Ethnicity
and Law in Contemporary Russia
By Valery
Tishkov
Corresponding
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Director of
the Ethnology and Anthropology
Institute of
the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Director
of Network for Ethnic Monitoring and Early Warning
(Translated from Russian)
TACIS
project of Promotion of Tolerance and Improving Interethnic Relations in
Russia presents one of its performance results in the realm of the legal component. This project area studied the basics of legal awareness and the
current legal regulations that determine and regulate ethnic relations in such
complicated society as the Russian Federation. As the point of TACIS is to introduce in Russia the best of social
experience accumulated by European Community countries, the foremost goal of
the project was to train Russian lawyers and law enforcers by introducing them
to the legal regulations and practices in European countries. At the same time, the project analyzed
Russia’s legal framework and law enforcement practices in the area of ethnic
relations as well as the influence of the Russian legal system as a whole on
this area of social life.
Why is this issue so crucial for Russia, what
are the obstacles involved, and how will the application of the best foreign
practices aid in improving social governance? First of all, let us note two
special circumstances that characterize Russia. First, Russia’s multiethnic, multi-confessional population makes
Russia similar to all other large states with complicated ethnic, religious,
and racial compositions. Only
ignorance or deliberate rejection of the outside world may result in statements
about the uniqueness of Russia’s multitude of nationalities. Secondly, Russia’s actual dissimilarity
from the rest of the world (except for former USSR countries) lies in the
meaning with which ethnic variance is invested in Russia and in the effect of
this special understanding of ethnicity on the society and politics.
The thesis about Russia’s similarity and
dissimilarity begs for clarification; too frequently two types of opposing
arguments are used in order to avoid making a mental effort or to dispute an
opponent’s statement, while in essence the meaning of these arguments is
identical. The first is, “Russia is
not America, which was composed of migrants and where all residents have melded
into a single nation of Americans. Russia
is a unique country, because over 160 peoples and nations live here in peace
and accord.” The second argument is,
“Russia has always been and remains to this day an empire. It is not a national, but a multinational state and the inevitable
process of self-determination has not yet run its course, because not all
peoples have achieved statehood.” Lately,
there has been one more theory that explains Russia, stemming from a dogmatic
interpretation of the modern approach to national identity as a multiethnic
civil society and the issue of the existence of such a national solidarity in
Russia. As a reminder, President
Vladimir Putin made this important statement on February 5, 2004 in the city of
Cheboksary, “I believe that today we have every reason to talk of the Russian
people as a single nation…The members of the most diverse ethnicities and
religions in Russia feel as one people. They
use all of their wealth and cultural diversity in the interests of the entire
society and the state. We must
preserve and strengthen our national and historic unity.”
This statement, so inconvenient for outdated
language and thought, was interpreted to favor the nationalists in the realms
of science and politics, who act on the part of “the nation forming the state,”
i.e. ethnic Russians. The single
nationality suggested by Putin in place of multiple nationalities was
interpreted not as an effort to infuse the political and legal concept of
“nation” with a civil, rather than ethnic meaning, but in the same old way, as
a reminder which ethnic communities are considered nations in Russia, while
others are merely national minorities, and who must hold the power in the
country: ethnic Russians, of course, since they make up 80% of the population!
The more careful “old-school” thinkers began to say that Putin had meant the
distant future, that a nation takes long in forming and that this forming of a
single whole must be started in Russia, but no one knows when it will be over. As a result, there was no conceptual
breakthrough in the realization of Russia as a national state. The 3rd Assembly of Peoples
of Russia, conducted in Moscow in March 2004, showed that “nation members” do
not wish to part with the old cliché of a “multinational people” and the
motto of “The friendship of people is the unity of Russia.” One people or one nation do not exist according to the
overwhelming majority of Russia’s experts and politicians, because these
approaches, in their opinion, will dictate the “cancellation of nations” and
forcible turning of everyone into ethnic Russians.
This distinctive understanding of the
ethnicity factor in people’s lives and the organization of state society is the
reason why the updated analysis of the doctrinal equipment used in Russia is so
useful and even necessary. If the
outdated language spoken by experts and used to pen laws is not dismounted,
Russia will never be able to become a fully realized state, and “Russian
people” will remain a euphemism for many within Russia, and definitely for the
world outside.
Contemporary
Russia has adopted many of the Soviet Union’s state-building experiences, such
as making ethnicity state-oriented and giving various ethnic communities
fundamental meaning under the watchful eye of the Communist Party and the
secret police. Even legal norms, which instinctively resist the priority of
collective principles as opposed to the principles of civil individuality and
responsibility, still have retained the language of ethnic nationalism. The
term “national” pertaining to such
notions as self-determination, interests, honor and dignity, culture and
education is still more ethnically particular than all-Russian. At the same
time, it seems to be obvious and universally recognized that collective rights
are just a mechanism that completes individual rights and that the realization
of “one nation – one state” principle, where “nation” stands for “a single
ethnic community”, is dangerous utopia. Nonetheless, Russian legislature and
legal practice continue to try and work in this vulnerable semantic field,
making it possible to adopt constitutions and laws on federal and regional
levels, presupposing the right to indicate (or not to indicate) a “national
identity”, meaning not Russian citizenship, but an ethnic identity. These laws
guarantee the “forms of self-determination of Tatar (Bashkir, Karelian and
other) nations”, recognize and protect “national languages and education”
(meaning ethno-cultural aspirations of certain groups of citizens), and make
provision for the punishment of those who insult and humiliate “national honor
and dignity”, meaning once again the culturally significant valuables of
certain groups of population.
Ethno-national
mentality has given birth to notions and political and legal practices which
divide the citizens of one country or federation subject into those who have
“statehood” and those who do not; all of these citizens have Russia’s passports
and equal legal rights. The citizens “without a statehood” use the services of
the state to the same extent as those “with a statehood”, and they serve the
state equally well, even at very high positions of authority. Nonetheless, the
laws and legal norms that divide the Russians into different status groups
still exist.
What Russia
needs is a fundamental clean-up of the legal field, so as to guarantee a more
correct treatment of the ethno-cultural needs. International legal norms could
be a useful but by no means the only reference point. What of the international
experience can be used in order to revise the domestic legal baggage? What
shouldn’t we use, since even international legal norms harbor certain
politicized absurdities? First of all, it is necessary to be more consistent in
administering the principle of citizenship. The citizens of one state cannot be
divided into “native” and “non-native” residents; even more so, some citizens
should not be considered “state-forming” while others as not; certain
populations cannot be labeled the “principal population” while others are
dismissed as the diasporas. All citizens, regardless of their ethnic
“membership”, are equally the creators and owners of the Russian Federation,
all citizens represent the “principal population”, including the so-called
“minorities”. The right to territory, resources and power in Russia travel
along with the citizen, wherever he or she lives and works.
Certain
restrictions might apply to foreign citizens or temporary migrants, but
exceptions from this principle have to be made for the former citizens of the
Soviet Union, considering the recent break-up of this historical state as well
as persistent human contacts and interests, including a special connection many
feel towards Russian national culture based on the Russian language. Legal subsidiarity, i.e. special rights to use
the resources and to organize territorial self-government, may exist only for a
special category of the population, which in the Western world is determined as
an “indigenous” or “aboriginal” population. However, the Western definition of
this notion applies to the carriers of life-support culture, based on
traditional ways of living (deer-raising, hunting, river and marine fishing)
and partly nomadic ways of life in extreme climatic conditions. In this
instance, special legal norms that could give additional protection to these
small-numbered and socially and culturally vulnerable communities are truly
necessary. The matter primarily concerns the so-called Indigenous Peoples of
the Russian North, Siberia and Far East. The focus of this legal exception is not
the indigenousness, since after all it is the representatives of these ethnic
communities who are the real aborigines in our country, and not the descendants
of recent immigrants. The main argument for the special legal status and
additional legal protection norms lies in the factors of minority, the ways of
living, and socio-cultural vulnerability.
Renewal of
the legal norms that regulate ethnic relations is not limited to the
extermination of ethnic nationalist moments and a more consistent realization
of the overall principle of equal civil rights. The legal system should also
strive to enrich private legal norms that reflect and ensure ethno-cultural
diversity. The most important sphere is the area of language and education. Law
and bureaucracy, just like military commands, prefer to speak one language, but
there is no state in the world whose citizens would be native speakers of one
tongue. Multilingual society is a civic norm. At the same time, the aspiration
of the citizens to know a common language that is native to the majority of the
country’s population is also a civic norm.
Russia has a
rich experience in language building and the legal regulation of the language
policies. Current laws, on the whole, correspond with the principles of
democracy and the best of international examples. But there still exists a
problem of legal inertia and ideological unfeasibility in regulating languages
in Russians’ life. First and foremost, it concerns a very narrow and
nationalist interpretation of the “native language” notion. The “native
(rodnoy) language” is often also called the “mother tongue”. It means that the
native language corresponds with the ethnic membership of the citizen. Many
experts, politicians, and, quite frequently, the law (especially in the Russian
republics) ignore the pertinent historical situation that shows that, in
Russia, the overwhelming majority of citizens of ethnically non-Russian descent
consider Russian language their native (meaning it is the principal language
they know and speak). Meanwhile, this is the exact interpretation of “native
language” presumed by international legal norms and domestic science. The
scientists, infatuated with the study and rescue of small languages, along with
nationalist politicians, believe that the transition from one language to
another is nothing less that “linguacide”,
the loss of “peoples’ soul”, etc. They ignore the rational behavior of Russian
citizens, for whom good knowledge of the Russian language is more important
than preservation of ethnic roots. It is convincingly shown by the behavior of
parents and young people interested in quality higher education and further
life and career success. But in the legal norms and practices, in some federal
and in many regional laws, language nationalism and politicized unreality are
still present. The motives of this are partly understandable, but they do not
always serve either the citizens’ interest or the task of socio-cultural
integration of the Russian society.
If we
continue to instill the understanding and legal norms which say that the
Russian language is not an exclusive property of Russians, that it is a native
language for everyone who speaks it, thinks it and uses it at home – then where
and how will we find a place for other languages spoken in Russia? How should
we build a national (Russian!) and regional education system, especially in the
regions where the majority (or even a substantial enough minority) speaks a
language other than Russian? The legal norm, in our opinion, should be based on
the fact that the language repertoire of a modern person is firstly determined
by the individual life strategy for personal success, and not by the task of
preserving an ethnos or a language.
The modern person’s possibilities and the methods of language acquisition are
such that they allow to master and use two or even three languages to an equal
degree, but in different situations and with different goals. That is why the
law should respect and guarantee Russian citizens’ right to master the
languages that are necessary for successful life and career both in the local
society and within the boundaries of the whole country, or even in the
international intercourse. The law should have as its goal not only the mission
to rescue vanishing languages or provisions for a full-scale usage of ethnic
minority languages, but the development of bilingual and multilingual
practices. The reality is such that this aim mainly concerns the
representatives of other nationalities, even though Russians who want to
succeed in the social competition and to become culturally richer also have to
know other languages spoken by the country’s citizens.
The problem
of vanishing minority languages and language assimilation in favor of the
languages spoken by larger ethnic communities certainly exists in Russia. A
good example is Republic of Daghestan
situated in North Caucasus where smaller peoples give up their languages
in favor of Avar and Darghinian languages commonly spoken in the republic.
These problems, however, must be solved not through legal regulation, but
through special state-run programs, including the efforts of public enthusiasts
from the scientific community and the native speakers of the language, granted
they are interested in preserving the language.
A special
realm of legal regulation covers the problems of xenophobia and ethnic, racial
and religious extremism. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has the
relevant articles, the wording of which has been recently improved. Experts and
politicians, as well as law enforcement officers, see more and more clearly
that it is necessary to legally persecute and punish not those who insult the
vaguely understood notions of “national honor and dignity” (since it is
difficult to explain what is Gypsy, Russian, Chuvash or Tatar honor and how
they differ from each other), but those who instigate (consciously or
unconsciously) any form of inter-group discord and/or organize and perform any
violent actions to this extent. Where “national honor and dignity” are concerned,
it seems that the punishment should be exacted against persons who verbally or
physically insult the values, norms, and notions collectively honored by the
representatives of a community (nationality or religious community) if the
offence causes unquestionable moral damage to the representatives of this
community.
The analysis
of legal norms in this area shows that even in their present form, laws can and
should work. It is necessary to act consistently and emphatically throughout
the country instead of limiting action to investigations “under special
control” by presidents or governors and to broadcast the trials which often
turn out to be a negative advertisement thanks to mass media efforts. The main
problem here is the mental lack of readiness on the part of law enforcement
officers. The conceptions held by prosecutors, judges, assessors, not to speak
of rank and file policemen, are no different from the common stereotypes and
politicized mythology. If the “Chechens killed so many of ours”, then a lost
young widow whose child was forcibly taken from her and who agreed to take part
in a terrorist attack in order to pay back the debt to her relatives and thus
save her honor (as per Chechen tradition), has to answer fully for her mistake.
This is the decision recently made by the Moscow prosecutor, judge and a jury
panel, which did not involve a single representative from the North Caucasus
peoples, including Chechens. The legal norm has no say in guaranteeing fair
justice in cases where ethnicity has to be taken into account. In many
societies better versed in securing ethno-racial equality, such an accusation
and composition of the jury panel would have been prohibited from the very
beginning. But in Russia this important circumstance was simply ignored and as
a consequence a law that is inherently good gave a bad result.
All of this
means that a special kind of laws and legal practice, as well as a special
preparation and enlightenment in the sphere of legal norms regulating ethnic
relations, guaranteeing harmony and preventing extremism and xenophobia, are
very much needed in the contemporary Russian society. If this is the case, then
the materials prepared by the TACIS project will aid all those interested in
changing the situation.
© EAWARN, 2004
© V. Tishkov, 2004