Homegrown
Solution:
Dagestan
Innovates to Address Ethnic Diversity
Enver Kisriyev
Dagestan has developed a unique local self-government system that is especially suited to the republic’s ethnic, social and historical peculiarities.
The republic does not have
a dominant titular population, but instead is home to a wide range of
ethnicities. Although nationalist leaders sometimes seek to divide the
population along ethnic lines, Dagestanis are more likely to identify with a
town or region. Traditionally, Dagestan was divided into hundreds of small city
states or jamaats, and memories of
these boundaries remain. Rather than claiming loyalty to a specific ethnicity,
a Dagestani is more likely to give allegiance to their jamaat.
The old jamaat structure never completely
disappeared under communism, and during the recent transition, when higher
authorities were in a state of turmoil, the people looked to their local
governments for leadership. So Dagestani’s have a history of local
self-government, and they are accustomed to giving real power to local
authorities.
In the political
wrangling that took place as Dagestan sought to form a new government,
statesmen and senior officials of the old guard elite have had to make way for
the new entrepreneurs and leaders of nationalist movements. A third category of
leader, consisting of statesmen-entrepreneurs who belong to both of the other
elite categories, has emerged to seize the upper echelons of power in the
republic. All of these political players attempt to use their own ethnic ties
to build up their power bases. But no single ethnic group can claim dominance
in the political sphere. In fact, careful analysis of the situation indicates
that ethnic issues are not at the core of Dagestani politics. In truth, while
politicians publicly proclaim the importance of ethnicity, the real source of
powers is the jamaats, and a
successful Dagestani politician needs strong backing from a jamaat, or several jamaats with similar interests.
But given the
importance that ethnicity receives in public discourse, leaders sought to
develop a Constitution that addresses ethnic issues and can provide equal
representation for all ethnicities. The result was a unique document that has
developed organically, a process that helped the new Constitution gain the
acceptance of the Dagestani people. Dagestan does not have a single president,
but rather a “collective president” or State Council, which has one member from
each of Dagestan’s 14 officially registered minorities. The Constitution also establishes
ethnic “territorial districts,” in which candidates cannot campaign for
election unless they belong to the specific ethnic group designated for that
district. While this system may appear outwardly undemocratic, by removing
ethnicity as an issue in elections, these “territorial districts” help ease
inter-ethnic relations—and force candidates to focus on more substantial issues
than nationality.
Despite its acceptance
within the republic, Dagestan’s Constitution is in conflict with some of the
norms set down in the Russian Federation’s Constitution. As federal authorities
seek to harmonize the laws of all the republics, the rules in Dagestan may be
altered. But changing Dagestan’s Constitution would mean discarding a system
that has been especially designed to meet the unique needs of the republic. Any
artificial structure put up in its place might not work as well, and might also
be rejected by the populace.
In this chapter, we
will outline some of the ethnic peculiarities and other unique factors that
define Dagestan and look at the ways in which these peculiarities have
influenced the republic’s response to local self-government.
1. Introduction
It was clear to observers in the regional capital of Makhachkala that the Communist Party was losing its grip in 1989, when the levers of power were taken over by the top leadership of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet of the Dagestani Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (DASSR).
By that time it was
also clear that Moscow no longer ruled the republic as it had done for decades
during the Communist regime. Instead, the central government, through all the
traditional channels of its influence, was provoking radical political changes
in the provinces. The innovations radiating from the center were both
mystifying and disastrous to the local leadership, who had to rely on their own
resources and experience to tackle the problems raised by “perestroika.”
The structure of state
power that emerged in Dagestan, following the disintegration of the Communist
regime and the USSR, was the result of internal development. The system of
government described in Dagestan’s 1994 Constitution was a natural response to
the republic’s situation and uniquely suited to the peculiarities of the social
and political structure of Dagestani society.
Of those
peculiarities, the one that had the greatest impact on Dagestan’s government is
its ethnic composition, which is unique in the entire post-Soviet space.
Dagestan has no “titular,” or “state-forming” nation. The republic is a
geographic concept that has existed since at least the 16th century, and its
name, which translates as “the Land of Mountains,” is not derived from any
ethnic name, as, for instance, Tatarstan or Bashkor-tostan. The idea of
opposition between “indigenous” and “alien” peoples has never been valid or
significant in Dagetstan’s political discourse. There are 14 local
nationalities that have roots in the republic’s traditional rural settlements
and are officially registered as Dagestani: Avars (about 28 percent of the
population), Darghins (slightly more than 16 percent), Kumyks (13 percent),
Lezghins (about 13 percent), Russians (7 percent), Laks (more than 5 percent),
Tabasarans (5 percent), Chechens (about 5 percent), Azeris (more than 4
percent), Nogays (1.5 percent), Rutuls (about 1 percent), Aguls (about 1
percent), Tsakhurs (about 0.5 percent) and Tats (less than 0.5 percent).
The peoples of
Dagestan speak languages belonging to three basic linguistic families:
Iberian-Caucasian languages are spoken by Avars, Darghins, Lezghins, Laks,
Tabasarans, Rutuls, Aguls, Tsakhurs and Chechens; Turkic languages are spoken by Kumyks, Nogays and Azeris; and
Indo-European languages are spoken by Tats, whose language belongs to the
Iranian group, and Russians.
Most of Dagestan’s
ethnic groups follow the Sunnite variety of Islam—except for Azeris and the
people of the Lezghin village of Miskindji, who are Shiites; Russians, who are
Orthodox Christians; and Tats, who practise Judaism.
In addition to the
principal nationalities mentioned above, there are many smaller, more compact
ethnic groups living in mountain villages and speaking their own languages.
Fourteen of these groups are related to the Avars: Andi, Archin, Akhvakh,
Bagulal, Bezhtin, Botlikh, Genukh, Godaberin, Gunzib, Didoy, Karatin, Tindin,
Khvarshin and Chamalin. Two of them are related to the Darghins: Kubachin and
Kaitag. So the total number of ethnic
groups in the republic is at least 30.
Prior to the arrival
of Russians, Dagestan was comprised of a great number of “republics” or “free
societies,” as they were termed in the official Russian documentation and
historiography. By the time the region and Russia undertook active contact, in
the late 18th to early 19th centuries, Dagestan had over 60 petty states with
different types of government. In the mountains, the common government style
was “a federative republic,” which was an independent “free society” or union
of free societies. In the foothills and on the flat land there were various
authoritarian regimes. Underlying all these political entities were the
so-called jamaats1 —societies based on densely populated and
strongly fortified settlements, situated in the center of the people’s
agricultural lands and farmsteads. An analysis of historical sources shows that
the ultimate, “atomic” sovereignty belonged to the jamaats, which formed voluntary, or sometimes forced, unions and
super-unions. Such city-states had their own civil laws, called jamaat adats,2 and all their adult male population took
part in solving issues of war and peace, forming unions with other jamaats or seceding from them. By a very
approximate estimate, there were about 350–400 such city-states in Dagestan in
the 19th century.
While the jamaat was ethnically homogeneous, from
the ethnographic point of view it was only part of an ethnic community, as
defined by the objective characteristics of shared or cognate language,
territory, etc. Although such larger ethnic communities existed, in traditional
Dagestan there was no “national” identity. Social and political identity was
based, above all, on belonging to a jamaat,
and then beyond that, to a union of jamaats.
Often, the jamaats that belonged to
these groups were ethnically different from one another, according to the
objective definition, and so the unified jamaats
could not be considered a single ethnic community.
Careful study reveals
that the jamaat structure never
disappeared completely after Dagestan lost its independence, when Shamil
surrendered in 1959. The structure still manifested itself in the colonial
administration of what was known as the “Dagestani region,” which was divided into districts, or nahibats. Even the
Soviet collective farms basically followed the traditional structure of jamaats.
When Gorbachov’s perestroika brought on a collapse of
social order, followed by a destructive transformation of most aspects of daily
life, the jamaat structure once more
assumed its political functions. It became a key factor in supporting “one’s
own people” in all the newly emerging economic and civil institutions of
Dagestani society. Ultimately, loyalty to one’s jamaat identity is more important than loyalty to any other
grouping—ideological, political or even national. The nationalities in Dagestan
were established in the 1930s by scholars, using objective registration of
ethnic characteristics, as part of the process of “solving the nationalities
issue.”
During the radical
transformation that followed the fall of totalitarian power, Dagestan’s
traditional ethnic and cultural peculiarities—above all its ethnic
variety—began again to have a direct influence on all social processes and the
formation of a new political structure.
2. Preparing a New Constitution for Dagestan
The work of constitutional transformation in Dagestan began with the first Congress of People’s Deputies, which, for the first and last time under the Communist regime, was elected on an alternative basis on April 24, 1990. The second session of the republic’s Supreme Soviet, held July 27, 1990, formed a commission led by Supreme Soviet chairman Mahomedali Mahomedov, who ordered the establishment of a working group of the Constitutional Commission. This working group included Dagestan’s leading scholars, industrialists and prominent political activists from the new wave. They tackled the task of formulating the concepts behind the republic’s new political structure.
The Dagestanskaya Pravda of Oct. 2, 1990
published the draft Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Dagestani Soviet
Socialist Republic (DSSR). The document, prepared by the Constitutional
Commission and approved by the republic’s Supreme Soviet, did not specifically
mention the rights of Dagestan’s nationalities, and instead used the phrase
“the people of Dagestan.” Only once,
in the preamble, it mentioned “the right of all
the peoples of Dagestan to self-determination.” The semantic nuances of the
term “people” as a civil and as an ethnic category can best be seen from the
text:
“The Congress of the People’s Deputies of the DSSR,
expressing the will of the people of Dagestan,
aiming to provide for each citizen an inalienable right to a worthy life,
recognizing the priority of the principles of democracy, social justice and human rights,
wishing to demonstrate an example of inter-ethnic harmony and consistent internationalism,
proceeding from the wish of the people of Dagestan to pursue independent economic, social and cultural policies,
understanding that the lawful aspiration of the people of Dagestan to state sovereignty should never be used for violating the existing internal unity,
considering that the status of an autonomous republic has ceased to meet the economic and cultural interests of the republic,
and realizing the right ofall the peoples of Dagestan to national self-determination,
declares the STATE SOVEREIGNTY of the Dagestani Republic and transforms it into the Dagestani Soviet Socialist Republic.”3
Fearing a possible
wave of “sovereignization” by separate ethnic groups in Dagestan, the authors
of the draft declaration avoided the term “peoples of Dagestan” and emphasized
the civil meaning of “people.” Thus, in Articles 2 and 3 the decraration says:
“2. The source of state power in the Dagestani SSR is its people. The people of Dagestan, made up of free, equal citizens of all nationalities, exercise state power directly and through the representative organs of power. The right to speak in the name of the entire people belongs to the supreme organs of state power.
3. No political party, public organization,
any other group of citizens, or an individual citizen, can claim a right to
exercise sovereign state power.”4
And another article of
the declaration clearly shows the wish to completely neutralize a possible
attempt by any separate Dagestani nationality to acquire sovereign political
status:
“13. Neither a person,
nor a public organization, can claim a right to speak in the name of its entire
nationality.”5
The heated
disagreement that arose during the preparation of the draft declaration is
witnessed by the fact that two members of the commission proposed their
alternative variants and published them for a discussion.6 An active debate on the various versions
of the declaration followed in the press.
But the republic was
not destined to pass that declaration: Dagestan was the only member of the
Russian Federation that never proclaimed its independence, even though it had
been deliberately provoked to do so by Moscow. Instead, events following the
publication of the draft declaration dampened efforts toward proclaiming
Dagestani sovereignty.
On Nov. 4, 1990, about
a month after the draft’s publication, an extraordinary congress of the Nogay
people and the Terek Cossacks was convened in the large village of Chervlyoniye
Buruni. The congress included over 300 delegates from the Nogay, Tarum,
Babayurt and Kizlyar districts of the republic, along with guests from the
Nogay and Cossack people of the Stavropol Region, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and
Checheno-Ingushetia. The congress passed a Declaration of Sovereignty of the
Indigenous Peoples of the Nogay Steppe. They also passed an appeal, addressed
to the powers of the DASSR, CHIASSR and the Stavropol Region, which stated
unequivocally that, should Dagestan proclaim its sovereignty, the entire
northern section of that republic would secede from it.
On Nov. 9, 1990, a
congress of the Kumyk popular movement called Tenglik passed a Declaration of
Self-Determination of the Kumyk People. Also
on that day, a congress of the Lezghin people, in Belidji in southern Dagestan,
passed an Appeal to the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic and DASSR. The
appeal asked these congresses “to confirm the right of the Lezghin people to
self-determination and to set up a commission for working out a mechanism for
the re-unification of the Lezghin people and the demarcation of the borders
between the two republics.”7 The appeal said that, if those demands were
rejected, “The Lezghin national council would prepare for holding a referendum
on the form of national self-determination of the Lezghin people within a new
Soviet Federation.”
Given the situation,
the second Congress of the People’s Deputies of the DASSR, meeting on Nov. 15,
1990, refrained from passing the sovereignty declaration. Instead, on the
following day, at a meeting in Kizilyurt, a new group called the Imam Shamil
People’s Front of Dagestan was
founded. The group proclaimed itself to be all-Dagestani but was actually made
up exclusively of Avar people. It was headed by Hadji Makhachev, then a
little-known young man from the Kazbegi District. The group’s aim was to act
“for the unity of the republic, against all forms of separatism.”
By that time, in an
atmosphere of developing political crisis in the country, the new Supreme
Soviet and the Congresses of the People’s Deputies of the Dagestani ASSR
became, for the first time, a real arena for political interaction. There were
debates on the amendments and supplements to the DASSR Constitution (Nov. 15
1990) and on the new Union Treaty (May 5, 1991), followed by amendments “On the
Status of the Republic,” “On the Draft of the New Union Treaty” and “On the
Draft of the Federative Treaty.” It was then that the word “autonomous” was
dropped, and Dagestan gained the status of “union republic.”
The work on the text
of the new constitution continued, but the constantly changing situation was
reflected in the changes in wording. The gist of the debate focussed around two
key issues: 1) the choice between a single leader or a collegiate organ at the
apex of the executive power; 2) the problem of proportionate representation of
ethnic groups in the state powers of Dagestan. These issues were important
because the greatest challenge to Dagestan’s survival as a single unit was the
need to harmonize a multitude of ethnic forces that were increasingly using
nationalist sentiment as their political resource. Such a situation usually
results in an escalation of inter-ethnic tension, because every conflict in the
struggle for power and property tends to take on ethnic overtones.
The republic’s
political elite, who were all fighting for shares of the pie, were wary of
installing a presidential mode of government, since that would inevitably give
an advantage to the president’s ethnic group. It became evident that there was
a need for proportionate ethnic representation in the state powers.
The failed coup in
Moscow, in August 1991, and the subsequent collapse of the Communist Party,
escalated political tension and accelerated the process of reform in the
republic. The fourth Congress of the People’s Deputies, held Sept. 17, 1991,
discussed a referendum to introduce the presidency. The congress also discussed
“Early Elections to the Supreme Soviet of Dagestan” which were demanded by the opposition—especially by the
nationalist forces. In addition, the congress passed some decisions dictated by
events in Moscow, including measures “On Ending the Activities of
Organizational Structures of Political Parties, Public Associations and
Movements in the Organs of Power and Government” and “On Measures for Implementing
the Decrees of the President of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist
Republic) on Suspending the Activities of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.” In January 1992, the Constitutional
Court of the DSSR was formed.
On June 28, 1992,
during a period marked by an escalating struggle for power in the republic’s
government and rising separatist trends in the ethnic groups of Kumyks, Nogays,
Lezghin and Cossacks, a referendum was held on the question of a presidency in
Dagestan. The result was a landslide vote against the idea.
The referendum made it
clear that no single group could claim dominance in Dagestan. With new
opportunities for enrichment, a multitude of relatively stable political
groupings, formed on the basis of traditional solidarity, had come onto the
scene and joined in the struggle for power and a share of former state
property. The situation necessitated discussions and compromises to resolve a
variety of sometimes vicious conflicts and achieve a stable balance of forces.
On the one hand, this power balance provided a high degree of durability for
the overall social system; on the other, it could not eliminate conflicts
altogether. So many unresolved disputes went on shaking the republic all
through the past decade. But, cynical as the assertion may seem, the conflicts
also performed a certain stabilizing function for the entire political system.
A new draft
constitution was presented to the Constitutional Commission’s 19th session on
Aug. 31, 1992 by the head of its working group, B. Akhmedov, the first
deputy-chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Akhmedov said the key issue for
Dagestan’s constitutional order was fair representation of ethnic groups. In
that context, the majority of the working group, and the Constitutional
Commission as a whole, supported the idea of a two-chamber parliament. But in
trying to work out a mechanism for forming these chambers, the commission came
up against differences that it failed to settle.
The stumbling block
was the idea of dividing Dagestan’s electorate on ethnic lines. If that
happened, members of the ruling elite would become controlled by the masses of
the particular nationality they served. Success in elections would no longer
involve agreements between various political groupings in their common stand
against the rising tide of mass movements. Instead, politicians would rely on
appeals to their “own” ethnic groups and on the nationalist demagoguery needed
to win votes. The “old guard” was very worried about their chances for survival
in such a new political order. But the new “nationalist” leaders felt that they
would fare better in an ethnically divided political landscape.
Seeking to press their
advantage, the new nationalist leaders campaigned hard to convene a Congress of
the Peoples of Dagestan. They envisioned a meeting where “representatives of
all nationalities of Dagestan,” elected for that congress, would proclaim their
authority to assume full power in the republic. In the atmosphere of the time,
such a method of a political coup d’etat seemed to have a fair chance of
success. But the republic’s existing leadership succeeded in seizing the
initiative from the new, informal leaders. By organizing the people’s congress,
the old guard was able to manage the gathering to its own advantage.
It was during the
build-up to the congress that open confrontation between the “new” and “old”
leaders gave way to political haggling and agreements. The most prominent
leaders of the new wave began to be incorporated into the republic’s elite—a
situation that further complicated the phenomena of conflicts and coalitions.
The Congress of the
Peoples of Dagestan was held Nov. 13, 1992. Contrary to the expectations of
many, its balanced decisions resulted in a considerable stabilization of the
public and political situation. It was probably during this congress that the
latent political structure of ethno-parties
finally crystallized. That development prevented the republic from
disintegrating on ethnic lines and determined the nature of Dagestan’s future
formal political structure.
A vital factor in the
final shaping of the Constitution was the cooperation among three senior
political figures from the three largest ethnic groups of Dagestan: The
chairman of the Supreme Soviet, M. Mahomedov, was Darghin; Prime Minister A.
Mirzavekov was Kumyk; and M. Aliyev, who was secretary of the republic’s
committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and then first
deputy-chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was Avar. The nearly imperceptible
opposition between these key figures
had a decisive influence on the formation of the power structure.
The last stages of
work on the new Constitution of Dagestan were made difficult by the escalating
struggle between Russia’s Supreme Soviet and President Yeltsin. After the
so-called “White House” in Moscow was fired upon by tanks and the “Soviet
power” fell, just as the Communist rule before it, the 23rd session of
Dagestan’s Supreme Soviet carried out similar reforms of state power and local
self-government. And after the Russian Federation’s Constitution was adopted
and the Federal Assembly was elected in December 1993, the work on Dagestan’s
Constitution entered its final phase.
3. The Structure of Political Forces in Dagestan
The political and economic transformation in Russia may be described as “a revolution from above.” The ruling elite could only affect such radical changes, while avoiding outside interference, in a society that has no influence in the choice of political leaders or other decisions of major importance for the nation. That Russia has undergone precisely such a revolution is seen from the fact that the upper crust has been practically unscathed by a painful transformation process, which was disastrous for nearly all other strata of society. The political, economic and intellectual elite has remained “on top,” just as it was under the Communists.
A similar process took
place in Dagestan, but it was altered by the republic’s ethnic and cultural
character, which had only manifested itself as a political factor after the
collapse of the former totalitarian regime. Beginning with the first years of perestroika, Dagestan’s leadership gradually shed control of the central
government and increasingly had to respond autonomously to the coming changes.
Throughout Russia, the
structural changes in the elite of the new post-communist society did not so
much involve replacing the “old guard,” but rather allowing the nouveau riche, previously unknown in Soviet society, to join the upper echelons
of power. In the USSR, a political career used to proceed in measured steps,
under rigid party and state control, and the requirements and procedures for
promotion could not be formally circumvented. After the changes, the new elite
rapidly joined the old elite, adding to the overall number of state officials.
While the fall of the cumbersome Soviet communist regime might have been
expected to result in simplified government institutions, the total number of
state officials has actually doubled throughout Russia, and in Dagestan it has
nearly trebled.
For some time after
the fall of the communist regime, there were no visible changes in Dagestan’s
top power strata. But certain inconspicuous trends, which would eventually
transform the republic’s political elite, had begun to develop. In describing
the new structure of the elite, we must single out two categories of the ruling
class:
• Elite 1: high-ranking statesmen and senior officials;
• Elite 2: major figures in the non-government sphere, including successful entrepreneurs, leaders of nationalist movements and/or informal groupings commanding large financial resources and/or mass support of their followers.
Until the mid-1990s
these were the two main groups among Dagestgan’s leadership. Parallel to the
development of that binary structure—and from within its ranks—there emerged
yet another category, Elite 3, who seized the top reigns of power. This third
group was created by those who simultaneously belonged to both of the other
elite categories, and its growth was fueled by two tendencies:
• enrichment of senior state officials, their involvement in public politics and consequent formation of latent armed support forces around them;
• attainment of high state and economic posts by the charismatic nouveau riche, through state appointments or democratic elections.
It is Elite 3, of
course, that gradually became dominant. Members of the two other elites who had
failed to move to the third one found themselves marginalized, and their status
suddenly reduced.
The situation resulted
in several types of conflict within the ruling class: first, among the
“heavyweights” of Elite 3; second, between that group and the two others;
third, between Elite 1 and Elite 2; and fourth, within each of the two
marginalized elite groups. In the course of this infighting, a dynamic
structure, consisting of horizontal and vertical relations of power and
submission, slowly developed. The “heavyweights,” while tensely opposing each
other, were also interested in mutual interaction in face of the “second
echelon,” which fell into groups supporting this or that “heavyweight.” In
their effort to move to the top echelon, or at least to keep their official
posts or wealth, the “marginals” sought support both above and below them, thus
building up a hierarchy of patron-client relations.
The most solid basis
for these relationships was found among ethnic ties. The old ruling elite, who
lost traditional backing as old power structures crumbled, sought to build new
support among their own ethnic groups. They tried to reap the benefits of the
mutual trust that exists between friends and relatives who come from the same
neighborhood and have the same ethnicity. Meanwhile, the ethnic organizations,
which were headed by new leaders and were gaining more grass-roots popularity,
were actively opposed to the republic’s government. This threat induced the old
guard to strengthen their vertical internal ethnic ties. The theme of ethnic
identity, therefore, became a crucial factor throughout the transition period,
and it still remains important.
The old guard and the
new leaders both worked to strengthen the political elite’s influence on ethnic
movements. As high state officials strove to become the leaders of their own
ethnic groups, the informal leaders of ethnic movements and the nouveau riche tried to penetrate the
ruling elite. Some members of both groups succeeded in their attempts.
Thus, through the
transformations of the past decade, the multi-ethnic structure of Dagestan
became the crucial political factor in the republic. Instead of being mobilized
on the basis of ideological differences or political trends, Dagestan’s
political forces were broken down on the basis of traditional ethnic and
cultural identities and values. Ethnic groups, which only recently played no
political role, have now turned into the leading subjects of the political
process.
But it would be a
simplification to say that political decisions follow ethnic lines. Despite its
apparent significance in the public mentality, nationalism in Dagestan fails to
produce tangible political results. Some leaders who rely heavily on
nationalist rhetoric fail to collect even the required number of signatures to
support their nomination for parliament. Others who espouse nationalism enter
the ruling elite by making concessions in the cause of protecting the interests
of their ethnic group, and rise thanks to qualities having nothing to do with
their nationalist discourse. Moreover, practice shows that the ethnic factor is
usually pushed to the side, or even ignored, when serious problems are solved.
A deeper analysis of
political practices, electoral behavior, and other phenomena, prompts the
conclusion that the nationalist discourse the public sees actually conceals,
rather than reflects, the genuine system of political relations in Dagestan.
The real players are structures that are absent from the political discourse,
but they may be discovered if we ignore the public arena and instead
concentrate on the specifics of the internal political developments.
These latent
structures of power may be called ethno-parties
for they have all the formal attributes of typical West European political
parties:
• a degree of shared convictions and common interests, needed for mobilizing social forces;
• an organizational structure with one or several strong leaders and a sufficient number of activists for mounting public actions;
• financial support from some members of the economic elite and mass support of certain parts of the population.
The only distinction
from West European political parties lies in the fact that the leaders and
supporting masses in Dagestan belong to the same sub-ethnic community: a large
village or several villages that are historically connected—what Dagestanis
know as jamaats. Ethno-parties may
include persons of other nationalities, but their leaders and financial and
mass support come from the same visible traditional society, which is much
better organized than an ethnic group. In fact, no ethnic group in Dagestan has
a single political center. The ethno-parties
express the interests of more specific groups. Their leaders may form alliances
with similar ethno-parties of
different ethnic origin than their own, if that meets their interests.
4. The Structure of Dagestan’s State Power
On July 26, 1994, the Constitutional Assembly passed the new Constitution of Dagestan, a document that takes unusual measures to ensure representation of many ethnicities. What follows is a breakdown of the power structure as outlined in the Constitution.
The Constitutional
Assembly is the supreme source of power in the republic, because its functions
include: 1) passing the Constitution; 2) forming the State Council, the top
executive collegiate body, and changing the council’s line-up; 3) making
essential amendments in the Constitution. The Constitutional Assembly consists
of 242 members, and half of these belong to the 121-member full parliament, or
the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan. The other half of the
Constitutional Assembly consists of delegates, who are elected by the
representative organs of the local self-governments—in the same proportions and
from the same administrative territories as the deputies of parliament.8
“The collective
president of Dagestan”—the State Council—has 14 members and is designed to
serve the officially registered minorities. Under Article 88 of Dagestan’s
Constitution, “The State Council may not include more than one representative
of one nationality.” The Constitutional Assembly, by secret ballot, elects the
chairman of the State Council, who is the head of state under Article 92 of the
Constitution. This State Council chairman recommends a candidate for the post
of chairman of the government, or prime minister, who automatically becomes the
first deputy chairman of the State Council.
After the top two
officials, each representing a different nationality, are named,
representatives of the other 12 registered nationalities are elected to the
State Council by the Constitutional Assembly. To do this, each member of the
assembly votes by secret ballot for one candidate from the 12 available
nationalities. The top two vote-winners from each nationality then face each
other in a second round of voting to determine who joins the State Council. The
State Council is elected for four years. Its members are not to be deputies of
parliament, members of the government or judges, but they can work as an
attorney, a teacher or the head of a joint-stock company or enterprise.
The 121 deputies to
the parliament are chosen by universal suffrage, through direct and secret
ballot, from one-mandate constituencies. Dagestan’s Constitution “guarantees
the representation of all the peoples of Dagestan,” and this is achieved by the
law “On the Elections to the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan.”
Under this law, the
republic is divided into ethnically homogeneous territories—such as the
highland areas wholly populated by Avars, Darghins, Lezghins, Laks, Tabasarans,
etc.—and ethnically mixed territories—including the cities and lowland rural
areas. The homogeneous areas have no ethnic limitations on nominees to
parliament. In the mixed areas, the election commission sets constituencies
that each nominate candidates of a certain nationality. Because every
constituency can only choose candidates from one ethnicity, their votes are not
influenced by nationality, and there is no reason for ethnic conflict over
elections.
In 1995, during the
first parliamentary election under this system, 66 out of the 121 one-mandate
constituencies were limited to voting for candidates of a specific nationality.
In the multi-ethnic areas and cities there were 12 Avar constituencies, 12
Kumyk ones, 10 Russian, seven Darghin, five Tabasaran, five Azeri, four
Lezghin, four Chechen, three Lak, two Tat and a Tsakhur one. One more constituency
was provided for nominees of any other nationality, so as not to discriminate
against such small minorities as Armenians, Jews, Georgians, Ukrainians, etc.
Those quotas, in combination with elections in the 55 ethnically homogeneous
constituencies, yielded a parliament adequately reflecting the ethnic
composition of the republic. The next elections in 1999 were held with the same
structure.
Alongside the State
Council, which, according to Article 87 of the Constitution, “heads the
executive power and provides interaction between the organs of state power of
the Republic of Dagestan,” there is another executive institution: the
Government of the Republic of Dagestan. Article 103 of the Constitution defines
the government as “the executive-administrative organ of the state power.” The
chairman of the government is appointed by the State Council, with the approval
of the People’s Assembly. The chairman, in turn, makes proposals “on the system
and structure of the republic’s organs of executive power ... and submits to
the State Council the line-up of the government or changes in it,” according to
the Constitution.
It should be noted
that many rules that help maintain an ethnic balance, though not included in
the Constitution or any official written documents, are strictly followed in
practice. For example, the first three state power posts—the chairman of the
State Council, the chairman of parliament and the chairman of the
government—are occupied by members of different ethnic groups. The deputies of
the chairman of the government are also selected so as to represent different
nationalities, preferably one of each. The same unwritten rule is observed
concerning the deputies of the chairman of the People’s Assembly, the chairmen
of parliamentary committees, the departments of the State Council, etc. And
there is also an unofficial effort to maintain an ethnic mix in the management
of the higher education establishments, research institutions and so on.
5. More about the Republic’s “Ethnic-Territorial” Constituencies
In order to maintain a fine balance of ethnic representation in the power structures, Dagestan has used election procedures that are unheard of in traditional democracies. The “ethnic-territorial” constituencies, invented for the republic’s parliamentary elections, are particular unusual and bear further study.
The idea of ethnic
constituencies is not an abstract theoretical invention divorced from real
life. Those constituencies were thought of after the failure of democratic
elections for local self-government that were held in early 1994, before the
new Constitution was passed. The elections were organized according to the
classical democratic standard, but their results were rejected by the
multi-ethnic population of most cities and lowland rural districts. That was
because, in Makhachkala, for instance, almost exclusively Darghins and Avars
were elected to the city assembly; in Kizilyurt, only Avars won; and in
Kaspiysk, the winners were mostly Avars and Darghins. Given the specific
conditions existing in these regions, the classical democratic procedure meant
that only members of the largest ethnic groups would have a chance of being
elected. It became clear that the elections had no social legitimacy.
Formal legal
procedures borrowed from books or other societies may fail to be legit-imate if
there are questions about who has the right to act as representatives of the
people. It is essential that elections coincide with the system of values
accepted by a certain society. Those values may dictate different electoral
procedures, which enjoy public recognition, as being the appropriate means for
conferring powers to certain persons. The problem of legitimacy is one of
political representation and social accord.
After the first local
elections, particularly in Makhachkala, it became clear that such a
“representative” assembly could not function. No one, not even the elected
deputies, found the local government to be a valid organ, capable of working.
In an urgent attempt to save the situation, the republic’s leadership added
more seats to the assemblies and formed new constituencies for conducting
by-elections—with certain limitations for nominating candidates of specific
ethnic groups.
The limitations
essentially stipulated that citizens of some constituencies could only vote for
candidates of a designated nationality. Such a constituency was called
“ethnic-territorial.” That innovation permitted the election of members of
ethnic minorities to the local assemblies of the multi-ethnic areas and
provided those areas with ethnically balanced representation.
Paradoxically, the
issue of ethnicity was not a factor in the “ethnic-territorial” election
campaigns, because all the contesting candidates were of the same nationality,
while the electorate was mixed. There was no point in candidates attempting to
exploit the resource of ethnic solidarity that is otherwise so important in
Dagestan. On the contrary, contestants had to try to win as many votes as
possible from ethnic groups other than their own. And the candidates, who were
all from the same ethnic bloc, readily agreed to talks with each other to set
rules for decency in campaigning. As a result, the campaigns, and the voting,
proceeded in a peaceful manner.
Two measures were
taken in order to give candidates from even smaller minorities, such as
Armenians and Ukrainians, an opportunity to win. First, candidates were allowed
to be nominated in any constituency, irrespective of their place of permanent
residence. Second, special constituencies were reserved for candidates of any
ethnic group not included in the 14 officially registered minorities.
Dagestani society was
satisfied with these procedures, which were also used for the parliamentary
elections of March 1995, when they again proved their effectiveness. Since
then, the mechanism of regulating ethnic proportions in parliamentary and local
elections in districts with ethnically mixed populations has been accepted as a
political tradition.
While the public
accepted the unique election procedures for ensuring an ethnic balance,
attempts to use the same system to increase the number of women and
professional candidates did not enjoy social legitimacy. The government sought
to improve the educational level of Dagestan’s leadership by insuring that a
certain number of deputies had either economic or legal training. These
“professional” deputies, who were supposed to pledge to give up their jobs and
work solely in parliament if they were elected, were allotted 25 territorial
constituencies. And women, who were underrepresented in government, were
allotted six special constituencies. There was even one constituency that was
simultaneously designated ethnic, women’s and professional, so that only women of a certain ethnic group with a higher
education could be nominated.
But in the 1995
election campaign, the women’s constituencies were unceremoniously grabbed by
men, and it appeared that nothing could be done about it, since no court could
ban anyone from nomination in any constituency. The same fate awaited the professional
constituencies. Even the “professional” candidates who won refused to honor the
written pledge to give up their former jobs in favor of professional work in
parliament. Again, no court could force them to observe their pledge. In the
end, the authorities closed their eyes to those breaches of election
procedures, and the public did not seem to mind. But there was never any case
of anyone breaching the principle of ethnic constituencies, which apparently
had much stronger social legitimacy. This is a striking example of the social
legitimization phenomenon at work in the process of emergence and consolidation
of legal institutions.
6. Future Challenges to Dagestan’s Constitution
Much of the early build-up of democratic institutions in Dagestan occurred in “free floating” conditions, at a time when Russia’s central government had abandoned the levers of power in the republic. While Dagestan re-invented its government in this period of relative autonomy, it did feel a strong moral and ideological influence coming from the democratic reforms in the center. These two factors both impacted on the process of democratization in Dagestan.
At present, the central government in Russia has begun restoring its direct administrative mechanisms for governing in the provinces, and Dagestan’s emergent state system is being revised. As it attempts to establish, from the top down, a “single legal space” throughout Russia, the central government is finding objections to certain political institutions in Dagestan—and to the wording of many items in the republic’s constitution. Dagestan’s political structure is now being subjected to a serious trial, and it is possible that it will be replaced by another, more-uniformly Russian system.
But there is a danger that such a new political
structure will be unnatural to Dagestan. Because Dagestan’s system developed
autonomously and organically, and is designed to meet the republic’s specific
needs, it has obtained a certain level of stability. Discarding that system
could threaten the social legitimacy of Dagestan’s government and put the
current stability at risk.
1 We use the notion “jamaat” as the most frequently accepted term for
the elementary independent politcal societies. In the political discourse of
traditional Dagestan there was no such degree of generalization: specific
“jamaats” were known by their proper names—Akhty,
Tsudkhar, Akusha, etc. Their “unions” (i.e. relatively stable territorial
federations) were also referred to by their proper names—e.g. Akhty-Para, Akusha-Dargo, Antsroso (ten
villages), and others.
2 “Adat” (Arabic—custom) means the peoples’ common law as distinct
from the Muslim Shariah law. But it would be wrong to ascribe that distinction
to the Dagestani adats: The written laws in Dagestan’s “free societies” and
their unions were conceived from their inception as Shariah norms. A tendency
to treat them as “adats” came in the early 19th century among the Murides, who
fought against independent jamaats for Dagestan’s political unity in facing
Russia. They insisted that “pure Islam” be adopted throughout the territory and
contrasted “adats” with Shariah law. The Russian colonial administration and
historiography borrowed that Muridist terminology, but in fighting against that
strong ideological movement, they preferred to revive the “adats.”
3 Newspaper Dagestanskaya
Pravda, Oct. 2, 1990.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 They were: Constitutional Commission member Zaidin Astemirov, a
professor of law at Dagestani University, who published his version of the
Declaration in the Dagestanskaya Pravda on
Oct. 18, 1990, and another member of the commission, Supreme Soviet Deputy
Mahomed Darbishev, who printed his version and spread it among the commission’s
members.
7 Relating the events of that time I use chiefly my own archive since I was a member of the working group of the Constitutional Commission and observed, as a sociologist, the entire course of political events.
8 See The Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan (1994) Makhachkala: Jupiter.