Titular
Population Has the Edge in Kazakhstan
Igor Savin
Local self-government in Kazakhstan is based on a system of representative bodies, elected by the people, and administrators, who are appointed by the executive power and beholden to the president. This system creates a strong “power vertical” through which the president exerts exceptional control over local self-governments.
A bill that would
alter the system to allow for direct election of the administrators has been
under discussion for some time. If passed, it would be a step in the right
direction, but it would still allow the executive power to maintain a certain
amount of local control.
In an effort to
address Kazakhstan’s ethnic needs, the government has set up the Assembly of
the Peoples of Kazakhstan, a consultative body that oversees a network of
similar assemblies on the regional and local levels. Although this network can
sometimes provide a useful forum for airing minority issues, it is controlled
by the government, so any truly independent issues are stifled.
An attempt to pass a
bill that would have done more to protect minority rights was unsuccessful. The
bill had some flaws, particularly in its use of out-moded, Soviet-era
definitions of an “ethnic community” as a group of people with common cultural
features and a “nation” as an ethnic community united behind a common political
cause. Nonetheless, the bill provided a useful starting point for discussion of
inter-ethnic relations, and suggested some good mechanisms for dealing with the
issue. But, if enacted, the bill would have also created independent
ethno-cultural organs, and the executive powers, apparently concerned about the
potential threat to their authority, effectively silenced discussion of the
proposed legislation.
As the situation stands
right now in Kazakhstan, the only ethnic group that seems to be represented
adequately by the government is the titular nation of Kazakhs. Kazakh has been
made the official language, and non-Kazakhs are slowly being edged out of
important political and business positions.
This state of affairs
has stirred discontent in various parts of the country, including regions where
the Russian population was once dominant. Aside from facing linguistic
barriers, and being removed from important positions, Russians are also losing
power due to the redrawing of voting districts in ways that dilute the power of
Russian voters. A poll showing a high level of discontent among the non-titular
population is a clear indication of flaws in the government’s ethnic policies.
Closer analysis of a
rural community with a population that is roughly 90 percent Uzbek shows that,
by employing historical traditions of local self-government, the Uzbeks are
able to take care of many of their needs. But certain needs peculiar to their non-titular
ethnic group, such as Uzbek-language education and mass media, are beyond the
scope of a local self-government. The government of Kazakhstan must also assist
in these areas, and the government’s efforts seem to fall short.
In this chapter, we
will look at the current state of Kazakhstan’s policy in local self-government
and inter-ethnic relations. We will analyze the good and bad points of the
bills that have been proposed to change these policies. Then we will discuss
the ways in which the current state of affairs seems to unfairly favor the
titular population and cause discontentment among other groups. And we will
look at a case study of local self-government in the rural Uzbek community, to
point out good practices by the local populace, as well as mistakes by
officials on higher levels. This will lead us to the conclusion that,
currently, Kazakhstan’s over-all policy on inter-ethnic relations is not only
flawed, but may actually be engendering anti-Kazakh sentiment among the
country’s non-titular minorities.
1. Introduction to the Country
The Republic of Kazakhstan is situated at the juncture of Europe and Asia. It is Russia’s nearest Central Asian neighbor, and the border between the two countries, which is mostly in the north of Kazakhstan, stretches 6,023 kilometers. In the south it has borders with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and in the east it has a 1,700 kilometer border with China. The total length of its borders is 11,304 kilometers. Two of its regions are situated on the Caspian coast. The territory of Kazakhstan is 2,717,300 square kilometers. The population is 14,953,000, and the ethnic make-up is 53.4 percent Kazakhs, 30 percent Russians, 3.7 percent Ukrainians, 2.5 percent Uzbeks, 2.4 percent Germans, 1.7 percent Tatars and 1.4 percent Uigurs. The urban population is about 8,377,000, the rural population is about 6,576,000. The capital is Astana, with a population of 322,000. The republic has fourteen regions, the most important ones for their social and economic potential are the Akmolinsk, Almaty, Pavlodar, Kustanai, West-Kazakhstan and East-Kazakhstan regions. The official language is Kazakh, but Russian is used parallel to it in state institutions and self-government organs.
The republic’s
Constitution was passed Aug. 30, 1995, then amended and supplemented Oct. 7,
1998. Kazakhstan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in
December 1991, it has diplomatic relations with 111 countries, it is a member
of over 70 international organizations, including the United Nations, and has a
mission with NATO.
Kazakhstan is a
unitary state and a presidential republic. The president is elected on the
basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot, for a term of
seven years. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was first elected in 1991 and then
re-elected in January 1999 for a second term. Parliament is the republic’s
supreme representative and legislative body, and it consists of two chambers:
the Senate and the Majilis, both working on a permanent basis. The government
exercises executive power at the head of a system of executive departments. The
prime minister is appointed by the president, with the consent of parliament.
The present prime minister is K. Tokayev.1
2. The Legislative Basis of Local Government in Kazakhstan
The activities of Kazakhstan’s local authorities are regulated by the republic’s law of Dec. 10, 1993 “On the Local Representative and Executive Organs of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” which has been amended by presidential decree over the years.2
Under that law, the
local executive powers are responsible to the local representative bodies,
though they are directly subordinate to the president and the government.
Article 4 of the law states, “The relations between the Maslikhat-Assembly of
Deputies and the local administration are based on the principle of delimiting
their functions and independent execution of their respective powers, and on
the principle of the local administration being responsible to the Maslikhat on
questions set by the present law.” This premise is further developed in Article
27, which states: “The number of the deputy-heads in an administration, as well
as its departments and other units, are set according to the system ... passed
by the respective Maslikhat-Assembly of Deputies.” That article also
stipulates: “The head of an administration and his deputies, the chiefs of
departments and other administrative services are not elected members of a
Maslikhat at any level.”
Another section of the
law provides a mechanism to make the local administration responsible to local
representative organs. According to Article 30: “The regional, district, or
city Maslikhat has a right to pass a no-confidence vote by a two-thirds
majority against the head of the local administration, and to raise the
question of relieving him of his post before the head of the higher
administration.”
A similar pattern of
interaction between the executive and representative powers is followed at the
level of rural communities—townships, aouls
(villages) and rural districts. According to Article 50 of the law, the
administration head of a village or town “is responsible in his activities to
the head of the district (or city) administration and to the meeting (of
representatives) to which he reports at least once a year.”
Article 53 sets the
order of convening the annual meeting. It is held “for considering vital
questions affecting the interests of the territory’s population” and is made up
of “representatives of the citizens of a settlement, aoul or a rural district over the age of 18.” Article 54 refers to
the meeting’s competence, which involves “hearing reports by the head of the
rural administration on his activities and, if necessary, passing a vote of no
confidence by a simple majority.”
Despite the level of
control by representative organs, according to Article 48, the head of a rural
administration is appointed by the head of the district (or city)
administration. This command vertical continues upwards: Administration heads
are appointed by the heads of higher administrations, and members of the
highest administrations are appointed by the president. Thus, local
administrations are responsible to the local representative bodies, but they
are appointed by the higher executive organs and are subordinate to those
organs. The mechanisms of this responsibility are prescribed by the law. And,
in practice, all the real levers of government power, including financial and
administrative power, are concentrated in the hands of the local head of the
executive organ.
This concentration of
power in the executive organs was fully demonstrated during the latest
elections to the local representative bodies (October 1999): The present
authorities used all means in their power to ensure the election of their
preferred candidates to the local maslikhats.
There were multiple violations of electoral procedure on all levels—including
direct pressure on voters, exerted by the local administration. As a result,
observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
refused to acknowledge the outcome of the election as legitimate.
Throughout the text of
the law “On the Local Representative and Executive Organs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan,” there is hardly any mention of the polyethnic nature of Kazakhstan
society. The only reference to this fact is in Article 46, which states that
“The regional, district and city administrations assist the propaganda and
development of the historical and cultural traditions and customs of the
peoples living on their territories.” But reading through the rest of the law,
it becomes obvious that its authors meant to foster the cultural traditions of
only one people: the Kazakhs. This attitude is clear from the insidious use of
terms taken from the Kazakh language. For example, maslikhat was introduced in the original text in 1993, when an
amendment was passed in which it was used parallel to the expression “deputies’
assembly.”
2.1 Proposed Changes to Legislation Affecting Local Self-Government
Since Sept. 12, 2000, Kazakhstan’s parliament has been considering two bills to replace the Law of 1993: one on local state government and the other on local self-government.3 The bill on local state government, which lays down the basis for the executive and legislative powers functioning on the regional level, would go further toward using Kazakh terminology: Representative organs are called maslikhats without any translation. The bill calls the local administration akimat and its head is akim, following an oral practice that has existed for years.
This new bill on local
state government would maintain the rigid power vertical, drawn from the
president, through the regional and district akims, down to the local akim.
According to Article 27 of the bill, the regional akims, and the akims in
the capital and other large cities, are appointed by the president on the
recommendation of the prime minister. There would be certain changes, though,
in the appointment of akims at the
lower level. Under Articles 31 and 35, the akims
in rural districts, regional centers, the capital’s districts, towns that are
centers of rural districts, villages, townships and rural areas “are appointed
or elected in the order set by the president.” Though this wording is vague, it
is a step towards allowing election of executive powers. The present administration
is naturally cautious about such a change, and the bill reflects this caution:
Even if the bill is passed, the president could give an “order” that would put
off elections of local akims for
years. Nevertheless, this is a pre-requisite of a transition toward elections.
The bill lists
detailed procedures for interaction between the executive and legislative
powers. Article 6 says the maslikhats,
or representative bodies, would have the authority and responsibility to
perform the following duties:
• the adoption of plans and economic and social programs of development in their territory;
• the approval of the local budget and its execution, including the estimate of expenses for districts in the capital and towns, villages and rural areas;
• the approval of the administrative system in a territory, as proposed by its akim;
• the solution of questions of local territorial administration within the competence of the maslikhat and definition of limits for the local self-government;
• the approval of the line-up of the akimat, or local administration, as proposed by its leader, or akim.
The bill also provides
mechanisms for resolving possible conflicts between the executive and
legislative branches of power. According to Article 22, the mandate of a maslikhat may be terminated by the
Senate on the proposal of the Prosecutor General “in case of irreconcilable
differences with the akimat, such as
twice-repeated refusal to accept the local budget or plans and economic and
social programs of development, or rejection of the administration system in
the territory.”
Conversely, Article 23
would allow the maslikhat to express
no confidence in the akim: “Maslikhat can pass a no-confidence vote
by a two-thirds majority and raise the question of relieving the akim of his post by the president or by
a higher akim. ... A no-confidence
vote is passed in case of a twice-repeated refusal by the maslikhat to approve the akim’s
report on the execution of plans, economic and social programs of
development or the local budget.”
Yet, under Article 32,
“The akim of a district (or a
regional center) within his and his akimat’s
competence is responsible to the president, the government and the regional
akim.”
Under Article 34, “The
akim of a district in the capital, a
rural district center, a town, village or rural area is the head of the
respective akimat of his territorial
unit and can speak in its name, without the power of proxy, in its relations
with the state bodies, organizations and individual citizens.”
Both the bill on local
state government and the bill on local self-government describe interaction
between all the levels of akims and
the organs of local self-government. At the lowest level, it looks like this:
The akim of a rural area, appointed
by the district akim, works jointly
with the local communities, which, under Article 2 of the bill on local
self-government, “are corporate legal entities and should be registered by the
justice organs.” The akimats and maslikhats of all levels are not such
legal entities.
The bill on local
self-government, in Article 4, describes the organization of local communities:
“The Rules of the local community are worked out on the initiative of a group
of citizens and voted on by the local population. ... The Rules are subject to
registration with the justice organs. ... The model Rules of a local community
are approved by the government.”
The independence of
local self-governments is described in Article 5 of the bill: “The organs of
local self-government are guaranteed independence within their powers, as set
by the present Law. The state organs have no right to interfere with their activities,
except in cases mentioned by the present and other Laws.”
Article six of the
bill describes the following organs of local self-government:
• The kenes of a local community is a representative organ of self-government consisting of up to ten members elected by a population of 1,000 or more. In settlements with smaller populations, the kenes functions are exercised by a general meeting of all citizens.
• The jamiat of a local community is the executive organ of self-government headed by the jetekshi.
• The organization and activities of the jamiat are defined by the rules of the local community in keeping with the present law and other legislative acts.
• The jetekshi is the head of the local self-government executive organ. He is elected by the population of the settlement. The end of his powers entails the cessation of the jamiat’s powers.
The proposed system is
supposed to legalize the already existing practice of organizing local
self-government—the only difference being that the terms used today for the
heads of the executive organs of local communities are varied, including micro-akims, ulichkoms or headmen. In
the areas with compact Uzbek populations, they also use the traditional Uzbek
term, makhalla, as well as the ones
mentioned above. The bill on local self-governments provides a unification of
such terms and a clear and simple system of relations. The bill is somewhat
inconsistent in that, on the one hand, local communities are supposed to be incorporated
as independent legal entities, and, on the other, their activities are to be
regulated by the state. However, this situation is possibly inevitable in the
transitional period. At least the bill lays down tangible, if tentative,
features of a civil society. It is hard to tell when and in what shape it may
be passed. For the time being, we must rely on the current legislation and the
actual practice.
These two bills are
being discussed among Kazakhstan’s government and non-government sectors, as
well as the international community. The prospects of local self-government in
the light of the proposed legislation was the topic of a round-table conference
in Almaty on Nov. 3, 2000. Participants in the conference included many
political parties and movements, parliamentarians and scholars. The conference
was also attended by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice Igor Rogov and Minister
of Information and Social Development Altynbek Sarsenbayev. Their presence
indicates the importance attached to the issue by the republic’s government.
3. Governing Kazakhstan’s Multi-Ethnic Society
Before we proceed to analyzing the current state and activities of local self-government in the multi-ethnic society of Kazakhstan, we must note that the bills discussed above never mention the need to meet the ethno-cultural interests of the population.
This omission may be
explained by the fact that Kazakhstan has already operated a system of
institutions specifically created for that purpose for five years. The Assembly
of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, set up by a March 1, 1995 presidential decree, is
a consul-tative organ on ethnic affairs attached to the president. On more than
one occasion, President Nazarbayev has used the assembly for the realization of
important public initiatives that he wanted to promote.
The assembly was
proclaimed to be an institution for promoting public accord and working out
mechanisms for balancing the interests of different ethnic groups. It is hard
to judge how far it has come in meeting those expectations. The assembly has
the status of a public organization, but it is wholly financed from the state
budget. It has a small executive committee, staffed with former members of the nomenclatura. About once a month, the
assembly has a meeting of its presidium, which also includes chairmen of the
republic’s ethno-cultural centers. Once a year, a full session of the assembly
is convened, with several hundred deputies from all the regions. Each region
has a Smaller Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, which includes the
chairmen of the regional ethno-cultural centers. Each regional administration
has a paid official responsible for the Smaller Assembly. Each region also has
a House of the Peoples’ Friendship, an office with a small staff paid from the
regional budget. Each city or district administration has an official
responsible for maintaining links with the ethno-cultural centers. Each
district, township, or rural area compactly populated by so-called ethnic
minorities, in other words non-titular ethnic groups, has ethno-cultural
centers for these groups. There are also Kazakh ethno-cultural centers, which
are intended to spread the Kazakh language and culture in society.
In the
South-Kazakhstan Region, for instance, the executive staff of the Smaller
Assembly and the House of Friendship is entirely made up of Kazakhs. The
central apparatus in Almaty has some Russians in it. The questions most often
discussed at the sessions of the different assemblies concern education in
minority languages, folklore festivals, radio and television transmission in
the minority languages, locating premises for the ethno-cultural centers, etc.
The government supports such centers, both by allotting the needed
premises—usually in the Houses of Friendship—and money—mostly special funds for
holding festivals of ethnic cultures.
The Assembly of the
Peoples of Kazakhstan also provides a forum where representatives of various
ethnic groups air their concerns, and occasionally give sharp criticism of the
government. The institution of several levels of assemblies can sometimes be seen
as a mostly symbolic organ, intended to demonstrate the state’s attention to
the problems of inter-ethnic relations. Nevertheless, with the help of these
assemblies, the ethno-cultural centers are able to achieve solutions for some
of their communities’ problems, especially in the cultural and educational
spheres. With the support of the assembly, ethnic representatives hold
theoretical and practical conferences, which include the participation of the
OSCE’s high commissioner for ethnic minorities’ affairs, Max van der Stool, and
his representatives. Those conferences permit an exchange of opinions between
members of ethnic communities, government officials and experts.
But the assembly does
not meet all of the country’s needs for solving inter-ethnic problems. It is a
consultative body, fully controlled by the authorities, and not an effective
mechanism for coordinating the interests of different ethnic communities in the
political sphere. The assembly is still part of a system of government based on
absolute domination of the “titular nation” in all spheres of public life. In
the framework of that system, the assembly has the role of preserving the
cultural identity of the peoples on the level of folklore festivals.
The insufficiency of
the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan can be seen from the results of a
poll held in 1997 as part of a program called “The Development of Ethnic
Minorities and its Prospects in the Republic of Kazakhstan.” The poll,
conducted by the Institute of Strategic Research attached to Kazakhstan’s
president, involved 67 people, including officials in ministries, departments,
the Almaty akimat and the executive
committee of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. Also polled were some
heads of ethno-cultural centers, college professors and leaders of political
parties and public movements, as well as historians, political scientists and
philosophers studying inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. Thirty-six of those
polled were Kazakhs, to match the 53.7 percent share of the total population.
Respondents were
asked: “On which public figure or institution do you lay your hopes for solving
the problems of inter-ethnic relations in the republic?” In response, an
absolute majority named the president first (94 percent), next came the
parliament (40.2 percent), then the government (34.3 percent), then local
authorities (28.3 percent), and the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan came
last (26.8 percent).4 Evidently, even people directly involved
in the assembly’s activities can’t see it as an effective means of regulating
ethnic relations. An analysis of the answers with respect to the nationality of
the respondents is also interesting: The assembly’s prestige is highest with
smaller ethnic minorities (43.7 percent), it is lower with the Kazakhs (27.7
percent) and its lowest rating is with the Russians (13.3 percent). The poll showed
that the assembly can at best satisfy the cultural interests of the minorities,
but can hardly regulate inter-ethnic relations.
The fact that there is
more to inter-ethnic relations than cultural interests was confirmed by 40.3
percent of the respondents, who said the country needs to pass a law on ethnic
minorities. In their opinion, that would give the minorities a better social
status and help them realize their aspirations in the transitional period of
Kazakhstan’s development as a civil society. Most of the 59.4 percent of the
respondents who opposed passing such a law argued that the Constitution and
other laws of the republic are sufficient for the realization of rights and
freedoms of its citizens irrespective of their nationality. Therefore, the
respondents argued, passing that law would only contradict the idea of creating
a civil society in Kazakhstan.
4. An Initiative for Governing Ethnic Communities
Even though many see a need for a law on ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan, this need has still not been met. An attempt to create such a law was taken up on the initiative of the Association of Kazakhstan’s German Public Organizations. In spring of 1999, they proposed a bill “On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.” It was prepared with the assistance of the secretariat of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan and was modeled on similar laws passed in Hungary and Poland. The assembly’s executive committee also organized an expert assessment of the law by lawyers and political science experts. This action shows that the assembly is potentially a social institution, capable of promoting initiatives by ethnic minorities for improving the system of government. But the low status of the assembly hampers such initiatives, and it is hard for the assembly to attract public attention. That is what happened in this case: The bill drew more negative than positive assessments and was never widely discussed.
In fact, the bill
reflected the present complex stage in the development of public awareness in
Kazakhstan and may be considered in two aspects: as evidence of a certain level
of understanding of the problems of the emerging multi-cultural civil society in
Kazakhstan and as a project of optimizing the system of government in a
multi-ethnic society.
The text of the bill
intricately combines two discrepant tendencies:
• on the one hand, concern for keeping the ethno-cultural identity of Kazakhstan’s peoples—particularly minorities—and for realizing civil rights by its non-titular population;
• on the other hand, assertion of those principles—such as the priority of ethno-cultural identity over any other—which threaten the ethno-cultural identity of the non-titular groups and make the realization of civil rights dependent on ethnic origin.
This, and other such
contradictions, reflect the vague conceptual argumentation and general
ineptitude of legislation on practical mechanisms protecting the rights of
ethnic minorities. The text of the bill contains incompatible phrases and
statements, such as “harmonic co-existence of ethnic minorities with the Kazakh
and Russian majority” and next to it: “The source of minority rights is not
their numeric strength, but the right to individuality based on respect for
personal freedom and civil peace.”5 What is the sense of talking about
minority or majority rights, if they are basically individual rights that don’t
depend on numeric strength? Possibly, this language is just a tribute to public
discussions of minority rights that have been popular throughout the world in
recent years.
Still more curious are
the arguments for special rights of ethnic minorities. It is asserted that:
“The right to national and ethnic self-identification is an integral part of
basic human rights.” That statement recognizes the right to ethnic
self-identification along with other identifications, such as sex, age or
profession. Moreover, it is specially stressed in Chapter 2 that: “The decision
on belonging to any national or ethnic group or minority, as well as
declaration of it, is an exclusive and inalienable individual right. Nobody is
obliged to declare belonging to a minority.” Furthermore, the bill states that:
“The right to national and ethnic self-identification and a declared membership
of any minority does not exclude recognition of a link with another ethnic
group.” Here is a fine sample, it would seem, of a document in the spirit of
civil society and cultural pluralism: Ethnic identity is an individual matter
that does not rule out multiple cultural or ethnic identification.
But further on in the
text of Chapter 2, Part 1, we find that: “The right to national and ethnic
self-identification is a basic human right that applies to individuals as well
as to their communities.” Here we see prerequisites of granting collective political
rights to a group of people with certain cultural peculiarities. And the bill’s
preamble contains a passage confirming that it will support this concept: “The
parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan grants members of national and ethnic
minorities, as citizens of Kazakhstan, not only the basic human rights, but
also such political rights that are needed for their national and ethnic
self-identification.”
The implication is
that basic, individual rights, granted to all citizens of Kazakhstan by its
Constitution irrespective of their cultural identity, are not enough. It is
necessary to grant ethnic minorities some special conditions for exercising
their basic rights. Second, the bill asserts that ethnic minorities, in other
words groups of people with specific cultural features, can claim special political rights, because they have some
specific interests that are different from people of other cultures. The text
says that those political rights are needed “for their national and ethnic
self-identification.” Some questions arise: What kind of identification
requires special political rights? And, why would people’s social needs be so
different that they require special state institutions apart from the existing
ones?
In search of an answer
to those questions, we turn to the text of the bill. Its preamble defines the
authors’ understanding of the term “ethnic minority.” On the whole the
definition follows the formulas accepted in the world practice: Ethnic
communities are characterized by “national languages, material and spiritual
culture, historical traditions and other peculiarities of their lives.” Thus,
underlying “ethnic” distinctions are cultural peculiarities formed by specific
conditions in which earlier generations had lived for centuries.
But can we say that,
in the present global economic system and universal social environment emerging
now in Kazakhstan and most contemporary states, people’s cultural identity,
psychological peculiarities, etc., provide their successful socialization and
adaptation to the challenges of modern production? Cultural heritage is
certainly crucial in forming the unique personality of each human being, but it
can’t replace the technological skills and knowledge required in the modern
world—unless access to material, political and social public resources are
dependent on the cultural (ethnic) identity of one part of the population in
contrast to all others. The latter model underlies the so-called nation-state,
in which part of the population is proclaimed as indigenous, or titular, on the
strength of common cultural features. The arguments in its favor are usually
based on specific “ethno-polito-genesis,” peculiar ethnic interests, etc. In
fact, this is an attempt to inculcate the idea that people with certain
anthropological distinctions and a “traditional”—or already non-existent—way of
life have such deeply deviating social requirements and political interests
that they need “their own” national state. But there is no evidence that people
with different skin color or eye shape have any different ability to master
modern education and technological skills, or to realize their potential
without support of “their own” state and “natural preferences” granted to the
“indigenous nation.”
Pronouncements of that
kind applied to individuals are quite justifiably qualified as racism and, as
such, are subject to legal persecution. But camouflaged in phrases like
“specific ethnic requirements,” they form the ideological basis of state
nationalism.
An essential, though
inconspicuous, perversion of meaning is performed right before our eyes: By
emphasizing cultural identity—not national or ethnic identity, for these are defined through cultural
peculiarities—as an element of personality, a group of people is singled out as
bearers of special social interests and political rights. In that way,
individual cultural self-identification as part of the basic human right to
general self-identification is turned into a guarantee of specific social
interests common to the bearers of similar cultural features. But at the same
time, discriminating between citizens on ethno-cultural features is condemned
both by law and public morality.
The paradox is
explained, in my opinion, by the special magic that the words ethnic and national acquired in the course of the struggle for sovereignty.
The frequent use of those terms in the emotional speeches of fighters for
national freedom and ethnic identity endowed them with special meaning. Yet, in
truth, the entire realm of phenomena to which those terms are applied can be
adequately, if unemotionally, described by the term culturally specific. So, if we exclude impassioned ranting, the
analysis shows that an ethnic community is a group of people united by the
consciousness of their common cultural features as common social requirements.
That means the community has an ideology, or purposefully formed mass notions.
A nation in this
context is formed when such an ethnic community, or group of people with common
cultural features, proceeds from the idea of shared social interests to
developing political ambitions, such as carving out their own nation-state. But
these def-initions are characteristic of our post-Soviet mentality, which
freely operates with expressions such as “the Kazakh nation” or “the Russian
nation.” The rest of the world, with a few exceptions, like former Yugoslavia
and the former South African Republic, understands a nation in the sense of
citizenship, that is community on the basis of single statehood and political
loyalty, irrespective of the cultural origin of individual citizens.
But decades of
domination by Soviet ethnic theory has created a situation where not only the
apologists of state nationalism, but also activists of ethno-cultural
centers—such as the authors of the discussed bill—are captured by its rhetoric.
Therefore, while the bill voices dissatisfaction with the existing system,
which is based on the principle of a nation-state that proceeds from certain
political rights owed to a cultural group, it proposes to follow the same
principle, only this time not in the name of the “indigenous nation,” but of
“ethnic minorities.”
If we accept the idea
of ethnic communities as bearers of political rights, we must inevitably cause
mutual isolation between them. To explain why special political institutions
are needed for “ethnic minorities,” people will have to admit that members of
different cultures are so incompatible that their interests can’t be realized
within a single political system—and that is a sure way towards division.
On the other hand, the
authors of the bill are understandably concerned over the present situation,
which is not quite favorable for each citizen’s free self-realization,
including ethno-cultural identification. But is it possible to find alternative
ways of cultural identification without undermining political loyalty to the
state? It is possible, if we distinguish between cultural and political
identification. In other words, we can recognize the inalienable human right to
cultural self-identification but not use this as a basis for special political
rights. Unfortunately, in present-day Kazakhstan, it is only possible to derive
special political status from one’s cultural identity if you belong to the
titular nation. This is confirmed by the rhetoric used in legislation, as well
as by the selection of cadres and cultural-linguistic policies.
The non-titular
population in Kazakhstan enjoys a right to satisfy their specific cultural
requirements in the framework of the state-sponsored system of assemblies and
ethno-cultural centers, without any claims to special political rights. Special
rights for a specific ethnic group are monopolized by the “titular,
state-forming nation,” the Kazakhs. The rejected bill may have been seen by the
present authorities as an attempt to break that monopoly. That is probably why
it was never widely discussed and was instead buried in the offices of
government experts.
We may add that
another drawback of the proposed bill was that it failed to define the status
of the Russian people. The text includes Russians in “the majority,” which
means they are not subject to the law on minorities, yet Russians are not “the
state-forming nation,” and their tongue is not recognized as the second
official language. That dubious position was pointed out by Yu. Bunakov, the
head of the Russian Community organization, at a session of the presidium of
the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. But his speech found little
sympathy, either from the “ethnic minorities” or “the titular nation.”
Proceeding to the analysis
of the said bill in the sense of practical proposals on self-government in an
ethnically mixed environment, we may say those proposals are stamped both with
the conceptions discussed above and the existing system of ethno-cultural
organizations.
Because the bill
admits special minority rights, it proposes a special mechanism for realizing
those rights. Chapter 3, entitled “The Collective Minority Rights,” states, in
Paragraph 14, that minorities have the right to preserve, support, strengthen
and inherit national and ethnic self-identification. Paragraph 15 says that
ethnic minorities also have a right to preserve and develop their traditions
and language and to keep and increase their material, cultural and spiritual
values. To pursue those goals, according to Paragraph 16, ethnic minorities
have a right to set up public organizations and local and republic-wide organs
of self-government.
These paragraphs
graphically demonstrate a gradual transition from cultural to political rights.
Further on, in paragraphs 19.1 and 19.2, the text gives minorities the right of
political representation: “National and ethnic minorities have a right to be
represented in the parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” To do this, the
parliament “elects a special representative on the rights of national and
ethnic minorities whose tasks and functions are defined by a special law.”
The next chapter of
the bill, entitled “The Organs of the Minorities’ Self-Government,” develops
the idea of special self-government bodies and sets the principles for forming
such organs. “Specific national and ethnic minorities can elect, on the basis
of the present law, in towns, districts and cities, directly or indirectly,
their own local self-government organs, as well as their own self-government
organs on the republic’s level,” according to Paragraph 20.1. And Paragraph
21.1 adds: “A territorial organ of self-government may declare itself as belonging to a minority if at least half its
deputies are members of that minority. ... If at least 30 percent of the
deputies of a territorial self-government organ represent a minority, not less
than three of them can form a self-government organ of that minority.”
Furthermore, according to Paragraph 22.7: “In case a national or ethnic
minority has no self-government organ of its own, its interests may be
represented in the local self-government by a special delegate.”
The chapter goes on to
outline the status and functions of these special organs. According to
Paragraph 24.1: “A self-government organ of a national or ethnic minority is a
corporate legal entity. The goals and powers of such minority organs, other
than those given by legislation to other territorial self-government organs,
are defined by the present law.” Paragraph 24.2 adds: “In solving local
problems, territorial self-government organs of minorities are to observe,
under Item 1, the rights and interests of Kazakhs and other ethnic groups
constituting minorities in that particular territory.” To solve problems,
according to Paragraph 25.1: “Local self-government organs of minorities may
appeal to the head of the respective administrative organ on any issues bearing
on that minority’s affairs.”
Based on these
provisions for minorities’ self-government, we get the impression that the bill
would allow a group of people with common cultural characteristics and
self-identification to create a territorial and administrative state structure.
But this is a superficial impression, because the sphere of influence actually
reserved for such minority self-government organs is limited only to their
specific ethno-cultural requirements: local education; local printed and
electronic mass media; observation of traditions; and preserving their culture.
In fact, the minority local self-governments would handle the same issues that
are now entrusted to ethno-cultural centers and assemblies. The only difference
is that, unlike the assemblies, which are consultative bodies controlled by the
local executive powers, the bill would make minority local self-government
organs corporate legal entities, with more independence. For example, these
special minority organs would have a right to control territorial powers in
matters concerning minority interests.
In particular,
Paragraph 25 of the bill stipulates that “Local self-government organs of
minorities have the following rights:
a) to make inquiries;
b) to move proposals and initiatives;
c) to initiate taking necessary measures;
d) to protest against the administration’s activities or decisions infringing on the rights of minorities and to demand changing or canceling such decisions.
2. In cases defined by
Item 1 the head of the respective administrative organ is obliged to give a
pertinent answer on the issue within 30 days.
3. If the issue is
outside the administrative organ’s competence, its head is obliged to send it
within three days to the organ empowered to solve it.”
The bill more clearly
defines the rights of the local minorities’ self-government organs in their
relations with local administrations:
“Par. 27. The local
administrations are obliged to help the local minorities’ self-government
organs.
Par. 28.1. The local
administrations can take decisions on matters of education, local mass media,
culture and traditions, or on the public use of language, only with the
agreement of the pertinent minority self-government organ.
2. In appointing heads
of ethnic institutions and in matters of professional competence of members of
an ethnic minority, it is necessary to have the agreement of the local minority
self-government organ, or the opinion of that minority’s special
representative, or the opinion of its local organization.”
Under Paragraph 30, it
is also possible to establish a minority self-government organ for the entire
Republic of Kazakhstan.
The republic-level
organ is described further in Paragraph 35.1.2: “The Republic’s minority
self-government organ represents the interests of that minority and protects it
in the country as a whole and in its regions. In the interests of forming a
cultural autonomy, it can set up the necessary institutions and coordinate
their activities. ... That organ is a corporate legal entity.”
Under Paragraph 36,
the sphere of the republic-level minority self-government organ is described as
coinciding in principle with the goals of the republic’s ethno-cultural
centers. In other words it would handle: the minority’s festivals; awards and
rules of their distribution; the principles and methods of using available
radio and television channels or the available transmission time; press
reports; creation of minority institutions and setting their structure and
rules of functioning; theatrical activities; museum premises; creating and
keeping art collections of national importance; minority libraries; ethnic
institutions of art and science; publishing houses and their functioning; and
ethnic secondary and higher education establishments of national importance.
But there is an essential distinction between the proposed minority organ and
existing ethno-cultural centers: The bill stresses that the republic’s minority
self-government organ can take independent decisions on the above-listed
questions.
In
addition, according to Paragraph 37, the republic’s minority self-government
organ “a) can express its opinion on legal norms in the process of their
preparation, if they affect the interests of the minority; b) it can seek information from the
administrative organs on questions affecting the ethnic minority and move
proposals and initiatives on matters within its competence; c) it can cooperate
with the competent government organs in professional matters of primary,
secondary and higher education of the minority.”
Upon
receiving an inquiry on matters affecting an ethnic minority, the
administration would be obliged to submit all the needed information.
In
the course of preparing legal acts bearing on the preservation of architectural
relics of ethnic minorities, or in decisions on similar matters taken by
self-government organs, the republic-level or local minority self-government
organs representatives, or local ethnic organizations, have a right to express
agreement or disagreement. The same goes for decisions about teaching aids,
except those used for higher education.
As
we see, the bill would considerably enlarge the powers of ethnic organs of all
levels compared to the existing status of the ethno-cultural centers.
At
the local level, if there is no minority self-government organ in a particular
area, the bill proposes the function of a minority local representative, who
would be granted rather wide rights, including, as per Paragraph 39:
“.... a) if he is not a deputy of the local self-government organ, he is allowed to take part with a consultative vote in its session or to sit on any commission, even behind closed doors, when the agenda has a bearing on minority interests;
b) he can propose items for the agenda of such sessions to the chairman of the administration or a commission on questions concerning minority interests;
c) he can demand that the local self-government should revise decisions by such commissions if they affect minority interests;
d) he can ask for a clarification from the administration, the local self-government or a commission on questions within their competence affecting minority interests, etc.
e) in order to fulfil his tasks, he can receive the needed clarification and help from the administration and the secretary of the self-government organ;
f) he can propose initiatives on minority affairs to the administration, to the secretary or to the executive member of the office;
g) he can urge the local self-government organ to appeal to the appropriate competent agency on questions affecting minority interests;
2.
The administrator or the chairman of a commission is obliged to present the
proposal made by the minority representative at the latest session of the
self-government organ to the commission for taking a decision on including it
in the agenda for consideration.
3.
If the minority representative requests clarification from the administrator,
or the secretary of the self-government organ or a commission, they are to give
an answer on the essence of the matter right at the session or within 15 days
after holding it.
4.
The minority representative’s speech at the session is entered in its minutes
at his request or is attached to the minutes in writing.
5.
The deliberation on a matter pertaining to an ethnic minority and entered on
the agenda according to Item 2 on the basis of the initiative described by Item
1/b may be postponed or removed from the agenda by the collegium only at the
request of the minority representative.
6.
The self-government organ is obliged to take into consideration the opinion of
the minority representative on questions connected with the preparation of a
decision or a measure affecting the rights, duties and interests of the ethnic
minority.”
In
other words, the relations between the local administration and ethnic
minorities, as prescribed by the bill, are on a much better level than those
that exist today. The bill also settles the questions of minority language
rights, outlining a minority’s freedom to study and use their native languages.
Assessing
the bill as a whole we may note that, despite drawbacks in areas such as an
unclear definition of an ethnic minority, it could serve as a good basis for
legislation on governing ethnic communities and developing mechanisms of a
multi-cultural society. The fact that the present government of Kazakhstan
seems to have no interest in the bill is explained, in our opinion, by both
political motives and the shortcomings of its text.
The
higher role of self-government, or true citizens’ initiative, that is described
in the bill would diminish the importance of the existing system of local
government: Minority self-govenrments would compete with the akims, who are appointed from above and
dominate the representative organs at all levels. It is true that new bills on
local self-government that are now in preparation are intended to make the
process of governing local communities somewhat more democratic. But even in
those bills, the higher level akims
would still be appointed by the president. Furthermore, the development of the
ethnic minorities’ self-government may force the government to face an
unpleasant precedent of consolidation on an ethnic basis.
In
rejecting the bill on the rights of national and ethnic minorities, the
government criticizes it from a democratic position: Ethnic self-government
organs are superfluous, they say, because there are territorial self-government
organs for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic identity. At first this
criticism may seem justified, but we should not forget that, given the present
level of public mentality and social relations in Kazakhstan, all democratic
institutions are largely perfunctory—and real power is based on tacit alliances
between bureaucrats and the population they control. None of the ostensibly
democratic procedures have prevented the authorities from mobilizing their
administrative resources and carrying out a reshuffle of cadres in favor of
“the titular population” in all the regions and branches of power. Then, on the
basis of the state power—which is in reality Kazakh power—the government
creates a system of catering for the ethno-cultural needs of the non-titular
population in the style of folklore festivals.
Although
the rejected bill had defects, proceeding mostly from dubious Soviet-era
rhetoric about “minority rights,” it contained good prerequisites for a
workable system of governing ethnic communities. Its advantage lay in the mechanisms
of the minorities’ participation in local authorities’ decisions on questions
directly affecting them, as well as allowing the line-up of the local power
organs to be regulated by the majority of the population.
In any case, the bill
was not even accepted for consideration in parliament, and we have to review
the situation of governing ethnic communities in Kazakhstan as it exists today.
5. Ethnic
Policy as a Factor
in Governing Kazakhstan’s
Polyethnic Society
As we pointed out earlier, Kazakhstan has a mixed ethnic composition and an uneven territorial distribution of its various ethnic groups. The data in Table 16 clearly indicates that the Kazakh population is concentrated in the west and southeast, whereas the north and northeast are more than half populated by European-Slavic people. But considerable changes have occurred in recent years, both in the republic as a whole and in some of its regions. The most noticeable trend is a rising share of Kazakhs and a diminishing European-Slavic population. (See Table 2.)
Table 1. The Share of Kazakhs in the Total Population
(The Results of the 1999 Census)
Regions Total Kazakhs Percentage
of Kazakhs
Rep. of Kazakhstan 14,952,420 7,984,082 53.4
Akmolinsk Region 835,661 312,889 37.4
Aktyubinsk 662,793 482,487 70.7
Almaty 1,559,522 927,192 59.5
Atyrau 439,900 391,545 89.0
East Kazakhstan 1,530,792 742,215 48.5
Jambyl 983,935 644,951 65.5
West Kazakhstan 617,624 399,931 64.8
Karaganda 1,411,401 530,489 37.6
Koustanai 1,019,580 318,838 31.1
Kyzylorda 598,344 561,942 94.2
Mangistau 316,847 249,284 78.7
Pavlodar 806,034 307,870 38.2
Table 1 (continued). The Share of Kazakhs in the Total Population
(The Results of the 1999 Census)
Regions Total Kazakhs Percentage
of Kazakhs
North Kazakhstan 752,932 213,901 29.5
South Kazakhstan 1,976,689 1,336,533 67.6
Astana City 319,318 131,208 41.1
Almaty City 1,130,068 435,070 38.5
Table 2. The Dynamics of Kazakh Population Growth
in Kazakhstan (1999 Census)
Total Population 1999, Percentage
1999 1989 of 1989
Rep. of Kazakhstan 14,952,420 16,199,154 92.2
Akmolinsk Region 835,661 1,064,406 78.5
Aktyubinsk 682,793 732,653 93.2
Almaty 1,559,222 1,642,917 94.5
Atyrau 439,900 424,768 103.6
East Kazakhstan 1,536,792 1,767,225 86.6
Jambyl 983,935 1,038,667 94.7
West Kazakhstan 617,624 629,494 98.1
Karaganda 1,411,401 1,745,448 80.9
Koustanai 1,019,560 1,223,844 83.3
Kyzylorda 596,344 574,464 103.8
Mangistau 316,847 324,243 97.7
Pavlodar 806,034 942,313 85.5
North Kazakhstan 725,932 912,065 79.6
South Kazakhstan 1,976,689 1,823,528 108.4
Astana City 319,318 281,252 113.5
Almaty City 1,130,068 1,071,927 105.4
Table 2 (continued). The Dynamics of Kazakh Population Growth
in Kazakhstan (1999 Census)
Kazakh Population 1999, Percentage
1999 1989 of 1989
Rep. of Kazakhstan 7,984,082 6,496,858 122.9
Akmolinsk Region 312,868 266,831 117.3
Aktyubinsk 482,467 407,222 118.5
Almaty 927,192 741,737 125.0
Atyrau 391,545 338,998 115.5
East Kazakhstan 742,215 687,879 107.5
Jambyl 644,951 507,302 127.1
West Kazakhstan 399,931 351,123 113.9
Karaganda 530,469 449,837 117.9
Koustanai 316,636 279,787 113.2
Kyzylorda 561,942 504,126 111.5
Mangistau 249,284 165,043 151.0
Pavlodar 367,870 268,512 114.7
North Kazakhstan 213,901 206,060 103.8
South Kazakhstan 1,336,533 1,017,470 131.4
Astana City 131,208 497,998 263.5
Almaty City 435,070 255,133 176.5
In the period from
1989–1999, between the censuses, the Kazakh population has grown by 1,488,200,
or 22.9 percent, and its share of the population rose from 40.1 percent to 53.4
percent. The Russian population decreased from 6,062,000 to 4,479,600, in other
words by 1,582,400 or 26.1 percent, and its share fell from 37.4 percent to 30
percent. The Uzbek population grew by 39,600, or 12 percent; Uigurs increased
by 28,800, or 15.9 percent; Kurds increased by 7,400, or 29.1 percent; Dungans
increased by 7,000, or 23.3 percent. The German population decreased by
593,400, or 62.7 percent, which means their share of the total population dropped
by 3.4 percentage points; Ukrainians decreased by 328,600, or 37.5 percent,
which was a share drop of 1.7 points; Tatars decreased by 71,800, or 22.4
percent, a share drop of 0.3 points; and Belarusians decreased by 66,000, or
37.1 percent, which means their proportion of the total share dropped 0.4
points.7
The situation involves
a sharp change in the social environment, causing social discomfort for the
Russian-speaking population that used to dominate in the cities. This
discomfort is felt all the more keenly due to the fast pace of “Kazakhization”
of the executive power. The scale of this change can be judged by the available
statistics.
In 1994, the now
abolished Taldy-Kurgan Region had the following ethnic composition: 50.3
percent Kazakhs, 34.8 percent Slavic peoples and 14.9 percent other minorities,
including Uigurs, Koreans, Germans, Tatars, etc. Among the 94 leading members
of the administration and other regional institutions, Kazakhs made up 78.7
percent of the total, Slavs made up 18.1 percent and other minorities made up
3.2 percent. The 178
deputies of those leaders were 53 percent Kazakhs, 35.4 percent Slavs and 11.2
percent other minorities. The situation was not confined to just one region, as
can be seen from “Who is Who in Kazakhstan” for 1996–97. Among the leaders
named in the book, Kazakhs constitute 79 percent, Russians 11 percent,
Ukrainians 3 percent, Tatars 1 percent and Koreans 1 percent.8
With the continued
emigration of the non-indigenous population in the past years, its representation
among the republic’s leadership could hardly improve. It would seem that, in
the face of such an imbalance, the authorities should make a special effort to
correct policies of promoting cadres, at least on the local level. But in
1997–98 they reshaped the districts in a way that actually increased the
imbalance. They carved up the regions so as to dilute the percentage of the
non-titular population. In this redistricting, the regions with the majority of
Russian population were joined to those populated mostly by Kazakhs, and the
regional center was always set up in a city formerly settled by Russians.
Because twelve out of the fourteen regional akims
are Kazakhs, it could be expected that the predominantly Kazakh
administration moving in, along with numerous relatives and friends, would
change the demographic situation in favor of the Kazakhs.
The first results of
that redistricting were already noticeable during the 1999 census. For example,
in 1994, the Kazakh population of the old Taldy-Kurgan Region was 50.3 percent
of the total. After the district was joined with the predominantly Kazakh
Almaty Region, the share of Kazakhs in the new, enlarged district is 59
percent. (See Table 1.) By the same method, the share of the Russian population
in the East-Kazakhstan Region was reduced after it was joined with the
Semipalatinsk Region, and the Russian population was also diluted in the
Karaganda Region, which was joined with Dzhezkazgan, and two more regions in
the north of Kazakhstan. That method of “improving” the representation of the
Russian population in the power organs naturally failed to improve either the
Russians’ social standing or their relations with the Kazakhs. On the contrary,
it only formed new hotbeds of tension.
The industrially
developed East-Kazakhstan Region, which had always been a net donor to the
republic’s budget, is still largely populated by Russians. The Semipalatinsk
Region that was joined to it has a chronic budget deficit. Since November 1999,
about ten Russian directors of large enterprises and departments of the
Ust-Kamenogorsk administration have been replaced by Kazakhs. The region had
long had a festering ethnic conflict with financial roots: The taxes collected
mainly from urban enterprises, employing mostly Russians, are channeled to
rural areas, mostly populated by Kazakhs. The deputies of the city maslikhat, who were mostly Russians,
irritate the regional powers because they protest against the redistribution of
tax revenues. The conflict developed still further when the Russian deputies
voted to limit, and strictly register, the large influx of Kazakh youths
migrating from depressed rural areas to the city. There are rumors that the
present regional akim, V. Mette, will be replaced by a more
tractable Kazakh official, a move that would resolve the conflict between the
Russian-speaking city and the Kazakh-speaking region in favor of the Kazakhs.
The new law “On Labor”
also generates tensions by giving employers enormous advantages, since all
labor relations are regulated by contracts. Because most employers are now
Kazakhs, many workers in regions like Ust-Kamenogorsk expect that
non-indigenous people will soon find themselves unemployed. There is even a
sentiment among some citizens that a new Kazakh regional head will be soon
appointed to ransack the Russian-speaking region. Underlying social and
economic factors that triggered off worker dissatisfaction in the first place
can be gradually forgotten, and negative ethnic stereotypes come to the fore,
as Russian workers say their misfortunes are due to Kazakhs’ intolerance of the
Russian population. Actually this is not the case: The unfair employment and
appointment policies are pursued in the interests of specific local
bureaucratic groups and alliances. But in the absence of effective public
control over the authorities’ actions, the mass consciousness can transform
such practices into an ethnic confrontation.
In the Karaganda
Region, the struggle for influence in the city and the region, between the old
industrial and the new bureaucratic elites, also takes on ethnic overtones,
because the old elite was predominantly Russian and the new one is entirely
Kazakh. Being unable to defeat the executive power’s policies on language and
promotion of Kazakh cadres, the opponents of those policies have concentrated
their forces in the representative organs. During the 1999 local elections, the
Russian population chose the tactic of “protest ethnic voting.” Given the lack
of legal mechanisms to oppose the authorities’ policies, Russians voted on the
principle of “anyone but a Kazakh.” As a result, the local representative
organs contain a large number of Russian deputies.
A group of deputies in
the Karaganda regional maslikhat,
united under the slogan “Law, Equality, Dignity,” launched a demand to grant 5
percent of the citizens a right to call a referendum to decide whether to
transform the Constitutional Council into a Consti-tutional Court, and whether
to grant more local rights. The group noted in its statement that “... contrary
to the ban by the Constitution and the law ‘On the Civil Service,’
dis-crimination is practiced.” The proposal of a right to initiate a referendum
by this group of citizens clearly has the secondary goal of encouraging public
discussion on the question of Kazakhstan joining the Union of Russia and
Belarus—and also on official policies in the fields of culture, language and
cadres.
In the North
Kazakhstan Region, the main source of conflict is the decision to conduct the
work of state and public organizations in the Kazakh language. Russians
constitute the majority of the population there, and in the past they also
dominated in the power structures. To some extent, Russians are still important
in the region’s power structure, despite the current trend toward
“Kazakhization.” The current policies in language and cadres give those
Russians psychological discomfort and a sense they have no prospects in
Kazakhstan. Many of them accept the need to learn to speak Kazakh, but the
administrative measures taken to inculcate the language make them think it is a
deliberate anti-Russian campaign.
The government’s
strategy is rather aimed, as we said above, at promoting “their own” people and
removing undesirable rivals. The easy way to do this is to bar access to public
or professional careers for those who do not know the Kazakh language. At the
fifth session of North Kazakhstan’s regional Smaller Assembly of the Peoples of
Kazakhstan, held in January 2000, the chairman of the Kazakh Tili society’s
regional branch proposed that, “The heads of state institutions should be
tested for their knowledge of the official language and their attitude to it.”
In this approach, language is used as a weapon in the struggle for political
power.
This kind of attitude
causes widespread doubts among the population about the government’s ability to
pursue enlightened ethnic policies, as can be seen from the public opinion poll
of 807 respondents, taken by the Association of Sociologists and Politologists
of Kazakhstan in Almaty on June 15–16, 2000. The association’s president, B.
Bekturganov, said the poll produced unexpected results that contradict the
oft-repeated official assertion that the state policies help preserve the fine
balance of inter-ethnic accord in Kazakhstan.
The majority of those
polled found no inter-ethnic accord in the republic. (See Table 3.)
Particularly alarming is the fact that most of the polled Kazakhs were unable
to answer the question. If more than half of the polled members of the titular
nation cannot say whether ethnic peace is preserved in Kazakhstan, then the
process of integration of other ethnic groups around that titular nation must
have run into an impasse.
Table 3. Public Opinion Poll: Is There Inter-Ethnic Accord in Kazakhstan?
Total Kazakhs Russians Others
Yes 4.2% 18.1% 1.3% 5.6%
Rather yes than no 23.1% 20.7% 25.6% 17.8%
Rather no than yes 30.7% 7.8% 35.7% 36.4%
No 14.4% 0.0% 15.8% 26.2%
Unable to answer 27.6% 53.4% 21.7% 14.0%
The answers to the
question about the reasons for deterioration of inter-ethnic relations are
enlightening. (See Table 4.) Among the chief factors provoking that
deterioration, most respondents named the total “Kazakhization” of the state
structure and government. This would indicate a constitutional crisis and the
absence of a real balance of power in the polyethnic republic. Many respondents
also faulted errors of state reform policy that “spur” economic inequality,
political instability and a crisis of state control over society. The poll
showed that the non-Kazakh ethnic groups think Kazakhstan is becoming a state
for Kazakhs only. In effect, the state power, through its Kazakh officials, is
the chief violator of inter-ethnic accord.
Table 4. What Factors Contribute to Ethnic Tensions in Kazakhstan?
Total Kazakhs Russians Others
1. “Kazakhization” of state powers 24.2% 5.8% 26.3% 25.6%
2. Economic inequality 22.5% 19.5% 25.3% 5.5%
3. Political instability 14.9% 13.0% 15.2% 22.0%
4. Crisis of tractability in society 13.1% 5.8% 14.2% 17.4%
5. State ethnic and language policies 10.6% 0.0% 13.3% 0.0%
6. Mass media publications 2.1% 9.1% 1.4% 0.0%
7. Activities of nationalist organizations 1.6% 7.1% 1.1% 0.0%
8. None of the suggested factors 5.4% 32.5% 0.0% 21.2%
9. Unable to answer 5.6% 7.1% 3.1% 8.3%
Another
conflict-generating factor is Kazakhstan’s official language. (See Table 5.)
Most of the Russian and minority respondents think that the republic should
have two official languages: Russian and Kazakh. Only 19 percent of the Kazakh
respondents share that view, and 70 percent of them approve the present
situation, with Kazakh being the official language and Russian the language of
inter-ethnic communication.
In practice, the
proclamation of Kazakh as an official language was not accepted by the
non-Kazakh population of the republic. But the state ignores the scale of the
problem and fails to offer any civilized solution for it. This is clear from
the answers to the question about the nature of the government’s ethnic policy.
(See Table 6.) Most non-Kazakh respondents find that the present ethnic policy
infringes on the interests of all ethnic groups except the Kazakhs, whereas
almost 50 percent of the Kazakhs find that policy does not discriminate between
Kazakhs and others and provides equal opportunities for all citizens,
irrespective of their nationality.9
Table 5. Which of the Following Statements Do You Agree With?
Total Kazakhs Russians Others
All nationalities populating 1.7% 12.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Kazakhstan should use the official
Kazakh language.
Kazakh should be the official language 15.4% 68.1% 2.0% 43.0%
and Russian the language of
inter-ethnic communication.
There should be two official languages: 73.9% 19.8% 85.1% 57.0%
Kazakh and Russian.
Russian should be both the sole 3.7% 0.0% 5.4% 0.0%
official and inter-ethnic
communication language.
Unable to answer. 5.2% 0.0% 7.5% 0.0%
Table 6. Which of the Following Statements Do You Agree With?
Total Kazakhs Russians Others
Ethnic policy in Kazakhstan provides 7.7% 49.1% 1.5% 0.0%
equality of all citizens irrespective
of nationality.
Ethnic policy in Kazakhstan equally 24.4% 21.6% 23.4% 38.3%
violates the rights of Kazakhs
and other ethnic groups.
Ethnic policy in Kazakhstan violates 31.0% 0.0% 34.8% 50.5%
the rights of all nationalities
except the Kazakhs.
Ethnic policy in Kazakhstan promotes 16.3% 19.8% 18.1% 5.6%
the segregation of the population
into Kazakhs and all others.
Unable to answer. 20.6% 9.5% 22.2% 5.6%
Even taking into
consideration the fact that the poll was held in Almaty, where the non-Kazakh
population still constitutes the majority, its results show convincingly the
ineffectiveness of policies for governing the polyethnic society of Kazakhstan.
In our opinion, there are two reasons for this ineffectiveness:
• The undeveloped stage of civil society, which prevents the population from access to the process of decision making, coupled with excessive concentration of power and resources in the hands of official bureaucracy.
• The chosen model of building a nation-state of the titular Kazakh ethnic group, with all the preferences and peculiarities of ethnic policy that that model implies.
6. Case Study: Governing Local Polyethnic Communities
The situation described above applies to the state and regional level of governing Kazakhstan’s polyethnic society. But it is also important to consider the real state of affairs in the polyethnic communities of rural settlements or areas. An analysis of such a community provides a detailed snapshot of the situation of local government and ethnic affairs in Kazakhstan.
We will look at the
Sairam area of the South Kazakhstan Region. Our choice is dictated by the
area’s demographic peculiarities, which include a majority population of
Uzbeks, as well as the effectiveness of the old Uzbek tradition of community
self-government, which is still relevant in the modern system.
By the 1999 census,
the South Kazakhstan Region has a population of 1,978,889, consisting of
1,336,533 Kazakhs, which is 67.6 percent of the total; about 350,000 Uzbeks, or
18 percent of the total; and 150,000 Russians, or 7.5 percent of the total. The
Sairam area is populated by 35,000, of which Uzbeks make up 99.8 percent. There
are a few families of Kazakhs, Turks, Bashkirs and Russians. In the larger
district, also called Sairam, there 15 areas or villages, and Uzbeks constitute
over 90 percent of the population in four of them; Sairam, Kara-Murt,
Kara-Bulak and Mankent. The other eleven areas also have many Uzbeks, but not
the majority.
The system of state
government in the larger Sairam District consists of the district
administration, headed by the district akim, and fifteen rural administrations
within the village akims, which are
often referred to as microakims.
The akim for the whole district is a Kazakh,
and his deputy is an Uzbek. For a long time before 1999, the district akim had been Russian, of local birth,
speaking both Kazakh and Uzbek. His choice as a leader was a sort of
compromise: In Soviet times this region, along with its large Uzbek population,
also had many Russians and Germans living in it. The Kazakh population has been
growing only recently, so a Kazakh akim wouldn’t
have had mass local support. On the other hand, an Uzbek in that post would
have raised political apprehension in view of tense relations with nearby
Uzbekistan in the compact Uzbek-populated area. So a Russian akim was preferred, even despite the
dwindling number of Russians there.
There have been
changes in the region’s ethno-demographic make-up recently, due to the exodus
of the European-Slavic population, the steadily high birth-rate of the Uzbeks
and the deliberate policy of settling the area with Kazakhs from other regions
and from abroad. The so-called oralmans,
or Kazakh repatriates, have been directed here, with the purpose of changing
the ethnic composition of this mostly non-Kazakh area.
Among the 132 state
officials in the district, including the apparatus of the district akim and the village akimiats, there are 71 Kazakhs, or 54
percent; 54 Uzbeks, or 40 percent; six Russians, or 4.5 percent; and one
Korean. The majority of the village administration are Uzbeks, but the chiefs
of the local militia and tax service are Kazakh. The akim finished local secondary school and then was educated as an
agronomist.
The district
administration convenes all the fifteen rural akims once in two or three months for experience sharing.
In the Sairam rural
area, the Uzbeks call the head of the village kishlak hokim, based on their old traditions, and there is a
well-developed system of local self-government. The area is divided into 30
precincts, each with several hundred families, or a few thousand people. The
precincts are headed by an official called ulichkom,
in the old Soviet tradition, or mahalla
hokim in Uzbek. Because, in Soviet times, most of the local people were
employed by the sovkhoz (state farm),
which has now been transformed into a farm cooperative, the foremen in that
farm also play a certain role in public life.
For more detailed
information on the functioning of the local self-government in Sairam, we interviewed
the ulichkom of the Pakhtakor
precinct, which is situated in Artelnaya Street
and has about 850 families, or slightly over 3,000 residents. The ulichkom, as he called himself during
our talk in Russian, is elected from among the most respected elders, called aksakals. Our interview subject had
worked 30 years as a teacher at a vocational school and is proud of the trust
put in him by his neighborhood. He has no attributes of power, such as a seal
or official blanks—all the clerical office work is done by the village
administration. His work in that post is not paid but is considered an honor.
He has varied functions and is versatile in his efforts to meet the needs of
public life. The ulichkom’s responsibilities
include the following:
• He represents the official authorities in his precinct and announces all new public measures, initiatives and important events in the life of the region and the republic. For instance, ulichkoms were active in organizing elections for local representative organs in October 1999.
• He organizes effective interaction between the authorities and the population: collecting payments for public utilities, paying out pensions and relief payments and drawing the social security organs’ attention to the most needy families.
• He organizes public works in his precinct, including cleaning of irrigation canals, planting trees in public places, repairing of fences and cleaning of streets. Last year the community built an annex to the local school by the khashar method (i.e. people’s building), using money collected from the parents’ subscriptions and their direct participation in the construction. The authorities also gave a small subsidy for purchasing school desks and teaching aids. Next year, they plan to build a school gym in the same way. Because irrigation is a vital issue for the Uzbek agricultural community, the ulichkom also makes up the schedule for using the water.
• He acts as a magistrate in the court of first appeal, trying family disputes and small breaches which, if he settles them, never go to the militia or higher courts. If he is unable to solve some issues, he takes them to the village akim at the meeting of all the ulichkoms, called by the village administration once or twice a month.
In addition, he may
organize some initiatives regulating the norms of public life within his
precinct. For instance, on his initiative, it was decided that noisy family
celebrations, such as weddings and other parties, in Paktakhor must wind up by
7 p.m., to give peace to the neighbors. On the other hand, he also acts as
master of ceremonies at all weddings.
The ulichkom also cooperates with the local
mosque. The region has seen an influx of Islamic religious extremists, and four
local families who have converted to Wahhabism wanted to preach it at the
mosque. The community balked at the idea, and with the participation of the ulichkom, they banned it. But they
cannot turn the Wahhabites out of the village, so the ulichkom, seeing the importance of the problem, monitors
developments at the mosque.
The ulichkom can’t do it all alone, of
course; he is supported by a group of other respected elders, who always help
him.
The function of ulichkoms, or mahalla hokims is a symbiosis of the traditional Central Asian
peasant community’s self-government and the Soviet system of local
powers.Another rural public office brought over from the old traditions is the Biy, a man of authority consulted by ulichkoms before they turn to the
village administration. There are 12 Biys
in the Sairam area.
A similar system of ulichkoms, or precinct elders, exists in
other, non-Uzbek settlements. But Uzbek communities are unique in that they
have an age-old tradition of self-government based on their customary respect
for authorities and elders. That ensures a more successful organization of
public life and works. Their experience was considered in drawing up the bill
on local self-government, which is being discussed in Kazakhstan’s parliament.
The ulichkoms were convened several
times by the village administration and asked to express their opinions of what
the new law should be like.
From the point of view
of a rural community like Sairam, with a non-titular population, some of the
most important areas involving government of the ethnic sphere are culture and
education.
In the Sairam area,
there is a school in nearly every precinct. The Pakhtakor precinct has a school
for 1,250 students. It is an Uzbek school, where most subjects are taught in
the Uzbek language, but Kazakh, Russian and other languages are also taught
there. A special problem for the more than 70 Uzbek schools in Kazakhstan arose
in 1994, when Uzbekistan’s education system introduced the Latin alphabet
instead of the Cyrillic. The Uzbek schools of Kazakhstan had always used school
books and curricula from Uzbekistan, and between 1994 and 1999, they also used
the Latin scripted curriculum they received from Uzbekistan. But this
curriculum made it harder for children to adapt to the Cyrillic information
environment that dominates in Kazakhstan, and diminished their chances of
getting a higher education. Since the majority of local Uzbeks have no
intention of leaving Kazakhstan, parents in the area raised the alarm and
appealed to the republic’s education authorities of all levels. They wanted a
curriculum where most subjects are taught in Uzbek language using Cyrillic, but
Latin script is used for teaching the Uzbek language, so cultural and
educational ties with Uzbekistan could be maintained. In 1999, officials
decided to teach all subjects in Cyrillic, ignoring the special request for the
Latin script in teaching Uzbek. Political motives may have played a role in
that decision: Authorities do not want South Kazakhstan’s Uzbeks to have too
close ties to their powerful southern neighbor.
In 2000, children in
the Uzbek schools of South Kazakhstan began to study in Cyrillic. Since they
had no modern textbooks of that type, Kazakhstan’s government ordered 8,000
such books to be published for the primary schools. The undertaking was
considered an historic event, because the state had never before shown so much
care for the needs of the Uzbek diaspora. But the content of the textbooks
caused some concern: The main complaint was that the books had been translated
into Uzbek from similar textbooks published in the Kazakh language. Though they
had been prepared with the participation of Uzbek teachers and scholars, and
drew on works by Uzbek writers, they mostly focused on encouraging the spirit
of Kazakh patriotism rather than acquainting students with Uzbek culture. Many
teachers complained that the books did not have enough of an Uzbek ethnic
flavor and said that they could have used extracts from Uzbek textbooks.
Furthermore, instructive and reference materials contained many grammatical and
factual errors. For instance, the wrong date was given for the passing of the
law “On Languages” in Kazakhstan. The republic’s anthem was printed in the
Kazakh language, though it has been translated into Uzbek. It was obvious that
there was insufficient time allotted for proof-reading and insufficient
financing for a competitive selection of authors and textbooks. It was apparent
that the pedagogical experts consulted at the initial stage of planning the
books were also not the best. On the whole, although the content of the
textbooks may have satisfied the officials of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of
Education, it failed to meet the expectations of the teachers and the pupils of
the Uzbek schools.
At least, thanks to
those new textbooks, the children of the first through fourth grades were able
to begin their classes. The senior grades are still waiting for their books to
be prepared, so they are now in a transitional period, with half their Uzbek
teaching aids being printed in the Latin alphabet and half in Cyrillic.
A different dilemma
faces school-leavers who had been taught for some time in the Latin script:
They have to choose between further education in Kazakhstan—either in Russian
or in the Kazakh language, both using Cyrillic—or going to Uzbekistan, where
they are educated in their native language, using Latin script. In any case,
parents wishing to prepare their children for college entrance exams have to
hire private tutors, as schools fail to train students properly in either
alphabet.
Out of the 30
school-leavers in Pakhtakor who succeeded in entering colleges or universities
in 2000, only one received a grant from Kazakhstan’s government, the rest study
at the paid departments. Two of these graduates went to be educated in
Uzbekistan, after studying with private tutors. Given that the region has 76
Uzbek schools, this is rather a large-scale problem. The district education
department, headed by a Kazakh official, instructs school headmasters to tell
their students to rely on government grants. They evidently try to avoid the
impression that the Kazakh and Uzbek youths are placed in unequal conditions.
But it is hard for Uzbek students to obtain the grants, because the standard
tests have not yet been prepared in the Uzbek language. The local state
colleges are willing to prepare Uzbek tests, but they have not received the
needed permission from the Education Ministry.
Local students still
suffer from not being able to learn Uzbek in Latin script, because it prevents
them from fully mastering the language of their “cultural motherland.” Some
journalists call Uzbek in Cyrillic a dead language, in view of the prospect that
Kazakhstan’s Uzbek schools will also switch over to the Latin alphabet. So far,
though, the presence of Cyrillic in schools helps Uzbek students adapt to the
present informational and cultural environment in Kazakhstan.
The local school
headmaster admits the need to teach Uzbek in the Latin script, and he is
planning to organize extra-curricular classes. Local people have
enthusiastically welcomed the initiative of the non-government organization Dialogue for organizing seminars, in
cooperation with similar organizations in Uzbekistan, for volunteer trainers
from the local Uzbek community to learn the Latin-script version of their
language. That course is to be supplemented by developing skills needed for
launching civil initiatives, particularly in the field of ethnic education.
Such instruction and discussions will help
Uzbeks in Kazakhstan to keep up with the development of modern Uzbek
culture.
There is a growing
understanding among the more educated part of the local rural population that
the state is unable to meet fully all the educational requirements of different
communities. Some Uzbek teachers quietly express regret that, in a district where
70 percent of the schools are Uzbek, the head of the education department is a
Kazakh, as are most other members of the district administration.
Ethnic-cultural
activities in the Sairam area are supported by the Uzbek ethno-cultural center,
which is subordinate to similar centers on the district and regional level. The
chairman of that center acts as the deputy of the local hokim in the cultural sphere. He cannot do anything without the hokim, who, in turn, needs the help of
the center’s chairman in staging cultural occasions, such as a concert of Uzbek
music or a competition of amateur art. In an area 99 percent populated by
Uzbeks, they work in close cooperation, with the ethnic center, organizing all
of the local cultural events. They
take measures aimed at upholding Uzbek culture, sometimes with support from the
hokimiats at higher levels. One such
successful event was the recent competition of young wives, which displayed
many old folk customs and traditions. It was attended by the village hokim.
The district runs a
newspaper in the Uzbek language. A few years ago, it also had a local
television station transmitting in Uzbek, but now that is closed for lack of
financing. There is a regional Uzbek paper, too. The population of Sairam can
receive television programs directly from Tashkent in Uzbekistan. The other
Uzbek districts of the region have Uzbek programs transmitted by the state and
private TV channels.
On the most local
level of this practically mono-ethnic rural area, the ethno-cultural situation
looks, on the whole, satisfactory. But on the next level, in the multi-ethnic
district, the titular Kazakh nation is dominant, and preference is given to the
development of Kazakh culture. All the leading members of the district
administration, including those responsible for the cultural sphere, are
Kazakhs, while Uzbeks are found only among their deputies.
In general, any
situation that exceeds the control and capacity of a village or a rural area
depends on the local executive organs. In that sense, the cultural and
educational sphere is no exception. A guest tour by an Uzbek ensemble, or
repairs to the local Uzbek school, can be managed by the villagers on their
own. But their children’s studies and school books in the native language, and
their prospects for college education, are problems the villagers cannot cope
with by themselves.
The state powers keep
all the resources in their hands, giving ethnic culture the role of a
decorative attribute. For instance, the regional budget allocates millions of tenge (1 USD = 144 tenge) for annual
festivals of ethnic cultures, which are usually turned into mass folklore
performances. At the same time, the local Uzbek educators cannot solve the
problem of teaching the Uzbek language in the Latin alphabet, simply because they
have not received the permission from above.
7. Conclusion
In assessing the overall development of government of the polyethnic communities in Kazakhstan, it becomes clear that the present system is monopolized by the titular nation. There is a wide network of institutions set up to preserve the ethnic cultural traditions of different nationalities populating Kazakhstan, but that structure is completely dependent on the executive powers because it is maintained by the state budget.
Local self-government
can meet specific cultural requirements of the citizens only on the lowest
level—and only where a certain ethnic community constitutes practically the
entire population of the area. It is also helpful if, as in the Sairam rural
area, the community has historical traditions of community self-government.
Even in that case, the community can’t influence the cultural and educational
policy on the district level, despite the fact that the district is mostly
populated by Uzbeks. There are no mechanisms for openly lobbying the interests
of ethnic groups in the organs of power.
There may be some changes after the passage of the now widely discussed “Law on Local Self-Government,” which could increase the people’s participation in making decisions and monitoring their implementation. But, considering the present nature of relations between self-government organs and the executive powers, we cannot expect a radical change in the situation. Most likely, the law, which introduces procedures to allow the populace to more actively defend their interest and take civil initiatives, will only prepare the soil for an effective system of self-government in local, multi-ethnic communities.
The non-governmental organizations of ethnic communities can also play a vital role by concentrating on the solution of specific problems—not seeking to replace the territorial powers but cooperating with them. In conditions when a special law on the rights of ethnic communities is unlikely to be passed, it is the non-governmental organizations that can create prerequisites for the institutions capable of functioning as regulators of public self-government in a multi-ethnic society.
1 Information provided by ITAR-TASS, published on the site of the International Eurasian Institute of Economic and Political Studies—http://www.eurasia.org.ru, June 19, 2000. The demographic data (of the 1999 census) borrowed from the official site of the RK Statistics Committee—http://www.statbasekz-111-naselenie.htm.
2 The law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of Dec. 10, 1993 “On the Local Representative and Executive Organs of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (“O mestnykh predstavitelnykh i ispolnitel’nykh organakh Respubliki Kazakhstan”) (with amendments made by Presidential Decrees No. 2254 of 2.05.95; No. 2488 of 5.10.95; No. 2740 of 3.01.96; No. 2824 of 26.01.96; by RK Laws of 20.11.98; No. 360-1 of 5.04.99; No. 442-1 of 20.07.99; No. 476-1 of 16.11.99). Published online at: http://www.zakon.kz.
3 “The Bill of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Local State Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan” (“Project zakona Respubliki Kazakhstan o mestnom gosudarstvennom upravlenii v Respublike Kazakhstan”), published in the Internet: http://www.pmicro.kz/DB/Busn/Govern/Laws/Act/.
4 Lev Tarakov. Ethnic Minorities of Kazakhstan: the State and Prospects (Natsionalniye menshinstva Kazakhastana: sostoyanie i perspektivi) // Modern Ethno-Political Processes and Migration Situation in Central Asia. (Sovremenniye ethnopoliticheskie processi I migratsionnaya situatsia v Tsentralnoi Asii). http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1998/07av/toc.asp.
5 Electronic version of the bill “On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities” in the author’s personal archive.
6 Tables and diagrams drawn from the 1999 census results are on the Internet site of the Republic of Kazakhstan State Statistics Committee—http://www.statbasekz-111-naselenie.htm.
7 The 1999 census results, official site of the RK State Statistics Committee—http://www.statbasekz-111-naselenie.htm.
8 V. Khlyupin. Strange Cooperation: Some Aspects of Contemporary Kazakh-Russian Relations. (Srannoye sotrudnichestvo: nekotoriye aspekti sovremennykh kazakhstansko-rossiiskikh vzaimootnoshenii). Published on the site of the Eurasian Institute of Economic and Political Studies: http://www.eurasia.org.ru —January 2000.
9 Bakhytzhamal Bekturganova. “On the Specifics of Inter-Ethnic Accord in Kazakhstan” (O specifike mezhnatsionalnogo soglasiya v Kazakhstane) // Navigator—electronic magazine. Published on the site of the Eurasian Institute of Economic and Political Studies: http://www.eurasia.org.ru, July 6, 2000.