are obvious: it was primarily the intensive migration which took place in the end of 1980s, both from Armenia (following the earthquake) and from Azerbaijan (following Karabakh conflict). The second reason is the positive demographic growth, especially among those Armenians who are peasants by origin.

The second place, in terms of numerical growth, is occupied by the Chechens. The data shows that their numbers increased by 50 percent (there were 899,000 Chechens, and now there are 1.3 million). The mass media talked a lot about the fact that the number of Chechens was overestimated in the process of the census. Demographic result analysis is still waiting for its turn. Even now, however, calculations show that, considering a relatively high level of natural reproduction, a considerable growth of Chechen population really could take place. Direct and indirect losses among Chechens in the course of the arm conflict in 1990ths were lower that it has been generally believed.

Among large ethnic categories, the census showed numerical growth among Bashkir, which can be explained not only by demographic reasons (including migration), but also by political factors. The population of Tatars basically did not change. There were 5.52 million, and now there are 5.55 million. The processes of demographic ageing are not the only reasons for growth slowdown. The problem is partly due to assimilation processes, and partly due to inaccuracies in the calculation of ethnic identity. Concerning the Tatars residing on Bashkortostan Republic, many observers talk even about the forgery of census data. Now it is clear that if the State Statistics Committee did not include among the Tatars the Kryashen and Siberian Tatars, there wouldn’t be even this minimal growth. Earlier, in the micro-census of 1994, Siberian Tatars were counted separately from Tatars. And where Kryashen are concerned, on the eve of the census, this group was the cause of vehement public and political discussions that spilled outside of scientific argument[13]. Additionally in the course of this census the State Statistics Committee counted separately an ethnic group of Nagaibak, who were earlier also considered a part of Tatar group[14].

Nonetheless, these exceptions are not statistically significant viewed against the background of more than 5 million people who named themselves Tatars. In actuality, we should be speaking not about the decrease in the population of Tatars, but about the trustworthiness of the census in Bashkiria, where, as the last Soviet census had shown, the number of Tatars was greater than that of Bashkir.[15] Even considering a low level of natural reproduction[16], and not taking into account the migration inflow, the number of Tatars compared with 1989 had to increase by 500,000. And this is many times more than the aforementioned groups of Siberian Tatars, Kryashen and Nagaibak counted all together.

As for the anticipatory growth of Bashkir as compared to Tatars, “demographic games” of Bashkortostan politicians is only one of the reasons behind such a result. If we compare the data of several censuses, we will see a following picture: in 1989 the population of those who called themselves Tatars constituted 110.3 percent as compared to the population of 1979, while the number of those who called themselves Bashkir – only 104.2 percent. If the do not take into account the phenomenon of identity change, the results may seem strange. It is well known that there are more peasants among Bashkir and that their fertility rate is greater than that of Tatars. In the most recent census Bashkirs gained a revenge of sorts: among the Tatars the increase is minimal – only 100.7 percent, while among Bashkir – a very noticeable 124.4 percent. The truth, as always, is somewhere in between.

The Chuvash population has decreased slightly: there were 1.77 million, and now there are 1.64 million. The process of demographic ageing is among the listed reasons, but the main factor is the change of ethnic identity. The second reason behind the decrease in population is also typical for the Ukrainians. It is known that in the first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, a great number of Ukrainians, especially from the Far East region of Russia, moved back to Ukraine. But soon a reverse migration tendency from Ukraine to Russia appeared and it was most obvious in the second half of 1990s. To this day, Ukraine is the main source of the Russia’s migratory growth. On the eve of the publication of the first results of the census mass media gave their forecasts according to which the population of ethnic Ukrainians had to increase very strongly[17]. Yet, despite the forecasts, the census registered a considerable and unforeseen decrease in the number of Ukrainians – from 4.3 million to 2.9 million, which is almost a third. The presence of change of identity factor in this case seems obvious.

Among other large ethnic categories, less than one million, but more than 500,000 people strong, the growth in numbers is typical only for the groups from the Caucasus region. The most noticeable are Azeris. The recent census counted 622,000 of them as compared to 336,000 in 1989, which means that there had been an 85 percent increase. The tempo of growth of the Azeri population is just somewhat slower than that of the Armenians. The factors of fast population growth are mostly the same, mainly of the migratory kind. Still the census dispelled the myth about enormous scale of Azeri influx to Russia. It is obvious that there will be a large amount of publications in the mass media, trying to prove that the census underestimated the Azeri population. After all, the mass media wrote about “millions” of Azeri living in Russia, a large diasporas in the Volga region and in the Urals, and about a “million” in Moscow alone.

Underestimation could possibly take place, but it cannot be considerable. The thing is, there simply cannot be several million of Azeri natives living outside of Azerbaijan, and this is shown by simple calculations. The census of 1989 showed that there were 7.02 million people living in the republic of Azerbaijan. The census, which was conducted in 1999 showed the number of Azerbaijan’s residents to be 7.95 million. If we proceed from the assumption of hypothetically high figures of natural reproduction, then there should have been approximately 8.8 million living in the country in 1999. But the census gave a figure 850,000 less than the forecasted number. We should, of course, take into account the demographic consequences of the conflicts which took place in the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s: almost all of the Armenians left Azerbaijan, and on top of that, the Azeri census could not for certain count the population of the Karabakh region. But it did take into account a large number of forced migrants who came to the country from Armenia and Central Asia, and demographically speaking, this should have largely compensated the difference. It is obvious that the difference between the end result and the forecasted population was created by other migratory processes, namely the outflow of the population. Among those who left Azerbaijan approximately 250,000 were ethnic Russians. A certain amount of the gone residents were ethnic Ukrainians, Tatars and Jews. But the majority of those who moved abroad are Azeri, and there are approximately 600,000 of them. Many of them settled in Turkey and in the states of the former USSR, a certain part moved to the European countries and the American continent. The majority moved to Russia and this corresponds with the figures of 2002 census, which show the increase in Azeri population by 285,600. Of course, we cannot but agree that the number of Azeri at the moment of the census was greater. But a greater number was caused by the presence of temporary working migrants, who are not taken into account during the census. And even in this case it is not a matter of millions of people. For various reasons the state migratory services constantly overestimate the number of migrants due to the fact that statistical accounting of them takes place two or three times a year, and in turn creates many misfits in the numbers.

A 40 percent increase in population has been registered among Dargin and Avar population, which corresponds to the notions prevalent among experts about the permanent and considerable natural reproduction rate in Daghestan Republic. The increase turned out to be even greater than could be forecasted from the calculations. Considering the tendencies that existed on the borderline between 1980s and 1990s, the growth in the Avar population had to amount to approximately 120,000-150,000 people, while the census showed an increase of more than 200,000. This is taking into consideration that the present census didn’t count with the Avars the representatives of Ando-Tsez groups whose total number amounts to approximately 58,000. The forecasted growth of the Dargin population should not have exceeded 90,000 but it turned out to be more than 150,000 people.

Another point of surprise is the anticipatory, as compared with the forecasted level, growth of the Kabard population. The assumption was that the growth will amount to approximately 80,000 but the census showed an increase of more than 130,000.

It should be noted that the aforementioned groups couldn’t grow due to migration, or thanks to integration and assimilation processes. Natural reproduction is basically the only source of growth in this case. This is why the received results need a special analysis. It is possible that mistakes have been made in the process of the census, and deliberate overestimation of statistical data should not be discounted either.

Among large groups, which grew in numbers considerably the census also showed the Ossetians. Their 28 percent increase, which is far from being as striking as that of the Kabard or the Avar, doesn’t present any grounds for suspicion. It is well known that tens of thousands of Ossetians moved to Russia, in particular to North Ossetia, from the neighboring Georgia. Without taking migratory inflow into account, the numerical growth of the Ossetian population could be considered slow, judging from the demographic criteria (approximately 1 percent a year).

Where Kazakhs are concerned, we observe a phenomenon opposite to the Caucasus one. Here we see not the overestimation, but underestimation of population. The number of Kazakhs, according to the census, grew only by 3 percent while it is well known about the intensive migratory inflow from the neighboring Kazakhstan. The majority of newly arrived Kazakhs settle down in the southern areas of the Volga regions and in the rural areas of the Urals. Meanwhile, in the previous inter-census interval, the increase of the Kazakh population in the Russian Federation was second only to the increase in the fastest growing North Caucasus ethnic groups.

Other large ethnic categories – Belarusian, Mari, Mordovians, Germans, Udmurt – saw their population decrease (even though a decrease among Mari wasn’t considerable, their population can be characterized as stable with a tendency to decrease). The main reasons are demographic ageing and the change of ethnic identity. The number of Belarusian and Germans had also decreased due to migration, even though at different stages of the process migration played a ambiguous role. Over the course of 1990s Russia was a staging post of sorts for the migratory flows to Germany. Even though every year a large amount of Germans from Kazakhstan and Central Asia came to Russia, between 30,000 and 50,000 of them left the country for Germany on yearly basis. By the end of 1990s the migration was more likely a factor of growth of the number of Germans in Russia, than a factor of their decrease. But the overall balance turned out to be negative and there has been a decrease by almost one third in the German population of the Russian Federation.

The next category – 100,000 to 500,000 people – includes a much greater number of groups. Among them are Jews, whose population according to the last Soviet census exceeded the half-million level and now amounts only to 230,000 people. The occurred population decrease, which happened due to the intensive emigration to Israel, the European countries and the American continent and also due to demographical ageing, amounted to almost two thirds and turned out to be the greatest figure among all ethnic categories.

Reasons of assimilative character stand behind the decrease in the population of Komi and Komi-Permyak. There has been negligible growth among such groups as Buryat, Kalmyk, Adygei. The growth in the number of Yakut and Tuvinian is slightly more noticeable. The increase in the number of Yakut is explained not only by the demographic growth, but also by the impossibility to account for a double identity (Yakut-Russian, Yakut-Evenk and other variants). The growth in the number of Tuvinian is explained mostly by their considerable demographic increase.

The census showed an almost 20 percent increase in the population of Gypsies. The census of 2002 counted 183,000 of them, while the previous census of 1989 found only 153,000. The trustworthiness of this calculation is doubtful. Just like in Soviet times, the recent census is highly unlikely to adequately calculate the population of this category. It is known that the overall number of Russia’s Gypsies has been strengthened by the natives arrived from Ukraine and the Central Asia[18]. The census of 2002 distinguished a separate category, Central Asian Gypsies, but only several hundreds of people signed their name under this category. Those who moved to Russia, even if they were registered by the census, called themselves simply Gypsies. Some called themselves members of a completely different category, for example Uzbek or Tadjik, meaning the country of their origin. Considering the significant natural reproduction rate among the Gypsies, the results of the census should not be trusted, because they show an annual growth of 1.4-1.6 percent, which doesn’t correspond well with reality. It is possible that a large number of Gypsies can be “found” in other groups. For example the census showed that a number of Tadjik in Russia has increased greatly.

Tadjik are the first in Russia in terms of speed of growth among large-numbered groups. Their population has increased from less than 40,000 to 120,000, which is more than three times. The main factor here, no doubt, is migration. But natural reproduction also plays an ever-growing role. Russian mass media produces a great number of myths regarding Tadjik, the gist of which is the same as with Azeri. Tadjik are accused of almost total migration to Russia. In reality the scale is completely different. However, if we take into account the labor migrants, the number of Tadjik in Russia would come out to be greater than that presented by the census.

Great growth rates have also been registered among Ingush, Lezgin, Koreans, Kumyk, Tabasaran, Lak, Balkar, Karachai and Georgians. Lezgin population grew by almost 60 percent. This is explained not only by the significant natural reproduction rate, but also by the inflow from outside of Russia, namely from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. A 40 percent growth in Korean population and a 50 percent increase among Georgians are explained by the same reasons.

As far as Ingush are concerned, it is obvious that a relatively high rate of natural reproduction (highest in Russia, except for Daghestan population) is unlikely to give such a significant increase as 92 percent. There are almost no sources of migratory inflow for Ingush. Therefore it is possible that there have been trivial upward distortions in the course of the census, since a change in ethnic identity in favor of Ingush among other nationalities is highly unlikely[19]. The wish of Ingush authorities to preserve the population of the level of recent years (due to high amount of refugees from Chechnya) is understandable, considering that state subsidies from the federal budget are decreasing. The artificial nature of the excessive increase in numbers or the mistakes in census calculations can be applied to the Balkar population as well.

4. Dismantling the Myth of the Extinction of Indigenous Northern Minorities

Back in the 1920s, the USSR had pinpointed a special population that lived in particularly difficult climactic conditions, was distinctively small in number and preserved traditional ways of life. These were the 26 so-called Indigenous Northern Peoples. In the 1990s, several other groups were added to this category. At the moment, there are approximately 40 so-called indigenous northern peoples in Russia, residing in the North, Siberia, and the Far East. The federal law On the Governmental Support of the Indigenous Northern Peoples in Russia, passed in 1999, determines that this population category includes ethnic groups numbering less than 50,000 that lead a traditional way of life (hunting, river/sea fishing). The social and economic condition and the cultural state of these groups are in critical condition. In the beginning of the 1990s, as the USSR fell apart and market relations developed, northern peoples were in a very difficult situation: they were left without state nurturance and financial support, operational healthcare, educational, and supplies networks, along with other social security measures that they had gotten used to over the years of Soviet Government. Many had to switch to self-subsistence to feed their families and ensure survival. A number of families left cities for settlements, and settlements for the taiga and the tundra, where previously seasonal colonies and camps had been established. The expectations of the aboriginal peoples are connected to their hopes of social support on the part of the government. Indigenous minority associations have vocally supported this, along with numerous scientists and social activists.

Census data can aid in making state policy more effective in supporting the aboriginal peoples and preserving their unique culture. First and foremost, the very existence of one or another peoples in the census list is a launching point for creating appropriate government programs for supporting ethnic culture and language. In 2000 and 2001, Russia passed two laws on indigenous communities and on the allotment of land to the aborigines (the “traditionally used territories”). Moreover, according to Russian laws, indigenous peoples have a number of privileges, including the dismissal from army service and the opportunity to participate in regional and local administration on the basis of special quotas. Obviously, then, the statistics on the numbers of aborigines are very important.

The 2002 census determined the numbers of indigenous minorities in the North, Siberia, and the Far East. The numbers had increased by 17 percent in comparison to 1989 statistics (Table 3). Approximately the same growth was observed during the previous inter-census period (1979-1989).

Table 3. Indigenous Northern Peoples (1979 – 2002)

Group		Total Population
	Total in 1979	Total in 1989	percent of 1979 Figure	Total in 2002	percent of 1989 Figure
Aleut	489	644	131,7	592	91,9
Chukcha	13937	15107	108,4	15827	104,7
Chuvan	–	1384	?	1300	93,9
Dolgan	4911	6584	134,8	7330	105
Ent	–	198	?	327	165
Eskimo	1460	1704	116,7	1798	105,5
Even	12452	17055	137	19242	112,8
Evenk	27941	29901	110,6	35377	118,3
Itelmen	1335	2429	181,9	3474	143
Ket	1072	1084	101,1	1891	174,4
Khanty	20743	22283	107,4	28773	129
Koryak	7637	8942	117,1	9077	110
Mansi	7434	8279	111,4	11573	133,9
Nanai	10357	11883	114,7	12355	104
Negidal	477	587	123,1	806	137,3
Nenets	29487	34190	115,9	41454	121,2
Nganasan	842	1262	149,9	879	69,6
Nivkh	4366	4631	106,1	5287	114
Orochi	1040	883	84,9	884	100,1
Ulta (Orok)		179	?	432	241,3
Saami	1775	1835	103,4	2132	116,2
Selkup	3518	3564	101,3	4367	125,5
Tofalar	576	722	125,3	1020	141,3
Udege	1431	1902	132,9	1665	87,5
Ulchi	2494	3173	127,2	3098	97,6
Yukagir	801	1112	138,8	1529	137,5
Total:	156575	181517	116,4	212489	117
Kerek	-	-	-	22	-
Tatz	-	210	-	291	138,5
Total:		181727		212802	117
Kumandin	-	-	-	3123	-
Teleut	-	-	-	2658	-
Tuvinian Todzhan	-	-	-	36230	-
Shor	-	15745	-	14018	89
Итого	-	183272	-	268831	-
Chelkan	-	-	-	864	-
Chulym	-	-	-	661	-
Kamchadal	-	-	-	2422	-
Soyot	-	-	-	2833
Telengit	-	-	-	2614	-
Tubalar	-	-	-	1569	-
Total:	-	-	-	279794	-

Four out of 26 indigenous northern minorities decreased in numbers – the Aleutians, the Nganasan, the Ulchi, and the Chuvan. The decrease in the number of the Udege people is due to the separation of the Taz (the total number of the Udege and the Taz is 1956 vs. 1902 in 1989). The number of the Orok (Ulta) has increased by a factor of nearly 2.5. To a large degree, this is due to a more precise census process (the more precise name ulta was used) and increased self-identification. The numbers of the Nenets, Selkup, Khanty, Yukaghir, Negidal, Tofalar, Itelmen, and Ket have increased considerably (from 20-30 percent to 70 percent). If we look at 30 Indigenous Northern Peoples (together with the Kumandin, Teleut, Tuvan-Todzhynts, and Shor), they now number 268,831 people. Only the Shors and the Taz can be compared to the 1989 figures: the number of Shors has decreased by 11 percent, while the number of the Taz increased by 37.5 percent. The total number of all Indigenous Northern and Siberian Peoples in the Russian Federation (including the newly singled out Kamchadal, Telengit, Tubalar, Chelkan, and Chulym) is 279,797.

These figures are disproved by many expert evaluations and the current data collected by the Russian State Statistics Committee concerning the issue of the extinction of the INM, which have been made over the past ten or fifteen years. According to the data collected by the RAS Institute of Cytology and Genetics and the RAS Institute for the Issues of Indigenous Northern Peoples, over ten minorities are “on the verge of losing their gene pool, language, and culture, i.e. extinction as a people”[20]. The experts at these research institutes have concluded that the natural increase of Indigenous Northern Peoples has decreased by the factor of 2.3 on average between 1990 and 1998. Current State Statistics Committee data also created a distorted demographic picture of the INP, because a) it did not include the data about the numbers of city dwellers among the aborigines, and b) they were based on natural growth data and did not account for the national self-identification factor. Thus, much of this data (most often collected by local administrations) turned out to be inaccurate. The integrity of a number of academic publications based on this data is also questionable.

[1] Stepanov V.V. Russian Census 2002: The Ways of Measuring Identity of Multitudinous and Small Numbered Ethnic Groups //Applied and Urgent Ethnology Investigations. #.145. Moscow: Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001 (in Russian).

[2]See: V.A. Tishkov. By the Way of Introduction. How was the ethnography of the census made possible? // Ethnography of Census. Under editorship of E. Filippova, D. Arel, K. Gusef. Moscow, 2003(in Russian).

[3] Osipov A. Comment on the publication “On the state of Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar Region” // Bulletin of the Network for Ethnic Monitoring and Early Warning, N11, 1997 (in Russian).

[4] “Meskhetian Turks” name is most often used by the authorities to identify a category of citizens repressed in the Stalin era. The group originated in Georgia and was exiled to Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). In reality this name covers several groups. The majorities of them are the real Meskhetian Turks or as they often call themselves “Akhaltsikh Turks”. This category also includes natives of Adjaria Autonomous Region (Georgia) : Khemshil, Laz , Adjar (Popov A. Krasnodar krai: On the state of migrants from Transcaucasia // Bulleting of the Network for Ethnic Monitoring and Early Warning, #25, 1999, (in Russian)).

[5] Stepanov V.V. Will the census be able to count the ethnic groups? // Scenic Russia, 2002, #2 (in Russian).

[6] See: V.A. Tishkov. Ethnical puzzles of the first Soviet population censuses. // Social transformations in Russian history. Anthology of articles in honor of 70th anniversary of academician V.V. Alekseev. Under editorship of V.A. Vinogradova. Yekaterinburg, 2004 (in Russian).

[7] On this issue see: Gorenburg, Dmitry. Identity Change in Bashkortostan: Tatars into Bashkirs and Back. // Ethnic and Racial Studies 22 (3): 554-80.

[8] Based on the results of 2002 census in Russia, 1.5 million people did not specify their “nationality” (i.e. ethnic identity). In reality, this number includes not only those who declined to answer the question but those who were counted in absentia (the census presupposed such a possibility) – from the information given by relatives, neighbors or provided by the local authorities.

[9] Stepanov V.V. Ethnical identity and registration of the population (how the state conducted the All-Russian Census 2002) // Ethnography of census – 2002. – Moscow: “Aviaizdat” publishing house, 2003 (in Russian).

[10] The quantity of accounted for ethnic categories is greater because the census of 2002 distinguishes not only the statistical groups, but the so-called statistical subgroups as well.

[11] See for example, certain historical and ethnographical essays about all of these peoples in the publication: Peoples of Daghestan. Under editorship of S.A. Arutyunov, A.I. Osmanov, G.A. Sergeeva. Moscow, 2002 (in Russian).

[12] Tishkov V.A., Stepanov V.V. Ethnical makeup of Russia’s population (first results of the 2002 census) // Bulletin of the Network for Ethnic Monitoring and Early Warning. Volga Federal District, 2003, #64 (in Russian)

[13] See on this topic: V.A. Tishkov, S.V. Sokolovsky. Russia’s Tatars and the All-Russian population census of 2002. Report made at the research seminar “Tatar question in Russia”. Moscow, 2004 (in Russian).

[14] In Orenburg and Chelyabinsk regions there lives a small group (10,000-15,000) which calls itself Nagaybaks (Nagajbekler). The researchers believe that Nagaybaks are the descendants of either christened Nogay or christened Kazan Tatars. In the census of 1926 and also beginning with the micro-census of 1994, Nagaybaks are considered as statistically separate from Tatars.

[15] According to 1989 census, Russians made up 39.3 percent of population in Bashkortostan (Bashkiria), Tatars – 28.4 percent, Bashkirs – 21.8 percent. The republican authorities desired very much to change this ratio (for more details, see: Gabdrafikov I. Preliminary results of the population census. Bashkortostan. // Bulletin of the Network for Ethnic Monitoring and Early Warning, # 49, 2003 (in Russian)).

[16] Low natural reproduction amounts to 5-10 per mille a year. Taking into account the predicted level of 6.2 per mille of the natural reproduction of Tatars on the Russian territory, which was determined by the State Statistics Committee in 1990 based on the results of 1989 census and on the materials of current calculations, the forecasted number of Tatars during the census of 2002 could amount to 6.02 million people.

[17] Novye Izvestia daily wrote on September 5, 2003 about more than 700,000 increase in the Ukrainian population in Russia.

[18] Outside of Russia in other republics of the Soviet Union 1989 census registered more than 100,000 Gypsies. Approximately 48,000 were found in Ukraine, more than 28,000 in the Central Asian republics.

[19] However it can be assumed that some of Chechen refugees, living with their relatives in Ingushetia could call themselves Ingush. In addition Ingush identity could be claimed by the small-numbered group of Orstkhoy, who live on the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya. Earlier this group was considered a part of the Chechens.

[20] Ch. M. Taksami. Siberian People in the 20^th Century: Social, Economic, and Cultural Progress // Ecology of Siberian Ethnic Cultures on the Even of the 21^st Century. St.Petersburg, 1995, pp.17-19; G. I. Pelikh. The Selkup: a People is Dying Out in the Siberian Taiga // People of Siberia: Rights and Opportunities. Novosibirsk, 1997 (in Russian).

	Population accounted separately and as part of other groups
Adzhar	v
Akhvakh	v
Akkin Chechen	v
Andi	v
Archi	v
Astrakhan’ Tatar	v
Bagulal	v
Bengali
Besermyan
Bezhtin	v
Botlig	v
Central Asian Arab
Central Asian Gypsy	v
Chamalal	v
Chelkan	v
Chulym
Cossack	v
Digor Ossetian	v
Yezid
Ginugh	v
Godoberi	v
Gunzib	v
Ingermanland Finn	v
Ingiloy	v
Iron Ossetian	v
Kamchadal
Karata	v
Kaitaq	v
Kerek
Khemshil	v
Khwarshi	v
Komi Izhem	v
Kryashen	v
Kubachi	v
Kumandin
Latgali	v
Laz	v
Meadow Mari	v
Mingrelian	v
Meskhetian Turk
Montenegrians
Mordovian Erzya	v
Mordovian Moksha	v
Forest Mari	v
Nagaibak
Pomory	v
Portuguese
Rushan
Rusin
Setu Estonian	v
Shapsug
Shugnan
Siberian Tatar	v
Soyot
Svan	v
Swedish
Tatz
Telengit
Teleut
Tindal	v
Tsez	v
Tubalar	v
Tuvinian Todzhan	v
Urum Greek	v
Vod’
Yug	v