By Doris Wydra
Since the end of the 20th
century more and more federal structures are developing in
Federalism is seen as an essential
element for democracy and integration, especially in countries with a variety
of different regions and minority constellations. This article tries to give an
overview of different approaches to federalism in
One of the main aspects of
federalism is the distribution of the state territory and authority between the
federal state and the federal subjects. Also the federal subjects enjoy state
quality. This delimitation of competencies and powers is reflected by the
institutional setup of the state, like parliament, government, administration
and the judicial system. The subjects dispose of genuine competencies, which
are not derived from the central state and a set of instruments to allow for
their participation in the policy
formation of the federal state (Laufer 1996). As a
prerogative federalism includes three essential components, the federal,
regional and municipal component. Local self-government is therefore an
indispensable element of federalism (Rykin 1998). Mayntz states, that “federalism does not simply signify
decentralization, but denotes a multi-level structure, the interdependent
concurrence of central and regional levels of decision-making. It is not the
element of decentralization within federalism but exactly the concurrence of
various levels of decisions-making which represent a decisive evolutionary
advantage (Mayntz 1990)”.
Today, federalism is more and more
discussed as a means of minority protection in heterogeneous societies. To
protect minorities multicultural societies have developed two main concepts: on
the one hand the concept of individual freedom and equality, leading to the
individualisation of minority rights and on the other hand the principle of
territorial autonomy, basing rather on the rights of a group of persons living
in a common territory (Fleiner-Gerster 1995). But
within poly-ethnic societies territorial autonomy may not as such lead to an
adequate protection of minorities. Although the model case of
Although most modern theories on
democracy build on a more or less homogenous and closed society and on a basic
consensus of the people living in a democratic state, this is rarely the case, especially in
countries with heterogeneous minority structures (Fleiner
1995). In literature it is therefore quite often argued, that pluralistic
nations call for a federal state structure. It is based on the presumption that
in multicultural states the principle of consensus has to be superior to the
majority principle (Saladin 1995; Fleiner-Gerster
1995). This implies that federalism and democracy can in some way be seen as
contradictory principles, as they are basing on differing values. It can be
said, that the “nation of persons” is incompatible with a “union of places”.
This argumentation assumes, that democracy necessarily depends on the rule of
simple majority votes. In fact federalism can be a method to increase the
majority necessary for state decisions. This does not imply the search for a
“super-majority” for decisions but whenever issues are touched that bother the
essential interests of one or another group, this group has a right to protest,
that cannot or only under more difficult conditions be annulled (Abromeit 1997).
The Swiss constitution bases on the
principle of shared sovereignty between the federal state and the Cantons (Art.
3 Constitution) and a strong emphasis on pluralism within the whole political
system of
The main identification point within
Conflict solving between the Cantons and
the federal state is mainly a duty of the state authorities. According to
Section 4 of the Constitution (Federal Guarantees) the Federation guarantees
the constitutions and the territory of the Cantons (this is a duty of the
Federal Parliament, Art. 172 Constitution). The
Like the Swiss federal system the
German federalism is the result of a historic development, but was also
enforced by the Allied Powers after World War II. The German Basic Law provides
for the delimitation of competencies between the Federation and the federal
States (Länder). According to Article 30 of the
Basic Law all competencies, not explicitly assigned to the federal state lie
within the range of competences of the federal States, but federal law
overrides Land law (Art. 31). In the area of administration the German
federalism shows a strong prevalence of the Länder,
as Article 83 stipulates that “the Länder
execute Federal laws as matters of their own concern insofar as this Basic Law
does not otherwise provide or permit“(Kilper/Lhotta,
1996). The constitutional orders of the Länder have to conform to the principles of a
republican, democratice and social state governed by
the rule of law. Municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all
local affairs on their own responsibility, also concerning financial autonomy.
The Federation has to guarantee, that the constitutional order of the Länder confirms to the basic rights (Art. 28).
Because of the strong co-operation
between the federal state and the Länder, but
also because of the continuous co-ordination between the Länder
in areas, where they are assigned single competence, the German model of
federalism is often termed as “cooperative federalism”, but is also seen as
“executive” federalism, as the federal system is very much dominated by the
governments (of the federal state as well as of the Länder)
(Münch 1996). According to the “eternity”-clause
in Article 79 (3) the federal structure of Germany can not be changed (“An amendment of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation
into Länder, the participation in principle of
the Länder in legislation, or the basic
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20, is inadmissible“) (Arndt 1999). It has to be noted,
that this only guarantees the federal structure of the German state, but is no
guarantee for the continued existence of the Länder
as they exist at the moment[1].
Like the Swiss federalism within the
German model the affiliation to the federal subject is a strong reference
point, although it is not institutionalised like in
An example for a relatively new
federal system in
The new constitution of
The Belgian Court of Arbitration
(Constitutional Court) up to now plays only a limited role, as he cannot
control the compliance of federal and regional laws with all articles of the
constitution, but only with some of its principles (principle of equality,
freedom of education and ideology and the distribution of competences according
to the constitution or in special majority laws) (Swenden
2003).
Although Belgian federalism
comprises three regions and three communities, Belgian politics is in essence
bipolar, as the German speaking population is very small in number. In contrast
to the Swiss system, where political parties play a rather secondary role, in
The Austrian system of federalism
bases on the principle of the hierarchy of legal norms and the concept that all
sub-national power devolves from the federal constitution. The constitutions of
the provinces are delegated law. But according to Article 99 of the Austrian
constitution (Marko 2004)[2] the provinces have
“relative autonomy”, which means, that they are free to regulate all
organisational affairs as long as these provisions do not directly contradict
any provision of the constitution (Marko 2004). In contrast to already
presented federal systems like
This brief overview about different
federal systems showed that federalism is a legal and political term, but has
no fixed substance. As diverse as federal systems in themselves are the
provisions for minority protection within federal systems, as the next
paragraph will show.
Minority and language protection in
different federal systems
Different federal and constitutional
systems also lead to different mechanisms of minority protection and
integration of different ethnic and linguistic communities. Within Swiss
federalism terms like “minority” or “majority” do not have any real
significance. There is a common participation in power by the different
linguistic and religious communities. The linguistic groups for instance have
to be reflected by the composition of the government (art. 175 (4)). Those
communities are the constitutive element of the Swiss federal state. Minorities
are seen as an essential value in relation to the independence of the Cantons,
the linguistic authority of the Cantons and the municipal autonomy. This leads
to an inter-linkage of minorities, as the minorities are overlapping and to a
democracy of institutionalised (linguistic and religious) diversity (Basta 1995).
There are two essential problems
that may challenge the Swiss model of federalism and minority integration: the
first is, that this system is not adopted to non-Swiss nationals (immigrants),
who are not a structural part of the system. For taking part in decision
procedures within the Cantons and municipalities, they only have the chance of
voluntary assimilation. The other challenge is the increasing difference of the
economic development of the Cantons, as this may as a consequence also dissolve
the consensus between the linguistic groups. Another development can become an
increasing problem of legitimacy of the Swiss form of federalism, rather basing
on direct democracy than on representative elements, as the participation in
votes is diminishing (Basta in Samardzic).
The Swiss model, although in
literature often presented as ideal model of federalism, cannot be easily
transferred to other states and systems, although some basic principles can be
derived from it. One essential element is, that it shows, that federalism may
be an instrument of identification building, by strengthening the
identification of various groups with the federal state through identification
with a subject of the state. This is especially important for minorities and
for their relation with the overarching state, as they are more easily building
a loyalty with a state where they have the possibility to articulate their
interests.
When talking about minority
protection in
In
The German system of federalism
shows a lot of differences regarding the integration of immigrants in different
subjects, as the Länder have extensive powers
regarding integration policy (Thränhardt 2001).
An analysis of the German educational system shows, that the achievements of
pupils from immigrant families, vary from federal subject to federal subject.
This can be attributed on the one hand to a phenomenon called
“institutionalised discrimination” which is a form of discrimination that is
inherent in the institutional system of education but also to different forms
of education of pupils from minority groups in different federal subjects and
if the educational tends towards segregation (e.g. by creating separate classes
for foreign pupils) or integration (e.g. comprehensive schools). This analysis
also shows that there is a direct connection between educational policy and the
overall policy on foreigners of the subject (Hunger 2001).
In
Until the year 2000 minority
protection was an exclusively federal competence, in 2000 Article 8 of the
Constitution of Austria was added up by paragraph 2 making linguistic and
cultural pluralism a state goal with regard to the autochthonous ethnic groups.
It is the task of the federation, the subjects and the municipalities to
respect and protect ethnic groups, their language and culture. By this the
provinces will be able to adopt minority protection law, but still only in the
form of complementary law to the legislation passed by the federation (Marko
2004). Because of the federal prevalence the constitutions of the provinces in
question (
In Belgian the smallest linguistic
group is the German speaking minority, that is not protected by a territorial
autonomy but has full jurisdiction within the areas of culture, social matters
and education within the German linguistic region. But it is almost totally
excluded from the relevant mechanisms, which are designed to ensure a balance
between Flemings and French speakers. They enjoy linguistic and cultural
rights, but are only hardly included in the workings of the federal state (Scholsem 1994).
This introduction to different federal systems,
most of them members of the European Union allows for a brief look on the
regionalisation tendencies within the European Union itself, but also on the
commitment to diversity since the
While according to the soviet
perception the government of a multi-ethnic state with the dimension of the
Russian Federalism is mainly
characterized as asymmetric federalism, although in principle the equal
representation of the subjects is fixed within the Russian constitution[4]. This asymmetry is based
on the federal treaties as the constitutional equality of the subjects is not
fostered by the treaties, clearly putting a higher priority on the republics.
Three forms of asymmetry exist: differences in the status of the subjects, that
is provided for in the constitution, different executive powers, fixed by the
bilateral treaties and variations of regional political regimes, that are
mostly in contradiction with the constitution (Heinemann-Grüder,
2002). While the titular nations realise the right of self-determination the
status of other non-Russian nations follow a certain hierarchy (Roesler 1997). Another term used for the Russian form of
federalism is “ethno-federalism”. This refers to a system giving certain groups
a privileged access to power within the subjects de jure
and de facto and also comprises an ethnic component within the representation
of the subjects at the federal level (Heinemann-Grüder
2004). The territorial borders of the Russian subjects do not follow the ethnic
borders. Both, simple territorial or ethno-federalism would have had
disadvantages for the
The Constitutional Court of the
In contrast to other federal systems
the delimitation of powers between the federal state and the subjects (Art.
71-73) is not adapted to the respective state power, but the competences of
legislative and executive powers rather follow the general distribution of
competencies. The subjects may issue legal acts in all areas that do not
explicitly fall within the competence of the federal state. The Russian
constitution only very generally mentions the delimitation of powers, but it
does not clearly state if these are exclusive or concurring competencies.
Especially difficult is the delimitation in the area of shared competencies.
According to the constitution the subjects are competent, as long as the state
has not issued any regulation. There is also no exact definition of the limits
of the legislative powers of the subjects. Those limits are solely defined by
the authority issuing the provision. The hierarchy of norms is not abstractly
provided for in the basic law, but this hierarchy is rather determined by the
competences to issue legal acts. In the case of collision the overriding legal
act is not only prior with regard to the application but also with regard to
validity, the lower-ranking provision is treated as non-existent (Hartwig 2004).
But the delimitation of competencies
is not only fixed within the Russian constitution but also within federal
treaties between the centre and a whole range of the federal subjects. These
treaties vary from subject to subject and foster the asymmetry of the Russian
federalism. Another problem is, that these treaties are not always in line with
the requirements of the constitutional provisions, as single competencies of
the centre became shared competencies or single competencies of the subjects
and shared competencies were also provided for as exclusive competencies of the
subject (Schneider 2004).
The principle organ of
representation of the federal subjects of the
In basic Russian federalism shows
three principal conflict lines: between the centre and the autonomies
(especially the republics), between certain autonomies concerning economic
privileges and between titular nations and other ethnic groups within the
autonomies. Although in principle this may hint towards a possible
intensification of conflicts within Russian ethno-federalism, this does not
have to be the case. Ethno-federalism in itself may also lead to a
de-escalation as no influential interest group puts the system under question
and it also takes pressure from the centre. On the other hand as long as
non-titular nations within
One of the essential deficits of the
Russian federalism is the missing institutionalised communication mechanism
between the subjects of the federation (Hickmann
1996). Another problem are the contradictions between regional legislation and
federal legislation. In part this dates back to the time before the Russian
constitution was issued, as the subjects had already begun with working out
their own systems of sovereignty, but is also a result of the lacking and
imprecise delimitation of competencies within the Russian legislation
(Heinemann-Grüder 2004).
Within
In comparison to other federal
systems
When talking about minority
protection and integration within federalist systems, the shortcomings of
federalism also have to be mentioned. „Regionalism“ can only safeguard certain
minorities, namely those with territorial ties (Kulow/Steuer-Flieser
1995). Without adding features of personal autonomy, it does not protect
dispersed minorities and can by this create primary and secondary minorities.
Most of the federal structures all over
In general it can be said, that
within federalist systems political processes can be quite productive, if the
federal state creates the right framework and the subjects cooperate in kind of
an competition for optimisation. On the other hand federalism can also lead to
a blockade between federation and subjects (Thränhardt
2001).
The role of traditional
administrative entities is no longer only defined in relation to the national
state but also in relation to international developments, especially concerning
economic interests[5].
Globalisation and its effects on national political systems has been heavily
discussed in recent years in political science. This of course also effects
federal systems. Clearly the national state is, while still playing an
important role, loosing its role as single nodal point.
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[1] This
is also provided for in Art. 29 of the German Basic Law: The division of the
federal territory into
Länder may be revised to ensure that each
Land be of a size and capacity to perform its functions effectively, but with
regard to regional, historical and cultural ties, economic efficiency, and ,
the requirements of local and regional planning. Thoses
revisions have to be confirmed by a referendum of the respective Länder.
[2] The
difference between the Austrian and German constitutional law lies mainly in
the fact, that while the
German Basic Law stipulates that all federal
constitutional law has to be part of the constitutional document (Basic Law),
the Austrian constitution does not contain such a provision. In
[3] “The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of
Justice and the Court of Auditors
shall
exercise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for,
on the one hand, by the provisions of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and of the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and supplementing
them and, on the other hand, by the other provisions of this Treaty“
[4] The
and autonomous areas, which shall be equal
subjects of the
[5] Conference
on Challenges of Federal Governance in the Russian and Canadian Federations,
Ottawa 2000,
problemy federativnogo stroitel’stva,
www.forumfed.org